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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS NEED
SUPPORT AT STATE LEVEL
Rep. Scott Conklin
Domestic violence is a problem that affects people from all
walks of life. The abuse, both physical and emotional, creates a
lasting burden on its victims, no matter their economic background,
age, ethnicity or gender.
Too often, this problem goes unchecked. We must correct
this. Part of breaking the silence includes creating awareness for
programs aimed at helping domestic abuse victims.
In Pennsylvania there are a host of helpful places a victim can
turn to: 24-hour hotlines, individual and group counseling, court and
emergency room assistance, shelters and safe homes, and state
assistance programs to help compensate victims financially with
hospital costs and destruction of property as a result of domestic
violence.
I am thankful for these programs because many of them
undoubtedly help domestic violence victims in Centre County. For
some, that help is a lifeline and helping hand when there's nowhere
else to turn.
Victim assistance is just part of the solution. As a state
lawmaker, I realize the need to be proactive, not reactive in the fight
against domestic violence.
The unfortunate victims of domestic violence need many
advocates in state government. Since I was elected to serve, I have
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been one of them. My record of support for victims of domestic
violence is strong and consistent. During my tenure as a state
legislator, I have sponsored a number of legislative initiatives to help
women, particularly teens and young women, to recognize the early
signs of abuse and become armed with the information they need to
leave an unhealthy relationship. In addition, I am diligently working
to expand protections for abuse victims who live in fear of being
repeatedly victimized by their abuser.
Domestic violence is most commonly associated with abuse
inside a home. The definition of domestic violence is outlined as
behaviors used by one person in a relationship to control the other.
Domestic violence knows no boundaries; it can happen outside of
four walls and a picket fence. Sadly, it does. It happens between
partners married and not married, those living together, separated or
dating.
Shortly after being sworn in as a state legislator, I introduced
a bill to curb sexual violence on the campuses of Pennsylvania's
colleges and universities. The first few months of college are the
most dangerous for new students due to the availability of drugs and
alcohol, the absence of parental supervision and a lack of education
and awareness about sexual assault.
The bill was aimed to require colleges in Pennsylvania to
establish educational programs to provide discussion on various
topics relating to sexual violence, including educating students about
consent, the relation between drugs, alcohol and sexual violence, and
the possibility of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.
The legislation was also designed to establish a cohesive
support network for victims among members of campus security,
local law enforcement, the campus health center, women's center,
rape crisis center and counseling services.
The statistics clearly show that the new freedom college
provides students only months out of high school makes many far
more susceptible to sexual violence, especially when one figures in
the influence of alcohol and drugs. We need programs that will
educate them about the warning signs so they can recognize when
603
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something they are engaging in could lead to them becoming a victim
and help them avoid an attack before it starts.
It is likewise important to make it clear to students when their
own interaction with another student may be approaching what is
considered sexual violence.
The programs proposed in my bill were designed to teach
first-time students about the myths and truths concerning rape and
sexual assault, to understand what constitutes rape or sexual assault,
and create their own risk reduction strategy, as well as make students
aware of options for individuals who are victimized. This initiative
was well received by my colleagues, as it overwhelmingly passed the
House of Representatives with a vast majority of state lawmakers
voting in favor of the plan.
In addition, I was the author of a bill aimed to curb teen
dating violence that was named the "Demi Brae Cuccia Law" after a
Monroeville teen who lost her life as a result of dating violence.
Demi was a beautiful young lady, a high school cheerleader, a
typical 16-year-old who idolized Jessica Simpson and one day
planned on becoming a doctor or lawyer. On the day after her 16th
birthday, Demi's ex-boyfriend, who had a reputation of being
controlling and possessive, attacked Demi inside her home and fatally
stabbed her.
Unfortunately, Demi's picture is now one that serves as a
symbol of the tragic consequences dating violence can have.
Oftentimes violence doesn't begin until a relationship has ended. Too
many teens have been victims, and sadly too many have unnecessarily
lost their life.
The statistics are alarming. In fact, teen girls face relationship
violence three times more than adult women. That is why I
introduced a bill that was designed to integrate teen dating violence
education into middle and high school curriculums, by requiring
school districts to develop an anti-dating violence policy that could
be taught in health class, for example.
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Teens need to know that if someone is texting them
constantly and it feels uncomfortable, it's wrong; if they're being
yelled at or pushed or hit, it's wrong. The numbers are staggering
when you hear of students as young as sixth-graders have reported
being hit by a boyfriend or girlfriend. It was imperative to me to have
the tools in place so when teens are looking to talk, there is someone
there to listen.
The Cuccia family joined me in my effort to pass this
legislation to help raise awareness of teen dating violence issues.
After it cleared the hurdle of the House, during one of the news
conferences we held to call on the Senate to also pass the bill, Demi's
father, Dr. Gary Cuccia, said: "My daughter was experiencing teen
dating violence, we were all just unaware. Getting an education on
the dangers of teen dating violence is the best defense we can offer
our children. I stand with Representative Conklin to urge the state
Senate to pass this bill so no other family has to go through the same
agony mine has."
After the bill passed overwhelmingly in the House, it stalled
in the state Senate. However, part of it was amended into the 2010
school code that passed alongside that year's state budget.
The language adopted in the school code was scaled back
from my original proposal to recommend schools take up a dating
violence education and response program rather than mandating
them to do it. The law also instructed the state's Education
Department to develop a model dating-violence complaint form to
be distributed to Pennsylvania's public schools.
Even though I still think the dangers of teen dating violence
and domestic violence are something that all young people need to be
educated about, I am pleased that we were able to get to the point of
passing a similar law.
And while domestic violence isn't confined to the home, in a
perfect world that is where the education and awareness should start.
In that perfect world, every family would eat dinner together every
night of the week and discuss the tough issues. But the reality of the
situation is that we have kids whose parents are unable to be there for
them, kids whose parents aren’t around to teach these things. These
605
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things, like dating violence, don’t always get discussed. That is one of
the main reasons why I am pleased to say that we took a step forward
in raising awareness of this issue so we don't lose one more young life
unnecessarily.
I am continuing to fight against domestic violence by working
to add protections to the current law for victims of abuse.
I originally introduced such legislation during the 2013-14
legislative session, and have reintroduced it in January, following the
2013 murder of Centre County resident Traci Ann Raymond
Miscavish. Two months prior to her death Traci was granted a
protection from abuse order, commonly known as a PFA, from her
husband. Traci had a PFA against her husband yet lived in fear of
him. Sadly those fears were valid, as he violated the order, tracked her
down at work and took her life and his own.
My legislation would allow electronic GPS monitoring of an
alleged abuser in certain domestic violence cases. Under the bill,
courts could grant the monitoring in abuse cases while a PFA is in
effect.
A PFA bans a suspected abuser from harassing, stalking,
threatening or further abusing a protected person. Under
Pennsylvania law, abuse is defined as causing or attempting to cause
bodily harm, stalking, sexual assault, false imprisonment, and physical
or sexual abuse of a minor.
Twenty-one other states, including neighboring Ohio, permit
the use of electronic monitoring devices in domestic violence cases.
We've got to get on board. We need to give domestic violence
victims more peace of mind while expanding tools for law
enforcement so they can get in front of abusers who try to break the
law.
If this bill had been law in 2013, Traci's death might have
been prevented. What happened to her was a tragedy. Passing this bill
would be in her honor and send a message to domestic violence
victims that we are listening to their calls for protection.
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As a member of the state legislature, I am proud to be part of
a body that can make laws against domestic violence. Just as the
victim assistance programs, my efforts are one more part of the
solution. It's going to take more than legislation. It's going to take
education and empowerment, and it's going to take all of us being
proactive. We can be proactive by implementing programs in our
schools, like the teen dating violence program, and in community
centers and churches. Stopping an abusive relationship before it
starts is the ultimate goal and I believe if we continue to work
together we can achieve that.
Throughout my legislative career, I have dedicated a good
deal of time and effort to ensuring the safety and well-being of
women – teens and adults alike - particularly the unfortunate victims
of rape and domestic violence. I stand behind my accomplishments
and will continue to place a high priority on this issue.

Rep. Scott Conklin represents the 77th Legislative District within the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives. He serves constituents within the Centre
Region who reside in Philipsburg, State College borough, Huston and Rush
townships, and portions of Ferguson and Patton townships. Rep. Conklin is
currently serving his fifth term upon taking the oath of office on Jan. 6, 2015.
More information: www.pahouse.com/Conklin.
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THE FORGOTTEN VICTIM: MEN AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – ISSUES FOR
THE I-360 PETITION
Christine Grant, PhD*

Immigrant men who have been sexually, physically,
emotionally and/or financially abused by their US Citizen spouses
present very special issues for the practitioner. Common gender
stereotypes, including perceptions of male roles and the belief that
men are the typical aggressors can impede understanding of the male
victim within a marital relationship. These impediments – whether
conscious or not – can derail a successful VAWA petition for an
otherwise deserving client.
Josef was a young man from the Ukraine who arrived in the USA on a
J-1 visa. A quiet, reserved and uneducated man, he found employment as a
rolling chair operator on the Atlantic City Boardwalk. Danielle was a vibrant,
loud and gorgeous nightclub dancer who hailed his chair for a ride. Intrigued by
her flamboyance and flirtatiousness, Josef agreed to a date. Within weeks,
Danielle moved in with Josef and asked for $1000.00 to help her out of a “jam.”
Josef got a second job at a restaurant and eventually a third buffing floors on a
nightshift in a grocery store. Josef fell in love and the couple married within the
year. Their son was born four months later. However, their relationship was
tumultuous, Danielle claimed to be working but never had any money to show for
her job. Whenever Josef questioned her about the job she would barrage him with
cursing and accusations of infidelity and then would physically attack him. Life
fell apart when Josef finally decided to follow Danielle one morning. To his

*

Dr. Grant has written affidavits and provided expert evaluations for the
immigration law firm of Bagia & Associates, PC since 1997.
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surprise, she unknowingly led him to a mental health clinic where she was in a
methadone program for heroin addiction.
The challenge here is to “sort out” the addiction issues from
the domestic violence issues. Careful interviewing of the client is
required in order to determine the nature of the drug history of the
abuser and to determine if drug use correlates to incidents of abuse.
Too much attention to the drug addiction can deflect from the
battering and can shift the focus away from the trauma the client has
experienced. The examiner must be careful not to shift the attention
from the abuse to the drug addiction as the ill-informed USCIS
adjudicator may attribute the abuse as “involuntary behavior” as a
consequence of drug addiction. In addition, too much focus on the
addiction may result in an erroneous decision that the marriage was
not bonafide, instead allowing one to conclude that the US Citizen
married only to financially sustain their addiction.
Naresh was only five years old when his mother brought him to the
USA from Trinidad. Growing up in North Philadelphia he was unaware of his
illegal status until the age of 21. In his early twenties, he fell in love and married
a gorgeous African American woman, Nekeisha. The couple organized a
Caribbean honeymoon, but all their plans were thwarted when he realized he
could not travel. Nekeisha lashed out at Naresh – physically and emotionally –
and left him five days after the wedding. The couple resolved their differences and
reunited after 3 months at which time Nekeisha became pregnant. She
immediately asked for $500.00 and told Naresh she was getting an abortion.
Naresh begged her to keep the pregnancy, but she refused. Nekeisha escalated her
physical and mental abuse towards Naresh throughout the year until she again
pronounced that she was leaving him. Nekeisha returned to Naresh a year later
with a baby girl in tow and promises that she really did love him. Naresh took
them both in and raised the baby as his own. Nekeisha abandoned Naresh and
her baby when the little girl was two years old. Nekeisha’s maternal grandmother
petitioned the Family Court for the baby and Naresh had to give her up.
In this case, the difficulty confronting the practitioner is the
fact that this man endured years of abuse – both emotional and
physical – by a woman who, by all objective thinking, did not love
him. Infidelity and abandonment are very difficult to process and to
acknowledge. Men are expected to be able to ‘satisfy’ their partner,
take a slap or a punch or a scratch, and control the situation. Men
609
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are tough. Men believe the abuser will change. Men believe that love
will overcome the issues. Men do not want to lose their children.
Men feel guilty if they leave the relationship. Men experience the
same identical feelings that women experience in violent
relationships. Yet our American society has embraced the notion
that men can and should “take it.” The practitioner’s job is to dispel
these myths and preconceptions and explain in vivid and accurate
detail the violence endured by the client.
Addison, from the Dominican Republic, was 37 years old when he
married 27 year old Vicki who had three small children from three relationships.
Addison also had three small girls from his first marriage in the DR. The couple
married and within the year had a daughter together. Vicki preferred to spend
time in Lancaster, Pennsylvania with her aging father rather than with Addison
in Queens where he had a fulltime job as a locksmith. The couple met on the
weekends. Their baby daughter was usually with Vicki. Addison walked in on
Vicki and a man in bed at her father’s house when he arrived early to surprise
her. The couple split up but got back together after rounds of tears and apologies.
Their reunions never lasted long. Over the next three years, the couple endured a
vicious cycle of break ups and reunifications. Vicki became increasingly abusive
and demanded sex from Addison at least 4 to 5 times per weekend when they
were together. If Addison refused sex or failed to achieve an erection, she resorted
to throwing water on him, ripping his clothing, locking him in the bedroom alone,
and destroying his personal possessions – such as his cell phone, photo albums and
his locksmith tools.
Married men cannot be victims of sexual abuse. Men cannot
be raped by women. Men don’t have to engage in sex if they don’t
want to. All of these statements are misconceptions and must be
addressed by the practitioner in order to accurately assess and
interview the client. Understanding that men do experience
involuntary erections and can be coerced into sexual relations is
imperative when you accept cases involving abused men. When men
are forced into a sexual act that they do NOT consent to – then that
is abuse. Sexual intimacy is difficult to discuss and to inquire about
forced sexual intimacy presents an incredible challenge. The astute
practitioner must be aware that men are reticent to offer a sexual
history and therefore the practitioner must be comfortable with
asking detailed questions and be ready to “hear” the answers. Sexual
violence is NOT uncommon within the confines of an abusive
610
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relationship and must be addressed with your male clients. Men can
be embarrassed, ashamed and confused if they have been sexually
violated by a woman. They struggle to make sense of how it
happened and why it happened. Careful questioning can reveal a
pattern of sexual abuse that can be essential to a successful VAWA
case.
Onyedi came to the USA from Nigeria to study. After failing his
coursework, he took a job as a security guard for a parking garage. The same
woman parked in his lot every day. They struck up a conversation and soon they
were dating. The couple married the following year. After marriage, Amanda
brought her four children to live with the couple. Onyedi had no idea she had
children and was so astonished by the fact that he did not know how to respond.
Once the children, who ranged in age from 5 to 14, were settled and in school,
Amanda moved out. She refused to tell Onyedi where she was and only
corresponded with him through text messages and emails. She would come by the
house for food and clothes and to demand money from Onyedi. If Onyedi
hesitated she threatened to call immigration. During one particularly angry
interaction she pulled a knife on him. Onyedi went to the ER and had to have
six stitches in his forearm.
Important to remember is that we should not excuse women
for their violent behavior. As practitioners we have to be careful not
to minimize the threats a man receives by a woman and to carefully
examine the facts. The standard is that most people believe that men
cannot really be physically hurt by a woman. Compounding the
problem is that men do not call the police to report abuse; they do
not seek assistance and if they must seek medical intervention, they
are not asked about domestic violence. Men do not tell their coworkers or friends about their abuse and it is rare that men give off
signs that they are abused. People just do not ask. Men do not take
photos of their injuries and do not document their abuse. Men are
not likely to leave an abuser. They believe if they try harder they can
solve the issues and if there are children, men are afraid they will be
cut off from them.
The bar to present a complete and convincing VAWA
petition may be set higher for men. It is the practitioner’s duty to
directly confront the preconceived beliefs and issues in the VAWA
submission. First and foremost proof must be offered that the
611
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couple entered into the marriage in good faith. Second, battery or
extreme cruelty – language used by USCIS must be delineated.
Actual and threatened acts of violence must be clearly presented with
corroborative documentation. Abuse can include physical or mental
injury; psychological or sexual abuse or exploitation, including rape,
molestation, and forced prostitution. The pattern of abuse needs
clear definition and elaboration. Domestic violence is a sum of the
parts in context. Separate isolated acts may not appear to the
evaluator as abusive; so it is the practitioner’s job to demonstrate that
those small acts comprise a larger whole.
Our law firm has successfully filed hundreds of VAWA
petitions. Seldom has an I-360 petition been approved without a
Request for Evidence (RFE). This clinician has noted that every
single RFE has contained the following language:
Submit evidence to show that you or your
children have been the subject of battery or
extreme cruelty. Submit one or more of the
following as evidence:
Reports and affidavits from: police, judges,
court officials, medical personnel, counselors,
social works or other social service agency
personnel or school officials.
Evidence that you have sought refuge in a
shelter for the abused.
Photographs of your injuries, and affidavits
from witnesses, if possible.
A statement in your own words describing the
relationship with your abuser. Be as specific
and detailed as possible.
It is imperative that each item be addressed and it is best if all
this information is included in the original submission. If your client
receives an RFE, then it is imperative that each item be thoroughly
answered in-depth. A second affidavit is always recommended. The
second one addresses the fact that the first affidavit was submitted
612
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and this second submission provides supplemental information. The
practitioner needs to offer detailed descriptions of abusive events in
the client’s own words and correlate these to important time periods
in the relationship. For example, if the abuse escalated during the
time the abuser was over-spending money – perhaps on drugs –
overdraft statements from the bank could be presented as evidence.
Medical records that correlate to injuries could support the victim’s
statements. Sworn affidavits which include all contact information
including cell phone numbers have proven essential. Counselling
notes, letters from therapists and professional evaluations all lend
credibility to the client’s statements.
Just as important are statements by the client as to WHY he
cannot provide the requested evidence. Shelters for men do not exist
in most states. Men do not call the police. Men do not seek
counseling. Men do not seek out social services. Embarrassment,
lack of knowledge and financial limitations are just a few reasons men
are left thinking they must resolve their abuse on their own.
Asking men about their abusive experiences is a start.
Advocating for their safety and their rights is a must.
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ABUSED, ABANDONED, OR
NEGLECTED: LEGAL OPTIONS FOR
RECENT IMMIGRANT WOMEN AND
GIRLS
Meaghan Fitzpatrick and Leslye E. Orloff

I. INTRODUCTION
The number of immigrants living in the U.S. has steadily
increased in the last fifteen years. In 2014, over 42 million
immigrants lived in the U.S. with women (51%) and children under
the age of 18 (25%) representing a substantial proportion of the U.S.
immigrant population.1 Of that population, 2.1 million children are
foreign-born and 17.5 million children are living with at least one
foreign-born parent.2 Many women and girls who have immigrated to
the U.S. will have experienced gender based violence in their home
countries and/or during their journey immigrating to the U.S..
Recently arriving immigrant women and girls are highly susceptible to
gender based crime victimization in the U.S. including child abuse,
child sexual exploitation, incest, dating violence, domestic violence
sexual assault, and human trafficking.3 U.S. immigration laws offer

Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants
and Immigration in the U.S., Migration Policy Institute (April 14, 2016),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statisticsimmigrants-and-immigration-united-states#Demographic, Educational, Linguistic.
2
Id.
3
Review of the President’s Emergency Supplemental Request for Unaccompanied
Children and Related Matters: Hearing on S. 272 DHS Appropriations Bill before the S.
Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. (2014) (statements of Jeh Johnson, Sec. of
Dept. of Homeland Security, and Sen. Dick Durbin).
1
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specific forms of immigration relief designed to offer humanitarian
protections for immigrant children and youth who are victims of
child abuse, abandonment, child neglect, sexual assault, or human
trafficking perpetrated either in the U.S. or abroad. As greater
numbers of immigrant children and youth arrive in the U.S., state
family courts are seeing an increase in the numbers of immigrant
children coming before the court in custody, protection from abuse,
child support, children in need of supervision, and child abuse and
neglect proceedings.
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJ) was created to benefit
and protect children who had been abused, abandoned, or neglected,
and ensures their continued safety in the U.S.. This article provides
an overview of immigration relief available to help immigrant women
and girls living in the U.S. and discusses how the process of applying
for SIJ, in particular, requires involvement of both state family courts
and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS). State courts play a vital role in SIJ
applications. To petition for SIJ status, eligible immigrant children
must obtain state court orders containing specified findings about the
custody and best interests of the juvenile.4
This article discusses the legislative history and the social
science research that supported both the creation of Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJ) and the expansion of SIJ protections
through the Violence Against Women Act of 2005 (VAWA) and the
Trafficking Victim’s Protection and Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA). The 2008 amendments to the Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status program required that all children seeking SIJ obtain a court
order from a state court containing statutorily required findings. SIJ
applicants must submit state court orders as a mandatory part of the
child’s SIJ application. This article provides direction and analysis on
the procedural and substantive legal questions arising in state family
courts in cases involving SIJ eligible children. Common issues that
arise at the intersection of state court and immigration law, such as
“ageing out,” and jurisdiction in state court will be discussed. The
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT § 101(a)(27)(J) defines
“Special Immigrant Juveniles”. This section was added by § 153 of the Immigration
Act of 1990 and amended most recently by the William Wilberforce Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) in 2008.
4
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article will also chronicle the broad range of state family court cases
that involve custody, placement, care and/or best interests of
children in which courts should be asked to issue SIJ findings. An
overview of the forms of immigration relief offering protection from
deportation and work authorization for immigrant children and youth
will also be provided. Finally, the article will highlight the need for
continuous screening of immigrant youth for SIJ, U visa, T visa, and
VAWA eligibility from arrival in the U.S., through placement with a
family, and the need for monitoring of the child’s placement to
screen for abuse that may occur in the U.S. following placement.
Women and children seeking safe haven in the U.S. are often
fleeing severe forms of violence that they have suffered in their home
countries.5 In recent years, the increase of gang violence, gender
based violence, and poverty in some Central American countries has
caused an influx of immigrant victims crossing the border into the
U.S..6 The geographical region known as the “Northern Triangle,”
consisting of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, in particular has
extremely high rates of violence against women and girls.7 El
Salvador has the highest rate of femicide in the world, Guatemala the
third highest, and Honduras the seventh.8 Women and girls living in
countries with high levels of violence against women are more
frequently attacked in public, including gang and intimate partner
violence.9 Women and girls in these countries are also victims of
physical and sexual assaults, child abuse, trafficking, economic
crimes, and emotional violence, often with the local government
unwilling or unable to help.10 This severe gender based violence has
caused many women and children to flee their countries of origin
seeking safe haven in the U.S.. The number of unaccompanied girls
younger than 18 years old caught at the Mexican-American border

5 U.N. High Comm. for Refugees Report, Children on the Run:
Unaccompanied Children Leaving Central America and Mexico and the Need for International
Protection (2014) [hereinafter UNHCR Report].
6 Id. at 45.
7 Id. at 5.
8
Mathias Nowak, Femicide: A Global Problem, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 3
Figure 2 (2012).
9
Id. at 4.
10 UNHCR Report, supra note 3, at 30-38.
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without documentation increased by 77% in 2014.11 Women and
girls face disproportionate risks of sexual assault and trafficking
during the course of their journey. At least 60% of Central American
women and girls crossing Mexico to get to the U.S. border are raped
along the way.12 The assaults are so rampant many girls take
contraceptives as a preventative measure.13
Women and girls who survive the journey across the border
and enter the U.S. without inspection are uniquely vulnerable. They
remain at an increased risk for crime victimization in the U.S. due to
previous victimization, undocumented immigration status, language,
cultural, and economic barriers. Undocumented immigrants living in
the U.S. can be very vulnerable to become victims of sexual assault,
domestic violence, child abuse, and trafficking. Many immigrant
women and girls suffer widespread sexual assault in route to the
border and many are also likely to have suffered previous
victimization in their country of origin. Additionally, many are
particularly vulnerable to be targeted for crime victimization as
women and girls living undocumented in the U.S.. Immigrants who
have been victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse,
child abandonment or child neglect or human trafficking in the U.S.
and/or abroad may be eligible for Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), Trafficking Victims Protection Act and other humanitarian
forms of immigration relief, including Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status (SIJ).
It is important for government agencies, attorneys, advocates,
and law enforcement to be aware of and understand the rates of
victimization among recent immigrants and be knowledgeable about
Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., At the Border, a Sharp Rise in Unaccompanied
Girls Fleeing Honduras, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2014).
12 Invisible
Victims: Migrants on the Move in Mexico, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS 15 (2010) [hereinafter Amnesty International
Report]; Erin Siegal McIntyre & Deborah Bonello, Is Rape the Price to Pay for Migrant
Women Chasing the American Dream?, FUSION (Sept. 10, 2014, 5:51 PM),
http://fusion.net/story/17321/is-rape-the-price-to-pay-for-migrant-womenchasing-the-american-dream/; Jude Joffe Block, Fronteras, Women Crossing the U.S.
Border Face Sexual Assault with Little Protection, PBS (Mar. 31, 2014, 1:49 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/facing-risk-rape-migrant-women-preparebirth-control/.
13
See Amnesty International Report, supra note 12, at 17.
11
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immigrant victims’ legal rights in the U.S.. Advocates and attorneys
play a crucial role in informing abused immigrants about their legal
rights, supporting them through the legal process, safety planning,
and encouraging those at greatest risk to turn to the justice system for
help.14
Research has found that establishing real working
relationships between advocates, police, and prosecutors working
collaboratively on cases is the most effective approach
in
encouraging immigrant victims to come forward to seek immigration
relief and pursue justice system protection.15 A significant proportion
of the immigrant and undocumented crime victims who, with
support from advocates and attorneys, file immigration cases and
seek protection orders embark on a path in which they develop trust
of the justice system that greatly increases their willingness to call
police and turn to the justice system for help.16
II. IMMIGRATION RELIEF FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME AND CHILDREN
Women and girls who have been a victim of crime may be
eligible for special forms of immigration relief designed to help
vulnerable immigrant crime victims and immigrant children.
14
Mary Ann Dutton et al., Cosmos Corp., Use and Outcomes of Protection
Orders by Battered Immigrant Women: REVISED FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT,
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (2006); Nawal H. Ammar
et al., Battered Immigrant Women in the U.S. and Protection Orders: An Exploratory
Research, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV. 337 (2012); Praxis International, Law Enforcement—
Patrol Response, in THE BLUEPRINT FOR SAFETY 43 (2007).
15
Giselle Hass et al., Barriers and Successes in U Visas for Immigrant Victims:
The Experiences of Legal Assistance for Victims Grantees, ARTS SOC.Social SCI. J. 14
(2014); Giselle Hass et al., U-Visa Legal Advocacy: Overview of Effective Policies and
Practices, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013); Rachel
Rodriguez, Community Partnership Models Addressing Violence Against Migrant and
Seasonal Farmworker Women, Rockville, MD: National Criminal Justice Reference
Service.
16 Leslye Orloff et al., U-Visa Victims and Lawful Permanent Residency,
NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2012); Krisztina E. Szabo
et al., Early Access to Work Authorization For VAWA Self-Petitioners and U Visa
Applicants, NATIONAL WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2014); Krisztina E. Szabo &
Leslye E. Orloff, The Central Role of Victim Advocacy for Victim Safety While Victims’
Immigration Cases Are Pending, National Women’s Advocacy Project (2014); Nawal
H. Ammar et al., Calls to Police and Police Response: A Case Study of Latina Immigrant
Women in the USA, I INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT 230, 240 (2005).
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Immigration laws in the U.S. provide several specific protections for
victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse, child
abandonment, child neglect, human trafficking, and other criminal
activities.17 The main forms of relief that women and girls crossing
the border should be screened for eligibility for are Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status (SIJ), the U visa, the T visa, and eligibility for Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) Self Petitioning. In addition, Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) provides protection from
deportation for immigrants who came to the U.S. as children.
DACA is a form of temporary immigration relief not related to crime
victimization.
A. Immigration Relief for Victims of Crime
1. VAWA Self Petitions. - Immigrant children who have been
victims of child abuse, incest, or sexual assault perpetrated by the
child’s U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident natural parent,
adoptive parent or step-parent are eligible to VAWA self-petitions.18
The approved self-petition allows the immigrant victim and any
children the immigrant included in the self-petition to apply for
lawful permanent residency.19
To file for a self-petition, the abuse, defined as battering or
extreme cruelty,20 must have been perpetrated by a U.S. citizen or

See Section III (b).
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a).
19
Spouses and children under 21 years of age of U.S. Citizens can
adjust to LPR immediately and can file the application concurrently with the
VAWA self-petition. See IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT § 201(b)(2)(A)(i),
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); Spouses and children under 21 years of age of LPRs
and must wait for an immigrant visa to become available under the current wait list,
the wait as of September 25, 2015 is 7 months. See Visa Bulletin: Immigrant Numbers
For October 2015, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS
(Sept.
25,
2015),
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_October2015.pd
f.
20
See generally Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battering and Extreme Cruelty: Drawing
Examples from Civil Protection Order and Family Law Cases, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT
WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013).
17
18
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lawful permanent resident parent or step-parent.21 When filing the
VAWA self-petition, the abused immigrant child must be under 21
years of age22 and unmarried.23 Married immigrant youth who are
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by their U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident spouses or former spouses also qualify for
VAWA self-petitioning.24 Formerly married immigrant youth must
file marriage based self-petitions within two years of the termination
of the marriage.25 The survivor must reside or have resided at some
time in the past (including periods of visitation) with the abusive U.S.
citizen or lawful permanent resident. The applicant must also prove
that they have good moral character which includes evidence about
any criminal history the victim might have.26
The self-petition allows spouses, parents, children, and stepchildren abused by a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident
parents to apply for permanent residence confidentially without
needing the abuser to file an immigration petition on their behalf.
Within three months of filing a VAWA self-petition, victims will
receive a prima facie determination making the applicant and any
children included in the victim’s application eligible for postsecondary educational grants and loans, public and assisted housing,
health care insurance and some other state and federal public

Policy Memorandum: Eligibility to Self-Petition as a Battered or Abused Parent
of a U.S. Citizen; Revisions to Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 21.15 (AFM
Update AD 06-32), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES
(Aug.
30,
2001),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2011/Augu
st/VAWA-Elder-Abuse.pdf.
22 Leslye Orloff et al., Battered Immigrants and Immigration Relief, in Breaking
Barriers: A Complete Guide to Legal Rights and Resources for Battered Immigrants,
NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013).
23 Immigration and Nationality Act § 204(a)(1)(D)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1154.
24 Immigration and Nationality Act § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC)(ccc), 8
U.S.C. § 1154.
25 Immigration and Nationality Act § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC)(ccc), 8
U.S.C. § 1154; Michael A. Pearson, Memorandum for Regional Directors: Eligibility to SelfPetition as a Battered Spouse of a U.S. Citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident Within Two
Years of Divorce, U.S. Department of Justice: Immigration and Naturalization Service
(Jan.
2,
2002),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/VAWADv_pub.pdf.
26
8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(i)(F)(2007)
21

620

2016

Fitzpatrick & Orloff

4:2

benefits.27
If granted, VAWA Self-Petitioners receive legal
immigration status, access to certain public benefits, and work
authorization.28
The VAWA self-petition primarily helps immigrant children
abused in the U.S.. However, immigrant children abused abroad by a
parent, step-parent, spouse or former spouse who is a U.S. citizen or
lawful permanent resident employee of the U.S. government or
member of the uniformed services also qualify to file VAWA selfpetitions.29
2. The U Visa. - The U visa is available to victims of qualifying
criminal activity who have suffered substantial physical or mental
abuse as a result of the criminal activity and who are willing to be
helpful to law enforcement, prosecutors, courts, child abuse
investigators, labor enforcement agencies or other government
agencies30 in detection, reporting, investigation, prosecution,
conviction or sentencing.31
Criminal activities perpetrated against immigrant children and
adult victims that qualify for U visa protection include the following:
abduction, abusive sexual contact, blackmail, domestic violence,
extortion, false imprisonment, female genital mutilation, felonious
assault, fraud in foreign labor contracting, hostage, incest, involuntary

28
See Moira Fisher Preda et al., Preparing the VAWA Self-petition and
Applying for Residence, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT
(2013).
29
Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 204(a)(1)(A)(v), 204(a)(1)(B)(iv).
30
The government agencies eligible to sign certifications include
agencies with investigative authority that in the course of their work uncover or
detect facts about criminal activities perpetrated against the survivor. See New
Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for ‘‘U’’ Nonimmigrant Status, 72
Fed.
Reg.
53014,
53019
(Sept.
17,
2007),
http://apps.americanbar.org/domviol/tip/trainings/Immigration%20Remedies%2
0for%20Trafficking%20Victims%20Workshop/U%20Visa%20Regs%20%20Fed.%20Register%209.17.2007.pdf.
31
For a full discussion on the U Visa see Leslye Orloff et al., U Visas:
Victims of Criminal Activity, in Breaking Barriers: A Complete Guide to Legal Rights and
Resources for Battered Immigrants, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY
PROJECT (2013).
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servitude, kidnapping, manslaughter, murder, obstruction of justice,
peonage, perjury, prostitution, rape, sexual assault, sexual
exploitation, slave trade, stalking, torture, trafficking, witness
tampering, unlawful criminal restraint, and other related crimes, and
include attempts, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the
above and other related criminal activities.32 The U visa qualifying
criminal activity must have occurred in the U.S. or violate U.S. law.33
Once the U visa case is approved, the applicant receives legal work
authorization and access to health care insurance and may apply for
legal permanent residence after four years.
Immigrant youth who are victims of U visa listed criminal
activities committed against them in the U.S. may be eligible for a U
visa.34 When the criminal activity the child suffered would under
state law be defined as abuse, abandonment or neglect the child may
also qualify for SJIS.35 The U visa may be an important avenue to
attain legal immigration status for children and youth suffering dating
violence, extortion, felonious assault and other U visa listed criminal
activities that would not make the child SIJ eligible.
3. The T Visa and Continued Presence. - The T visa and
Continued Presence are two separate forms of immigration relief
available to protect victims of severe forms of human trafficking
perpetrated in or being prosecuted in the U.S. Government officials
investigating or prosecuting a human trafficking case may file
requests asking DHS to grant the trafficking victims they are working
with continued presence. Continued presence allows immigrant

U and T Visa Law Enforcement Resource Guide for Federal, State,
Local, Tribal and Territorial Law Enforcement, Prosecutprs, Judges, and Other
Government Agencies, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2015). available at
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/u-visa-law-enforcement-certification-resourceguide
33 In some cases, crimes committed outside of the U.S. may qualify under
extraterritorial application of American Criminal Law; see generally Charles Doyle,
Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (2012).
34
Joanne Lin and Colleen O’Brien, Immigration Relief for Child Sexual
Assault Survivors, in Empowering Survivors: Legal Rights of Immigrant Victims of Sexual
Assault, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT 4 (2013).
35
Id.
32

622

2016

Fitzpatrick & Orloff

4:2

trafficking victims to stay temporarily in the U.S. with work
authorization and access to federal and state public benefits.36
The T visa allows immigrant victims who have suffered
severe forms of human trafficking to remain in the U.S. for four
years.37 Trafficking victims can file t for a T visa whether or not a
government official sought continued presence for that victim.38
Victims awarded T visa status receive protection from deportation,
work authorization, and access to state and federal public benefits.39
Both continued presence and the T visa are available to victims of
severe forms of human trafficking who are physically present in the
U.S. on account of the trafficking. Victims applying for and receiving
T visas are required to comply with reasonable requests for assistance
from law enforcement and prosecution officials with an investigation
or prosecution of the traffickers.40 To be awarded a T visa a victim
will also need to prove that they would suffer extreme hardship
involving unusual and severe harm if removed from the U.S.41
Human trafficking, often referred to as “contemporary
slavery,” may take the form of labor or sexual exploitation. Victims
of severe forms of trafficking are eligible to receive either or both
continued presence or T visas. Eligibility includes adults compelled
to engage in “sex acts” through the use of force, fraud, or coercion.
Children less than 18 years of age involved in the commercial sex
trade or prostitution as a matter of law are victims of trafficking. For
minors, no proof of force, fraud, or coercion is required.
Additionally, both adult and child immigrants who are forced or
fraudulently recruited, harbored, or transported for labor or services

TVPA 2000 §107(c)(3), 22 U.S.C. §7105(c)(3).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T).
38
TVPA 2000 §107(c)(3), 22 U.S.C. §7105(c)(3); The award of
continued presence does not guarantee an approval of a T-visa, there are separate
statutory requirements for a T-visa. .
39
TVPA 2000 §107(c)(3), 22 U.S.C. §7105(c)(3).
40
Carol Angel and Leslye Orloff, Human Trafficking and the T-Visa,
NATIONAL WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT 8 (2015).
41
Id. at 10.
36
37
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that subject them to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or
slavery are also victims of severe forms of human trafficking.42
Immigrant youth who are victims of human trafficking may
qualify for several different types of immigration relief. These
include the forms of relief discussed above: the T visa, continued
presence, the U visa and, in a limited number of cases, VAWA selfpetitioning. Immigrant child trafficking victims may also qualify for
the two forms of immigration relief discussed below: Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status and Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA). Which remedy an immigrant child qualifies for
and which they will be able to successfully pursue will depend on the
facts of each individual child’s case. Factors will include: whether the
perpetrator was a parent or step-parent, whether the parent or stepparent is a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resident; how long the
child has been in the U.S.; whether the child is a minor under state
law; or whether an immigrant child is married or unmarried.43
Additionally, some of these remedies can be pursued sequentially. A
child who has been in the U.S. since 2007 may decide to first pursue
DACA which will give the child protection from deportation and
work authorization. Immigrant children who have been victims of
human trafficking may also pursue either a U or T visa case
depending on which evidentiary requirements the child can best
meet. Which form of immigration relief is the best alternative for an
immigrant child who has been a victim of trafficking will also be
affected by the benefits a child can receive through the type of
immigration case filed. T visa and continued presence have the most
access to federal and state public benefits and the U visa has the least.
Work authorization can be more quickly obtained through DACA
and continued presence than other forms of immigration relief.

See Laura Simich, Out of the Shadows: A Tool for the Identification of
Victims of Human Trafficking, THE VERA INSTITUTE (2014).
43
See Leslye E. Orloff et al., Comparing Forms of Immigration Relief for
Immigrant Victims of Crime, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT
(2013).
42
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B. Immigration Relief for Vulnerable Immigrant Children
1. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status. - Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status (SIJ) is a unique form of immigration relief available
for youth who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected. SIJ can
be especially important for recent young immigrants because the
abuse, abandonment, or neglect by at least one of the child’s parents
need not have taken place in the U.S.. It is available to immigrant
youth who were abused, abandoned or neglected by the child’s parent
or parents in the child’s home country. Abused, abandoned, and
neglected immigrant children are among the most vulnerable
individuals in the U.S. and as such, are very susceptible to domestic
violence, sexual assault, and other crimes and victimization. For this
reason, SIJ is also available to immigrant victims who experienced
child abuse, incest, child exploitation, abandonment, or neglect by a
parent, step-parent, or adopted parent in the U.S..
SIJ is only available to unmarried youths who have been
abused, abandoned, or neglected by either one or both parents.
Applicants for SIJ must reside in the U.S. at the time the SIJ
application is filed. The SIJ application must include an order from a
state court judge containing findings on abuse, abandonment or
neglect, on the viability of reunification with the parent who
committed the abuse, abandonment or neglect and on the best
interests of the child to not be removed to the child’s home
country.44 The state court issuing this order must have jurisdiction
under state law to make judicial determinations about the care,
custody, dependency, or placement of children.45 It is important that
advocates and attorneys working with immigrant women and
children screen recent immigrants and all children involved in state
family court proceedings for SIJ eligibility unless the child is a U.S.
citizen or lawful permanent resident. Early and ongoing screening to
identify abuse suffered after arrival in the U.S. is essential to ensuring
that children eligible for SIJ are identified and provided the
opportunity to obtain state court orders needed to apply for SIJ
status before the child reaches the age of majority under state law.

44
45

Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J)(i)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101
Id.
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This helps children gain lawful presence in the U.S. and avoid some
of the dangers of re-victimization.
2. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals - Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is a prosecutorial discretion program
that provides temporary relief from deportation and work
authorization for certain undocumented immigrants living in the
U.S..46 DACA may be available for women and girls physically
present in the U.S. who have been continuously residing in the U.S.
since June 15, 2007.47 Deferred action provides qualifying individuals
protection from deportation for a period of two years with the
potential for renewal. DACA recipients are also authorized to work
in the U.S., and will not accrue unlawful presence during the period
deferred action is in effect. While it may be renewed after two years,
deferred action is not immigration status, does not provide a path
towards permanent residence or citizenship, and does not extend to
family members.
Deferred action is a useful tool for immigrant women and
girls who have been victims of a crime and may be eligible for longer
term immigration relief. Individuals coming forward for DACA may
also have been victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, human
trafficking, and other crimes that would make them eligible for
permanent legal immigration status as a result of having been crime
victims.
Survivors applying for DACA can apply prior to,
concurrently with, or while waiting for approval of crime victimrelated immigration remedies.48 This benefits immigrant women and
girls particularly, because it allows for faster access to work
authorization so they can begin rebuilding their lives and allows them
to feel secure and not fear deportation. Individuals can apply for
longer term immigration relief and deferred action at the same time,
as long as they are not currently in lawful status, and were under the
46
USCIS guidelines can be found on their website. See Consideration of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-actionchildhood-arrivals-daca#top (last visited APR. 20, 2016).
47
Id.
48
Orloff et. al. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: How is it helpful for
Immigrant Crime and Violence Survivors?, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S
ADVOCACY PROJECT (2012).
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age of thirty-one as of June 15, 2012. As soon as VAWA, U, T, or
SIJ is granted, however, the individual no longer needs deferred
action. Deferred action is also an important tool for undocumented
immigrants who are ineligible for other forms of immigration relief
or their eligibility has lapsed due to timing restraints.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE
STATUS
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status was originally introduced as
part of the Immigration Nationality Act (INA) of 1990.49 SIJ was
created to aid and provide stability for undocumented youth living in
foster care.50 Congress originally created SIJ to help undocumented
youth gain lawful permanent residency when the state juvenile court
system has taken jurisdiction over an immigrant child and is
responsible for insuring their safety, without regard to the child’s
immigration status.51 Undocumented youth living in foster care in
the U.S. had no parents they could rely upon, states bore the costs of
the immigrant children’s’ care, and the children had no path to selfsufficiency. In 1990, the federal government was exercising its
prosecutorial discretion by not seeking to deport unaccompanied
youths because “of their age and the impracticality of deportation” as
well as the fact many of them were victims of child abuse.52 At its
inception, to be granted SIJ only required proof that an
undocumented child was living in the U.S., was in foster care, and

49
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153
(allocating a certain number of immigrant visas for “special immigrants”);
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)
(defining Special Immigrant Juveniles).
50
See Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting Undocumented Immigrant
Children From Their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or How to Ameliorate the Impact of the 1997
Amendments to the SIJ Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 237-38 (2006).
51
Special Immigrant Status for Alien Foster Children: Joint Hearings on S. 358,
H.R. 672, H.R. 2448, H.R. 2646, and H.R. 4165 Before the Subcommittee on Immigration,
Refugees and International Law of the House Committee of the Judiciary, and the Immigration
Task Force of the House Education and Labor Committee, 101st Cong. 614 (1990)
(statement of Mark Tajima, Legislative Analyst, Chief Administrator Officer,
County of Los Angeles, CA).
52
Id.
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that reunification with the child’s biological parents was not viable.53
As the number of children eligible for SIJ grew, Congress made
several amendments in furtherance of the law’s original intent.
In response to a growing concern that the law as originally
written might encourage immigrant parents to give up their parental
rights so that their minor children could acquire Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status, in 1997, Congress modified the INA’s SIJ provisions
to limit SIJ immigration relief to immigrant children who had been
abused, abandoned, or neglected.54 The 1997 amendments also
added the stipulation that the state court orders containing the
findings of dependency and abuse, abandonment, or neglect were not
sought for the sole purpose receiving immigration relief through
SIJ.55 The court order needed to fulfill a state law purpose of
remedying the abuse, abandonment, or neglect by providing for the
care or needs of an immigrant child. Congress made these
amendments to further the original intent of SIJ, which was to
protect undocumented children from abuse, abandonment, and
neglect.56
The next significant amendment to SIJ was included in the
2005 Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA).57 Prior to VAWA 2005 when a child applied for Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status, the government officials adjudicating the
child’s case would as part of their adjudication contact the child’s
abusive parent or parents directly as part of the investigation of the
case.58 The practice of government officials contacting or requiring
53
Leslye Orloff et. al. Comparison Chart of Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) Self-Petition, U Visa, and Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, NATIONAL
IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2015).
54
See House Committee on Appropriations, Making Appropriations for The
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal
Year Ending September 30, 1998, and for Other Purposes, H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 2223, 130 (1997) (Conf. Rep.).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Violence Against Women Act, Department of Justice Reauthorization
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 826, 119 Stat. 2960, 3065-66. (Rule 12.4(a), (c),
(e) pgs. 116-17).
58
Immigration and Nationality Act Section 287(i) VAWA 2005
amendment reads as follows: ‘‘(i) An alien described in section 101(a)(27)(J) of the
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the child to contact their abusive parent was not considered to pose
grave danger for immigrant children applying for SIJ. The harm that
this contact could cause to abused children was well understood in
the domestic violence and child abuse fields and by members of
Congress involved in drafting the Violence Against Women Act.59
To bring an end to this dangerous practice, VAWA 2005 amended §
287 of the INA to bar government officials from contacting or
compelling an immigrant child applicant for SIJ to contact the child’s
parent who is alleged to have abused, abandoned or neglected the
child.60 This no-contact requirement also barred contact with family
members of the alleged abusive parent.61 These restrictions were an
important part of the VAWA 2005 legislative package in which
Congress created special protections for victims of
domestic violence against disclosure of information to
their abusers and the use of information provided by
abusers. . . These provisions are designed to ensure
that abusers and criminals cannot use the immigration
system against their victims. Examples include
abusers using DHS to obtain information about their
victims, including the existence of a VAWA
immigration petition, interfering with or undermining
their victims’ immigration cases, and encouraging
immigration enforcement officers to pursue removal
Immigration and Nationality Act who has been battered, abused, neglected, or
abandoned, shall not be compelled to contact the alleged abuser (or family member
of the alleged abuser) at any stage of applying for special immigrant juvenile status,
including after a request for the consent of the Secretary of Homeland Security
under section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of such Act.” In implementing these provisions
DHS directed its officers “Under no circumstances can an SIJ petitioner, at any
stage of the SIJ process, be required to contact the individual (or family members
of the individual) who allegedly abused, abandoned or neglected the juvenile. This
provision was added by the Violence Against Women Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) and is incorporated at section 287(h) of the INA.”
Donald Neufeld and Pearl Chang, Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions (March 24, 2009).
59
Katrina Castillo et al., Legislative History of VAWA (94, 00, 05), T and
U-Visas, Battered Spouse Waiver, and VAWA Confidentiality, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT
WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2015).
60
Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(h), 8 U.S.C. 1357(h)
61
Id.
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actions against their victims. This Committee wants
to ensure that immigration enforcement agents and
government officials covered by this section do not
initiate contact with abusers, call abusers as witnesses
or relying on information furnished by or derived
from abusers to apprehend, detain and attempt to
remove victims. . .62
In discussing how these immigration law protections were
applied by VAWA 2005 to Special Immigrant Juvenile Statue
immigration relief, Congress provided:
that in the case of an alien applying for relief as a
special immigrant juvenile who has been abused,
neglected, or abandoned, the government may not
contact the alleged abuser.63
In the DHS policies implementing this VAWA 2005 statutory
amendment to SIJ, DHS directed its officers not to question SIJ
applicant children applying for SIJ status about the details of the
abuse because these matters have been addressed by state family
courts experienced in working sensitively with traumatized children.64
The most significant change to SIJ came in 2008 with the
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2008 (TVPRA).65 The TVPRA expanded eligibility for SIJ in
significant ways. Until 2008, in order to qualify for SIJ the applicant
must have been deemed eligible for long term foster care by a
146 Cong. Rec. H9046 (2000), at 126, H.R. REP. NO. 109-233 (2000).
Id.
64
Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director of
Domestic Operations, & Pearl Chang, Acting Chief of Office of Policy and
Strategy, to Field Leadership, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (March 24, 2009)
(“During an interview, an officer should focus on eligibility for adjustment of status
and should avoid questioning a child about the details of the abuse, abandonment
or neglect suffered, as those matters were handled by the juvenile court, applying
state law.”).
65
See generally William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008); See
generally William Wilberforce Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act of 2007, H.R. REP.
NO. 110-430, Pt. 1 (2007).
62
63
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juvenile court and must therefore have been adjudicated dependent
on the state.66 This approach had the effect of barring access to SIJ
for large numbers of immigrant children who had suffered abuse,
abandonment, or neglect. These immigrant children needed and
deserved to receive access to the SIJ immigration remedy which
provides the stability and protection from deportation SIJ children
need to be able to heal, to overcome the impact of the abuse, and to
move beyond the abuse to become productive well-adjusted adults.
Congress recognized that many abused, abandoned, or
neglected children whose lives could benefit dramatically from access
to SIJ relief were living with one non-abusive protective parent.67 In
domestic violence cases the protective parent may have been a victim
of domestic violence perpetrated by the parent who also abused,
abandoned, or neglected the immigrant child. Prior to the TVPRA
2008 amendments to SIJ, abused immigrant children living with a
protective parent in a family relationship in which the child was
healing and thriving, could only qualify for SIJ if the child was taken
from the protective parent and placed in long-term foster care. This
placed immigrant children and their protective parents in the
untenable position of having to choose between two outcomes
neither of which furthered the immigrant child’s best interests. The
child would have to sever their relationship with their protective
parent so that the child could receive legal immigration status
through SIJ so the child could remain with their protective parent.
Alternatively, the child would continue living with their protective
parent and by doing so forfeit access to legal immigration status that
would otherwise be available to the immigrant child victim.
This approach was inconsistent with best practices and
research on the needs of abused children and children who had
witnessed domestic violence in their homes. State family laws
prohibit or discourage placement of a child in the custody of
perpetrators of domestic violence and instead encourage courts to
66
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2008, §235 (d)(1)(A); 22 USC 7101. available at http://library.niwap.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/IMM-Lghst-PublicLaw110.457TVPRA08-12.23.08.pdf
67
The expansion of SIJ eligibility to include “one or both parents”
reflects the recognition of the strong relationship between domestic violence and
child abuse.
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award custody to the non-abusive protective parent.68 As a result,
judges in domestic violence cases issue court orders granting custody
to the non-abusive parent in a broad range of family court
proceedings. The types of family court proceedings in which custody
or care of abused children and children witnessing domestic violence
are addressed include: protection order, guardianship, juvenile, abuse,
neglect, custody, divorce, paternity, child support, probate or other
state court proceedings in which rulings concerning the placement,
custody and care of children are determined. State family courts
recognize that the best interests of children who have suffered or
witnessed abuse in the home is best served by placing the child in the
care of a protective non-abusive parent rather than placing the child
in foster care.69

Men who perpetrate domestic violence against their intimate partners
who are the mothers of their children parent differently from non-abusive men.
Jeffrey L. Edelson,
Children’s Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence, 14 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 839 (1999); Behind Closed Doors: The Impact of Domestic
Violence on Children, U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND (2006); PETER G. JAFFE, DAVID A.
WOLFE, & SUSAN KAYE WILSON, CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN, (1990), cited
with approval in Rashida Manjoo, Violence Against Women in the U.S. and the State’s
Obligation to Protect: Civil Society briefing papers on community, military and custody submitted
to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Rashida Manjoo in
advance of her Mission to the U.S. of America January 24 – February 7, 2011 (2011),
https://www.gallaudet.edu/Documents/AF/EOP/vaw.pdf.
Perpetrators
of
domestic violence are less involved with their children and use parenting practices
that are harmful to their children including spanking, shaming and displays of
anger. George W. Holden & Kathy L.Ritchie, Linking Extreme Marital Discord, Child
Rearing, and Child Behavior Problems: Evidence from Battered Women, 62 CHILD
DEVELOPMENT, 311, 321 (1991); George W. Holden, Joshua D. Stein, Kathy L.
Ritchie, Susan D. Harris & Earnest N. Juries, Parenting Behaviors and Beliefs of Battered
Women, CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE: THEORY, RESEARCH AND
APPLIED ISSUES, 185 (George GW. Holden, Robert Geffner & Earnest N. Juries
eds., 1998), cited with approval in Manjoo. Abusive men do not serve as role models
for healthy relationships and conflict resolution in relationships. R. LUNDY
BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING THE
IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS (2002); Levendosky,
A.A. & S.A. Graham-Bergmann, Mothers’ Perceptions of the Impact of Abuse on their
Parenting, 6 (3) VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 247-271 (2000).
69
H. Lien Bragg, Child Protection in Families Experiencing Domestic
Violence,.U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for
Children
and
Families
(2003),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/domesticviolence.pdf (issuing guiding
68
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TVPRA 2008 made significant changes to Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status eligibility designed to promote healing for abused,
abandoned, or neglected immigrant children by allowing immigrant
children to apply for SIJ immigration relief and to allow the child to
continue living with a protective non-abusive parent.70 The approach
furthered the goal of keeping non-abusive one parent headed
households together. After enactment of TVPRA 2008 a nonabusive battered immigrant mother whose child was also abused
could leave the abuser and her child would be eligible to pursue SIJ
protection while living in the care and custody of the child’s nonabusive battered immigrant parent.71

principles for child protective services workers that recognize that offering
protection to domestic violence victims, enhances protection for children and has
the benefit in domestic violence cases of keeping children with their non-abusive
parent. “The following guiding principles can serve as a foundation for child
protection practice with families when domestic violence has been confirmed. The
safety of abused children often is linked to the safety of the adult victims. By
helping victims of domestic violence secure protection, the well-being of the
children also is enhanced. Perpetrators of domestic violence who abuse their
partner also emotionally or psychologically harm their children, even if the children
are not physically or sexually harmed. Identifying and assessing domestic violence
at all stages of the child protection process is critical in reducing risks to children. It
is important to understand potential effects of domestic violence to children
beyond those that are physical in nature. If the family’s circumstances are clear and
it is appropriate, every effort should be made to keep the children in the care of the
non-offending parent. Supportive, non-coercive, and empowering interventions
that promote the safety of victims and their children should be incorporated in
child protection efforts. Once domestic violence has been substantiated, the
perpetrators must be held solely responsible for the violence while receiving
interventions that address their abusive behaviors. CPS must collaborate with
domestic violence programs and other community service providers to establish a
system that holds abusers accountable for their actions.”).
70
See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE,(March 25, 2009). (stating that
“previously, the juvenile court needed to deem a juvenile eligible for long term
foster care due to abuse, neglect or abandonment. . .” while “. . .under the TVPRA
2008 modifications, the juvenile court must find that the juvenile’s reunification
with one or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law”) available at
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files
_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf.
71
Id.
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TVPRA 2008 made two significant changes to Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status. First, it opened up SIJ eligibility to
include immigrant children receiving state court orders placing them
in the custody of an individual or an agency which includes the
child’s other non-abusive parent. Secondly, the amendments
broadened SIJ eligibility to include immigrant children who suffered
abuse, abandonment or neglect by one parent ending the requirement
that both parents have been involved in the child’s abuse,
abandonment or neglect.
The TVPRA of 2008 included amendments of SIJ to include
any child who has been placed under the custody of an individual or entity
appointed by a State or juvenile court as eligible to apply for SIJ.72 This
allowed children in the custody of a protective parent, relative or
appointed a guardian by the court the opportunity to apply for SIJ.
This change illustrated a Congressional recognition of the important
role played in state family court proceedings of kinship care. The
amendments reinforce the importance child placements based on a
child’s best interests by removing obstacles in immigration law that
punished immigrant children whom courts had not placed in foster
care.
Placement with an individual, as opposed to placement with
an agency, allows for the child to remain in a familiar, stable
environment with a non-abusive parent, another family member,
guardian or other state court ordered kinship care arrangement. This
TVPRA 2008 change removes the requirements in SIJ immigration
laws that were directly contrary to social science research, state laws,
and court rulings. The 2008 amendments follow best practices in the
field that aim to promote placement with of children family members
or other care providers who could provide the best care for children
and youth traumatized by their experiences of abuse, abandonment
or neglect perpetrated by one or both of their parents.73 Children
who are able to remain with family members and familiar custodians
are better able to adjust to their settings and are less likely to face
Id.
See Stepping Up for Kids: What Government and Communities Should Do to
Support Kinship Families, THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION (2012) (reporting that
“extended family members and close family friends care for more than 2.7 million
children in this country, an increase of almost 18% over the past decade”).
72
73
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behavioral problems.74 This amendment was intended to allow
children the stability and safety of custody and guardianship
placements with protective parents, guardians or other family
members while retaining the opportunity to gain legal immigration
status through SIJ.
By deleting the long-term foster care
requirement, an undocumented immigrant child now has the option
to remain with kin including the protective, non-abusive parent and
still receive SIJ benefits.
The second major amendment in the TVPRA 2008 altered
the requisite findings a state court with jurisdiction over a minor must
make as part of the SIJ application. The state family court is no
longer required to find the child eligible for long term foster care
based on abuse, abandonment, or neglect, but instead must find that
the juvenile’s reunification with one or both of his or her parents is not viable
due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law.75
In amending SIJ, TVPRA 2008 explicitly deleted the long term foster
care requirement from the law, and replaced it with a statutory
provision that authorizes SIJ eligibility for immigrant children who
were abused, abandoned, or neglected by one parent and who reside
with a non-offending parent.76 As a result of the TVPRA 2008
amendments, if a child has one abusive parent and one protective
parent, the court may find that reunification of the abusive parent
and the child is not viable due to abuse. The state court order placing
the child with the child’s protective battered immigrant or other non-

Id.
In light of the Violence Against Women Act of 2005 amendments,
which directs that neither immigration officials nor the SIJ child applicant
communicate with the parent who has battered, abused, neglected or abandoned
(Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(h)), and the statutory language under
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J)(i) “or similar basis found under
State law,” “extreme cruelty” may be the basis for SIJ findings in state court.
Extreme cruelty has been defined by the Department of Homeland Security in
other contexts and is among the behaviors that would constitute abuse or neglect
for the purposes of SIJ status. The term has a long history in state court family law,
and the final regulations should clarify that “extreme cruelty” can form a basis for
SIJ status. Leslye Orloff et al., supra note 20, (describing behaviors of power and
control and coercive control that constitutes battering or extreme cruelty).
76
See Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions,76 Fed Reg. 54978 (proposed
Sept. 6, 2011).
74
75
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abusive parent would no longer cut off vulnerable immigrant children
from SIJ eligibility.
These changes in SIJ eligibility updated immigration law to be
consistent with changes occurring in the family courts and child
protective services systems, which had been moving in recent years
away from the foster care system and toward alternate placement for
children designed to be less harmful and more nurturing, stable, and
healing for children who had suffered trauma. Under the new
approach, immigrant children who have experienced abuse, neglect,
abandonment or other harm that under state law can receive the
protection they need under state law and obtain the findings they
need from state courts to qualify for SIJ. Examples of children who
were to benefit from the TVPRA 2008 amendments include:
•

children living with parents who have also been
abused;

•

children being returned from state custody to live
with an abused protective parent; and

•

children who benefit from the family court equivalent
of “alternatives to detention” where courts and child
protective services agencies placed an abused,
abandoned or neglected child with a family member,
school teacher, kinship care or other placement
designed to be better for the child and more in line
with the child’s best interests than foster care.

A cornerstone of recent evolution of the U.S. child abuse and
neglect system has been family reunification. As state courts and
state child protection agencies have gained experience on the
intersection of child abuse and intimate partner violence, they have
come to understand the impact that protecting the abused parent has
on protecting the child from ongoing child abuse. Research among
immigrant domestic violence victims found that protecting immigrant
mothers through protection orders and access to legal immigration
status had the effect of reducing the co-occurrence of child abuse and
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domestic violence in immigrant families.77 Offering protection for
the child’s non-abusive parent, results in less child abuse and neglect
of children in immigrant families that experience domestic violence.
The strong relationship between child abuse and domestic
violence is well documented,78 with co-occurrence rates ranging
from 30 to 60%.79 Children living in houses where there was
battering are twice as likely to be abused compared to those where
there was no battering.80 Further, 45-75% of women in shelters
report that their children experienced one or more forms of
maltreatment.81 Research among immigrant women has found
similar domestic violence and child abuse co-occurrence rates among
immigrants (40-44%).82 However, among immigrant women there
was a significant difference in child abuse co-occurrence rates
between battered immigrant women who had sought help from a
service provider (e.g. shelter, protection orders, immigration relief)
with a co-occurrence rate of 23%83 compared to battered immigrants
See generally Nawal Ammar et al., Children of Battered Immigrant
Women: An Assessment of the Cumulative Effects of Violence, Access to Services
and Immigrant Status, Presentation before the International Family Violence
Conference (Sept. 19-25, 2004).
78
Joy D. Osofsky, Prevalence of Children’s Exposure to Domestic Violence and
Child Maltreatment: Implications for Prevention and Intervention, CLINICAL CHILD &
FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 161-170 (2003); Christine E. Cox et al., A
longitudinal Study of Modifying Influences in the Relationship Between Domestic Violence and
Child Maltreatment, JOURNAL OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 5-17 (2003); Alissa C. HuthBocks et al., The Direct and Indirect Effects of Domestic Violence on Young Children’s
Intellectual Functioning, JOURNAL OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 269-90 (2001); Bonnie E.
Carlson, Children Exposed to Intimate Partner Violence: Research Findings and Implications
for Intervention, TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 321-42 (2000); Melissa Jonson-Reid,
Youth Violence and Exposure to Violence in Childhood: An Ecological Review, AGGRESSION
AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, 159-79 (1998).
79
Jeffrey Edleson, The Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and Woman
Battering, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (1999).
80 MURRAY A. STRAUS & RICHARD J. GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN
AMERICAN FAMILIES (Christine Smith ed. 1989).
81
Mary M. McKay, The Link Between Domestic Violence and Child Abuse:
Assessment and Treatment Considerations, CHILD WELFARE, 29-29 (1994).
82 Nawal Ammar et al., Presentation at the International Family Violence
Conference, Children of Battered Immigrant Women: An Assessment of the
Cumulative Effects of Violence, Access to Services and Immigrant Status (Sept. 1925, 2004).
83 Id.
77
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who had never sought help regarding domestic violence where cooccurrence rates rose to 77%.84 Children of help-seeking battered
women were 20% less likely to have the abuser threaten the child and
were one third less likely that the abuser would threaten to take the
child away from his or her mother.85
Historically many states had practices of removing children
from abused parents and placing them in foster care. After years of
litigation, advocates for battered women secured court rulings that
removals of children from the non-abusive battered parent’s care was
unconstitutional.86 As a result of these decisions, the failures of the
foster care system, and the benefits for children of remaining in the
care and custody of their non-abusive parent, courts today generally
place children with the non-abusive parent including when she has
been a victim of domestic violence. Courts issue protection orders
and other orders in custody, child abuse and neglect and other family
court cases that offer protection to abused mothers, abused children,
and other children in families in which domestic violence is
occurring. The changes in SIJ immigration laws removing the
requirement that a child have been placed in foster care, broadening
the types of family court matters in which SIJ orders can be issued,
and providing access to SIJ for children who suffered abuse,
abandonment, or neglect by one parent are a federal SIJ parallel to
this evolution in the law. Congress, in amending INA Section
101(a)(27)(J), accomplished several changes in Special Immigrant
Juvenile law with the goal of improving consistency with state family
laws and state court procedures regarding jurisdiction under state law
to make determinations about the custody and care of children.87

Id.
Id.
86
See generally Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y.
2002); Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003); Nicholson v.
Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004). See also David Lansner, The Nicholson
Decisions New York’s Response to ‘Failure to Protect’ Allegations, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION
ON
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE,
(2008),
https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/cdv_enewsletter_home/vo
l12_expert1.html.
87
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(27)(j),
66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(j)), (amended by
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
84
85
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Additionally, TVPRA of 2008 amended SIJ laws to clarify
“age out” protections for SIJ applicants. For applications filed on or
after December 23, 2008, if an SIJ petitioner was a “child” on the
date on which an SIJ petition was properly filed, USCIS will not deny
SIJ based on the petitioner’s age at the time of adjudication, so long
as the petitioner was under 21 years of age on the date their SIJ
application was filed.88 Congress created this “age out” protection to
provide immigration relief that includes protection from deportation,
work authorization and a path to lawful permanent residency that are
essential to promoting the best interests and long term stability to
immigrant children who have been victims of abuse, abandonment or
neglect by one or both of their parents.89 Through the creation of SIJ
and the amendments added in VAWA and the TVPRA Congress has
demonstrated a clear intent to protect not only children dependent
on the state, but all immigrant children who have been abused,
abandoned, or neglected as well as victims of domestic violence who
are mothers of immigrant children experiencing child abuse or
witnessing domestic violence.
IV. SCREENING FOR IMMIGRATION RELIEF ELIGIBILITY:
FACILITATING ACCESS TO HEALING FOR CHILD TRAUMA SURVIVORS
AND REDUCING VULNERABILITY TO ABUSE
Immigrant women and girls who immigrate to the U.S. are
very likely to have suffered crime victimization in their home
countries, to have been abused or sexually assaulted during their
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §1232
(2008))).
88 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-457, § 235(d)(6), 122 Stat. 5044 (2008); see also Memorandum from Dept.
of Homeland Security on Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions (May 2009), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_
Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf.
89
Policy Memorandum: Updated Implementation of the Special Immigrant Juvenile
Perez-Olano Settlement Agreement, U.S. CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (June
25,
2015),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2015/20150625_Perez-Olano_Settlement_Agreement_PM_APPROVED.pdf.
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journey to the U.S. and are very vulnerable to crime victimization
following their arrival in the U.S.. Every immigrant’s experience will
be different. Some will arrive in the U.S. already meeting the criteria
of eligibility for the special forms of immigration relief designed to
help immigrant children who have been abused, abandoned or
neglected, because they came to the U.S. fleeing domestic violence,
sexual assault, persecution, or because they are victims of human
trafficking. Others may arrive not having suffered traumas that
would make them eligible upon entry for immigration relief and
during their time in the U.S. become eligible for crime victim or child
related immigration remedies because of harms they suffer here.
Many immigrants who suffer these traumatic life experiences will be
eligible for humanitarian forms of immigration relief including relief
designed specifically to help immigrant children and immigrant crime
victims, but most children and victims do not know that they qualify
for protections under U.S. immigration laws.
Throughout their journey of resettlement, acculturation, and
adaptation to their new life in the U.S., immigrant children, women
and crime victims will encounter many professionals along the way
who can play a key role in their healing. Healthcare providers,
teachers, counselors, therapists, social workers, attorneys, advocates,
police, prosecutors, judges, child abuse agency staff, foster care
workers and staff at community based, immigrant and faith based
organizations all encounter immigrant women and children in their
work. These professionals can play a crucial role in screening for
trauma history, identifying immigration relief eligibility, and
supporting victims and children in in the process of applying for
immigration relief and seeking other justice and social services
assistance available to assist them in overcoming trauma and crime
victimization. It is crucial to screen immigrant women and children
for immigration relief at every encounter possible. As their stories
develop over time, because of abuse or crime victimization they
suffer while in the U.S., immigrants may become eligible for
immigration relief and child abuse or crime victim related services
they were not previously able to apply for.
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A. Vulnerability of Immigrant Girls and Need for Facilitating Access
to Protection and Humanitarian Relief
Growing numbers of immigrant women and girls who
immigrate to the U.S. have experienced domestic violence, sexual
assault, or human trafficking in their home countries or in the
process of their immigration to the U.S..90 In addition, immigrant
women and girls are at a significant risk of crime victimization after
their arrival in the U.S., particularly as victims of domestic violence,
sexual assault, and human trafficking.91
Rates of domestic violence among immigrant women are high
due in part to the perpetrators’ ability to use immigration related
abuse and threats of deportation as an effective coercive control tool
that locks victims in abusive relationships and cuts them off from
available help.92 As a result, immigrant domestic violence victims stay
longer in abusive relationships, have fewer resources and options,
and sustain more severe physical and emotional consequences of
abuse.93
When immigrant women and girls immigrate to the U.S. they
often reconnect with parents and other extended family members.
This reunification results in a restructuring of immigrant families and
introduction of young immigrant children into families that include
step-parents, step-siblings and extended family members who are
relatives of either the child’s original family or the child’s new step
parent’s family. Recently arriving immigrant children living in homes
with step-fathers, step brothers, grandfathers, uncles, cousins, and/or
the child’s mother’s new boyfriend or in-laws are at greater risk of
Review of the President’s Emergency Supplemental Funding Request for
Unaccompanied Children and Related Matters: Hearing Before the Senate Appropriations
Comm. on Dept. of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 113th Cong. (2014) (statements
of Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Dept. of Homeland Security, and Sen. Dick Durbin).
91 Id.
92
Leslye E. Orloff & Olivia Garcia, Dynamics of Domestic Violence
Experienced by Immigrant Victims, in Breaking Barriers: A Complete Guide to Legal Rights
and Resources for Battered Immigrants, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY
PROJECT (2013).
93
Giselle Aguila Hass et al., Battered Immigrants and U.S. Citizen Spouses,
Washington, DC: Legal Momentum, Immigrant Women Program, LEGAL MOMENTUM,
(2006).
90
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child abuse, sexual assault and incest.94 Undocumented, limited
English proficient, girls may also be targeted for sexual assault by
predators in their life outside of their new families at school, church,
or in the new community in which they settle.
For newly arrived immigrant women and children, limited
English proficiency, undocumented immigration status, the process
of acculturation and the lack of knowledge about laws and services
available to offer protection from family violence and sexual assault
result in vulnerability to being targeted by abusers and sexual
predators.95 This explains, in part, why research has found that
foreign born girls are twice as likely as U.S. born girls to have
suffered multiple incidents of sexual assault by the time they reach
high school.96
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status was created to offer help
and an opportunity for healing for immigrant children harmed by
child abuse, child sexual assault, abandonment, or neglect. Many
state laws recognize that witnessing domestic violence in the home
falls within the behaviors that under state law constitute child abuse
or neglect.97 Theses state laws were developed based on recognition
about the effect that experiences of child abuse, sexual abuse and
witnessing domestic violence perpetrated against a parent have on
children are significant. Children in homes where domestic violence
is present are impacted by the trauma in a number of ways, leading to
obesity, heart disease, bed-wetting or nightmares, headaches, flu, as
well as long term psychological effects that include depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, substance abuse and an increased
likelihood to become victims of family violence themselves.”98

94
Michele R. Decker et al., Sexual Violence Against Adolescent Girls:
Influences of Immigration and Acculturation, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 498,
503 (2007).
95
Jessica Mindlin et al., Dynamics of Sexual Assault and the Implications for
Immigrant Women, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013).
96
See Decker et al.
97
Varies by state, check local statute.
98
The Facts on Children and Domestic Violence, FUTURES WITHOUT
VIOLENCE (2008).
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It is important to note that best practices in cases of children
witnessing domestic violence is for the state to bring charges of child
abuse or neglect against the parent perpetrating the abuse. Best
practices promote placement of the children with the battered nonabusive parent with protection orders, custody and child support and
other supports in place to help the battered mother and her children
heal from the effects of the abuse. Cases have overturned court
findings of abuse against battered mothers for failure to protect their
children from the perpetrator’s abuse.99 U.S. immigration laws
contain waivers for battered immigrant mothers charged with or
convicted of failure to protect in states that continue to bring such
cases against battered mothers, despite best practices and research
findings to the contrary.100
For immigrant women and girls, the domestic violence or
sexual assault they experience in the U.S. may trigger memories of
prior victimization or dislocation occurring in their home country or
on their journey to the U.S..101 Many immigrant children who
immigrate to the U.S. have been the direct victims of violence
including child abuse and sexual abuse in the child’s home country.
An estimated 21% of the children from Mexico, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras who have crossed the border and are
living in the U.S. reported direct victimization in their homes as a
reason for immigrating to the U.S..102 In each country, these reports
were primarily made by girls who reported sexual assaults by stepfathers, boyfriends, and physical abuse from other relatives if they
attempted to get help.103 Young girls immigrating to the U.S. from
the four most common countries of origin, Mexico, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, all reported an express fear of sexual
violence at the hands of gangs in their home country.104 El
Salvadorian youth reported the highest percentage of gang related
criminal activity, with 63% of the children self-reporting gang
99
See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002);
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003); Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3
N.Y.3d 357, 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004).
100
Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. 1227.
101
Decker, supra note 68 at 2.
102
UNHCR Report, supra note 3, at 28-29.
103
Id. at 35.
104
Id.

643

2016

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:2

violence as the direct reason for immigrating to the U.S..105 Girls
reported death threats against themselves and their families if they
refused gang members sexual advances.106 These high rates of
violence in their home counties drive immigrant women and children
to flee and risk the dangerous journey to the U.S..
The journey from the home country to the U.S. exposes
young girls and women to rampant sexual assault. Traveling alone,
relying on guides for direction and sustenance, with no access to
government authorities to report crimes, immigrant women and girls
fall prey to sexual assault perpetrated by fellow travelers, by coyotes,
and by other men they encounter along their route to the U.S.. 107
Many women and girls have report being instructed to purchase birth
control before they begin their journey to the U.S., engaging in the
journey to help protect them against pregnancy as a result of rape.108
Immigrant girls and women who suffered domestic violence,
sexual assault, human trafficking, child abuse, child abandonment, or
child neglect either in their home country or in the U.S. may qualify
for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and/or other forms of
immigration relief designed to offer humanitarian protection for
immigrant victims of crime. Some children will qualify for several
forms of immigration relief due to abuse, abandonment, neglect or
other forms of crime victimization. Some immigrant children may
not qualify for immigration relief when they first enter the U.S.
because they may not have suffered harm in their home country that
would make them eligible for SIJ or other immigration relief.
However, these children may suffer harms subsequent to their arrival
in the U.S. that make them eligible for SIJ, the U visa, the T visa,
VAWA self-petitioning or VAWA cancellation of removal. Some of
the most common circumstances or experiences occurring to
children after their arrival in the U.S. that would make them eligible
for immigration relief include, but are not limited to:

Id. at 32.
Id.
107
Steve Inskeep, The Rarely Told Stories of Sexual Assault Among Female
Migrants, NPR (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/23/293449153/therarely-told-stories-of-sexual-assault-against-female-migrants.
108
Id.
105
106

644

2016

Fitzpatrick & Orloff

4:2

•

Being held hostage by coyotes after crossing the
border

•

Being raped in the U.S. when the child is in the
process of immigration to the U.S.

•

Being subjected to human trafficking in the U.S.

•

Experiencing child abuse, sexual assault, or incest
perpetrated by a parent or extended family members
in the household in which the child is living in the
U.S.

•

Becoming a victim of sexual assault at school,
university, or at work in the U.S.

•

Becoming a victim of dating violence in the U.S.

Depending on which side of the border a child’s victimization
occurred, children may qualify for different forms of immigration
relief. Screening and the dissemination of information about legal
rights in the U.S. is essential so that victims who may be eligible for
immigration relief learn about their eligibility. Too often, cases go
unreported due to threats, fear, and the high number of victims
detained at the border, who are not fully screened for the full range
of immigration relief children may qualify to receive. As a result
children and young women can be deported before they are able to
learn of their eligibility. Courts, advocates, and attorneys should
distribute DHS produced brochures on immigration relief for crime
victims and on Special Immigrant Juvenile Status at courthouses and
other locations that immigrant children and women frequent in the
community.109
Advocates and attorneys should screen immigrant girls and
young women for crime victimization early in their relationship with
See Special Immigrant Juveniles (SIJ) Status, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrantjuveniles/special-immigrant-juveniles-sij-status (last visited March 22, 2016); see also
Emily McCabe & Leslye E. Orloff, Pathways to Immigration Relief for Students,
IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2014).
109
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the client. Screening could include screening for trauma history
through which the advocate or attorney may detect additional crime
victimization, abuse, abandonment or neglect that may not have
initially been apparent. Knowing the full history of trauma, abuse,
and crime victimization may help attorneys and advocates identify the
full range of forms of immigration relief the immigrant child is
eligible to receive. The forms of immigration relief available for
immigrant crime victims and immigrant children vary with regard to a
variety of factors. All immigration case types developed to offer help
for immigrant children and crime victims offer protection from
deportation. The remedies vary however in some significant ways110
that include:
•

The length of time an applicant must wait to receive
legal work authorization;

•

Whether the form of immigration relief the child
qualifies for includes a path to lawful permanent
residency

•

When a child can receive a driver’s license or a state
issued ID;

•

Whether the applicant is eligible for federal or state
public benefits;

•

Whether the child can receive health care through the
federal or state funded exchanges and whether the
child qualifies for state or federal subsidies for health
care

•

If the child can qualify for food stamps, and

110
The National Immigrant Women’s Advocacy Project, under a grant
from the Department of Justice, Office on Violence Against Women, developed
several comparison charts illustrating the different eligibility factors, benefits,
processes, and access to state and federal services and public benefits for various
victim based immigration relief. See generally Krisztina E. Szabo & Leslye E. Orloff,
Comparison Chart of U visa, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJ), and Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2014).
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Whether the child qualifies for post-secondary
educational grants or loans through FAFSA (spell
out) or through state funded educational grants or
loan programs.

Since immigrant children may have suffered abuse in their
home countries and others may at a later time suffer abuse in the
U.S., it is important that advocates, attorneys, school teachers,
counselors, community programs working with immigrant youth and
faith based programs be cognizant of signs of abuse and screen
children at regular intervals for abuse. Ongoing screening for
domestic violence, child abuse, witnessing domestic violence in the
home, sexual assault, human trafficking and other U visa listed crimes
is important to ensure that children eligible for relief are identified as
early as possible.
This helps assure that children receive the help they need as
soon as possible. More importantly, ongoing screening is critical,
because it assures the immigrant children meet filing deadlines and do
not “age out” of immigration protections that they are eligible to
receive. There are age deadlines by which children must file
applications for SJIS,111 VAWA self-petitions,112 and DACA.113 Age
limitations also apply to a child’s ability to benefit from their
8 CFR § 204.11(c)(1).
Children who suffer battery or extreme cruelty before the age of 21
that is perpetrated by a U.S. citizen of lawful permanent resident parent or stepparent are able to file a VAWA self-petition up until the date of which they turn
age 25. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 204 (a)(1)(A)(iv), 204 (a)(1)(B)(iii), 8
U.S.C. 1154; see also USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0048, on Continued Eligibility to
File for Child VAWA Self-Petitioners After Attaining Age 21; Revisions to Adjudicator’s
Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 21.14 (AFM Update AD07-02), U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration
Services
(Sep.
6,
2011),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Draft%20Memorand
um%20for%20Comment/VAWA-SP-Child-Attains-Age-21-PM-comment-06-xx10-v3.pdf.
113
The current DACA eligibility criteria require that applicants were
under 31 years of age on June 15, 2012, however, under the new guidelines in
President Obama’s Executive Action of November 14, 2014 this age restriction
was lifted. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhoodarrivals-daca (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
111
112
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immigrant parent’s immigration case. Children who are under the
age of 21 can be included in the immigration applications of their
immigrant parents who are victims of domestic violence, human
trafficking, or crime victims filing for VAWA, or T or U visa
immigration benefits.
In order for immigrant crime victims to be able to access the
immigration and justice system relief available under VAWA and
state laws access to help from lawyers and advocates is essential.
Research has found that when advocates and attorneys offer
immigrant victims safety planning, legal rights information, and
support, greater numbers of undocumented immigrant victims are
willing to come forward and seek help offered by state civil
protection order laws114 and U.S. immigration laws.115 Furthermore,
immigrant women receive the support they need to file a crime victim
based immigration case and become more willing the call the police
for help and avail themselves of justice system protections including
protection orders, custody and participation in criminal cases.116
Access to legal services plays an important role in the ability of
immigrant victims of domestic violence and child abuse to file for
immigration relief and access justice system help. Based on this
understanding, Congress in VAWA 2005 amended the immigration
restrictions on Legal Services Corporation (LSC) funded agencies to
represent immigrant victims of domestic violence, sexual assault,
human trafficking, or U visa qualifying crimes on a wide range of
legal matters related to the abuse or crime victimization.117
In 2006, LSC issued program guidance to LSC funded legal
services agencies directing that under VAWA 2005 immigrant victims
could be represented by LSC funded agencies.118 LSC in 2014
Dutton et al., supra note 14.
Ammar et al., supra note 14.
116
Szabo, supra note 16.
117
VAWA 2005: LSC Statute with VAWA 2005 Amendments, available
at http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference/additional-materials/access-to-legalservices-for-immigrant-victims/statutes/vawa-2005-legal-services-corporationrepresentation-for-immigrant-crime-victims/violence-againstwomen%20LSC%20Statute.pdf/view.
118
Letter from Helaine M. Barnett, President of Legal Services Corporation on
Violence Against Women Act 2006 Amendments (Feb. 21, 2006) [hereinafter LSC
Program
Letter],
http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/cultural114
115
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amended its regulations119 and issued a program letter120 creating a
new path to legal representation by LSC funded agencies for
immigrant victims covered by the Violence Against Women Act’s
(VAWA) and the Trafficking Victim Protection Act’s (TVPA) antiabuse laws. These new regulations and policies offer protection for
vulnerable immigrant women and children expanding the scope of
representation at LSC funded agencies to include immigrant women
and girls fleeing violence including when the abuse happened in the
victim’s home country or in the process of the immigration to the
U.S..121 The representation can be offered for in any case that is
directly related to escaping abuse, ameliorating the effects of the
abuse, or preventing future abuse.122 Abused children and other
victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, human trafficking or
other U visa listed criminal activities occurring inside or outside of
the U.S. can receive assistance from LSC funded attorneys without
regard to whether the victim qualifies for or will be pursuing
immigration relief.123 These LSC regulations, implementing that
change, create two avenues an immigrant can pursue to attain
assistance from any LSC funded program. These two paths to
representation are representation under anti-abuse laws or
representation based on immigration status. Children who have been
abused in their home countries or in the U.S. qualify for LSC
representation.124 LSC funded agencies may also be able to represent
immigrant children whose abandonment or neglect by a parent was
tantamount to child abuse in the facts of the specific case considering

competency/access-to-legalservices/CULTCOMP_LSCPgmLetter_2.21.06.pdf/view.
119
Restrictions on Legal Assistance to Aliens, 79 Fed. Reg. 21861 (Apr.
18, 2014), codified at 45 C.F.R. 1626 [hereinafter 45 C.F.R. 1626].
120
LSC Program Letter, supra note 118.
121
Id.
122
45 C.F.R. 1626, supra note 119.
123 See generally Leslye E. Orloff & Benish Anver, And Legal Services Access
for All: Implementing the Violence Against Women Act of 2005’s New Path to Legal Services
Corporation Funded Representation for Immigrant Survivors of Domestic Violence, Sexual
Assault, Human Trafficking, and Other Crimes, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S
ADVOCACY PROJECT (2014) [hereinafter Access for All].
124 LSC Program Letter, supra note 118.
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the parent’s actions and the impact of the abandonment or neglect on
the child.125
B. Need For Screening of Children in Immigration Enforcement and
Detention for All Forms of Immigration Relief Including U Visa
and SIJ
For these reasons, it is also extremely important that
immigration officials be required to screen immigrant women and
children they encounter for the full range of humanitarian
immigration relief that immigrant women and children might be
eligible to receive. Screening should not be limited to the very
important credible fear interviews conducted to screen new
immigrants for asylum eligibility. Over the past two decades,
numerous additional forms of humanitarian immigration relief have
been created by Congress specifically designed for immigrant
children and crime victims. DHS officials working for Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE),Customs and Border Patrol
(CBP),Department of Health and Human Services, and Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR) should be required to routinely screen
immigrants who are detained and immigrants who become the
subjects of enforcement actions to identify immigrants who may
qualify for:

125

•

T visas, continued presence or U visas as victims of
human trafficking;

•

Violence Against Women Act self-petitioning or
cancellation of removal as victims of spouse abuse or
child abuse (battering or extreme cruelty) perpetrated
by the immigrant’s U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident family member;

•

U visas as crime victims who suffered criminal
activities committed in the U.S. including domestic

Id.; see also, Access for All, supra note 123.
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violence, sexual assault, kidnapping, felonious assault,
and other crimes listed in the U visa;126 and
•

Special Immigrant Juvenile Status for children who
have suffered abuse, abandonment, or neglect by at
least one of their parents.

Screening for VAWA, T and U visas, and SIJ is appropriate
and necessary at each new interaction and after every change in
location or custody.127 Federal agency officials, such as CBP and
ICE, are often the first encounter for undocumented women and
girls who either turn themselves in or are apprehended in the process
of crossing the border. The Department of Homeland Security
issued a brochure that briefly describes crime victim based forms of
immigration relief under the VAWA, T visa, and U visa programs. 128
This brochure should be distributed and be available on display in
multiple languages next to customs forms at ports of entry into the
U.S. and should be distributed to all immigrants who are detained or
subject to immigration enforcement. Additionally, DHS brochures
on SIJ and DACA should be distributed to immigrant children and
the organizations and professionals who work with and encounter
immigrant children.129 The DHS issued a specific brochure on SIJ
which gives victims, law enforcement and advocates detailed
information on the eligibility requirements for SIJ.130 These tools can
be used at every level of interaction with immigrant crime victims.

See U visas: Victims of Criminal Activity, supra note 30.
Leslye E. Orloff et al., Comparing Forms of Immigrant Relief for Immigrant
Victims of Crime, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2015).
128
Immigration Options for Victims of Crimes, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-options-victimscrimes (Sep. 12, 2015).
129
See generally Special Immigrant Juveniles (SIJ) Status, supra note 109;
Consideration of Deferre Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/considerationdeferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
130
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration Relief for
Abused
Children
(Apr.
2014),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Green%20Card/Green%20Car
d%20Through%20a%20Job/Immigration_Relief_for_Abused_ChildrenFINAL.pdf.
126
127
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In addition to the change of fact and circumstance
necessitating continuous screening as immigrant women and girls
move from the country of origin through the immigration system,
continuous screening is important because of the cultural,
psychological, and emotional factors involved in disclosing personal
and traumatic information particularly information about child abuse,
rape, sexual assault and domestic violence. Individuals will feel more
comfortable with different screening agents; healthcare professionals,
health outreach workers, and immigrant women community based
victim advocates are particularly trusted by victims and are often well
versed in screening immigrant women for crime victimization.131
C. How Trauma Informed Screening Can Help Advocates and
Attorneys Best Serve Clients Surviving Trauma
Advocates and attorneys should engage in comprehensive
screening for immigration relief while being conscious of and
sensitive to the trauma a victim may have suffered. It is crucial for
attorneys and advocates to build a relationship that will help their
clients feel safe enough to divulge traumatic information. As trust
builds victims who have suffered trauma will be more willing and
able to respond to questions that elicit the information necessary to
build the victim’s immigration case. In order to achieve this,
attorneys and advocates have found it useful to use a trauma
informed approach to interviewing clients.
A team of family and immigration attorneys and national
experts on trauma informed care developed an approach to
developing a victim’s immigration case that simultaneously helps
immigrant victims heal from trauma. What has been learned from
evidence based research on healing from trauma is that the process
working with a trauma survivor to write her own story is an effective
approach to healing and overcoming the impact that trauma has had
131
To find programs with expertise working with immigrant crime
victims and children who are knowledgeable about the forms of immigration relief
discussed in this article see the National Immigrant Women’s Advocacy Project’s
national service provider directory. Directory of Service Providers, NATIONAL
IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT, http://www.niwap.org/directory
(last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
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on a victim’s life. This approach uses an evidence based, research
tested, story writing intervention approach that therapists and
psychologists have been using with trauma survivors to identify
trauma experienced over a lifetime that helps victims heal.
In immigration cases all victims applying for immigration
relief are required to write an affidavit. This affidavit tells the victim’s
story and is one of the key pieces of evidence a victim submits to
DHS as part of their SIJ, VAWA, U, and T visa applications.
Victim’s affidavit provides an opportunity for Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) adjudicators to hear directly from the
survivor, in her or his own voice. When reading the survivor’s story,
the reader – ultimately, the DHS adjudicator – should be able to
know and feel what the survivor felt after being subjected to abuse or
crime victimization. The fact that the victim has to write their story
for their immigration case provides an opportunity for the victim to
go through the story writing process in a manner that parallel’s the
approach therapists use to treat trauma survivors.132
The story writing intervention includes the following
components. First the advocate, attorney, or therapist invites the
survivor to write her story, uninterrupted. The person working with
the victim’s role during the story writing is to empathically listen, be
aware of trigger points, and be ready to help should a survivor have
difficulty during the process.133 During the second stage of the story
writing intervention process there will be an opportunity during the
structured interview session to ask follow-up questions in order to
gather more details. Some survivors may be comfortable with
132
Krisztina Szabo et al., Advocate’s and Attorneys Tool for Developing a
Survivor’s Story: Trauma Informed Approach, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S
ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013); see also Leslye E Orloff & Meaghan Fitzpatrick, How to
Prepare Your Case Through a Trauma Informed Approach: Tips on Using the Trauma
Informed Structured Interview Questionaire for Family Court Cases, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT
WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2015).
133
The story writing process can be emotionally difficult and the
advocate, attorney or other professional should not send the client to write the
story on their own. Sometimes the process of writing and retelling the story can
trigger the client to relive the trauma and go into crisis. When this occurs, the
advocate or attorney should intervene using crisis intervention techniques. See
Training for Advocates and Attorneys on Trauma-Informed Work with Immigrant women,
YouTube (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05Z95q1bkG4.
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speaking freely about their experiences and others may not. For
those that are not, we may want to guide them along this process by
asking open-ended questions that prompt an open dialogue. The
second stage of the trauma informed approach is an interview in
which the advocate or attorney leads the victim through a second
interview using a Structured Interview Questionnaire (SIQI) which
obtains greater detail about the survivor’s trauma history. The third
part of the trauma informed story writing intervention involves the
survivor reading back her final story to the advocate/attorney. This
assists attorneys and advocates working with survivors of trauma to
facilitate meaningful information gathering with your client and to
help prepare her for interactions with the justice system. This
approach produces stronger more quickly approvable immigration
cases and better more robust evidence for any family law case that
will be filed on the child or immigrant victim’s behalf. At the same
time this approach helps survivors heal.
The SIQI is designed to encourage trauma survivors to
disclose in-depth information. Some of the questions prompt
responses that will help build a stronger case, while others may be
helpful details to include as evidence. The SIQI establishes a series
of questions to ask that are designed to facilitate the client’s healing
and to strengthen the client’s immigration application or family law
case by uncovering important details of the story. The SIQI helps
advocates and attorneys working with immigrant women and
children who have suffered trauma uncover additional incidents of
abuse. The SIQI also identifies experiences and emotional harms
that contribute to extreme cruelty, provide evidence of substantial
mental or physical abuse, contribute evidence that will support a
court in rulings regarding the best interests of a child and the viability
of reunification with their abuser.134 The more detail an application
for immigration relief can provide the more likely it is to be approved
and the approval is likely to come more swiftly reducing the need for
requests that the attorney representing the immigrant child or victim
submit to additional evidence to support the immigration case.
Similarly, the more the detailed evidence provided in the family court
Mary Ann Dutton et al., Trauma Informed Structured Interview
Questionnaires for Immigration Cases (SIQI), NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S
ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013).
134
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case about the trauma and abuse the more likely a victim will be to
win custody of her children or a protection order and the more
detailed the court orders and findings will be supporting a child’s
application for SIJ.
V. SPECIAL ROLE OF STATE COURTS IN SPECIAL IMMIGRANT
JUVENILE CASES135
SIJ was created to protect a class of especially vulnerable
immigrant children from further upheaval in their lives and offer
them a path forward with greater stability that attaining lawful
permanent residency provides. SIJ offers abused, abandoned, or
neglected immigrant children a path to lawful permanent residency
and protection from deportation. SIJ involves a bifurcated system
with proscribed roles for the Department of Homeland Security’s
Office of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and
state courts with jurisdiction over the immigrant children.136 USCIS
relies on the state court, as experts on child welfare issues, children’s
best interests, and state law. State courts issue findings applying state
laws to the facts of the SIJ child applicant’s case. The state court
findings are not an adjudication of the child’s immigration case. They
provide evidence as to some of the factors that an immigrant child
must prove if their SIJ case is to be approved. USCIS receives these
findings as required evidence to prove abuse, abandonment or
neglect in the SIJ case together with the totality of evidence in the
case and adjudicates whether to grant an immigrant child applicant
SIJ status or lawful permanent residency.
Congress chose to statutorily rely on state court adjudications
relying on the expertise of state courts that are responsible for
insuring children’s safety and well-being regardless of the child’s
immigration status. The TVPRA 2008 amendments recognized the

State courts also have a role in U visa certification and T visa
endorsement. See Leslye E. Orloff et al., U Visa Certification Toolkit for Federal, State,
and Local Judges and Magistrates, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY
PROJECT (2014).
136
8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a).
135
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“presumptive competence”137 of the state court in child welfare
matters.
Federal immigration law does not define abuse,
abandonment, or neglect.138 Instead, federal law relies on state courts
to make factual findings describing in each case how the treatment
the child has suffered meets the statutory definitions of abuse,
abandonment, or neglect under the laws of the state in which the
court is presiding. Federal law requires this finding be made in a
court proceeding in which the court is exercising its jurisdiction
under state law to issue orders involving care, custody or placement
of the child.139
State family law courts have deep expertise and experience in
assessing the needs of children and issuing court orders that promote
the healing, well-being, and best interests of children. State court
judges issue orders involving children on a daily basis in a wide
variety of cases. Congress chose to rely on state courts’ expertise in
crafting court orders that promote child development, best interests
and child welfare in making amendments to SIJ statutes. Congress
required that state court judges be the finders of fact as to the abuse,
abandonment, or neglect the child suffered, the viability of
reunification with the abusive parent and the child’s best interests.
Receiving specific types of state court findings are a prerequisite to an
immigrant child’s ability to file an application for SIJ immigration
benefits. Children applying for SIJ must prove to USCIS that they:140
•

Are under the age of majority as set by state law at the
time the SIJ findings are issued by the court and on
the date the SIJ application is filed (the maximum
allowable age is 21);

•

Are unmarried both at time of filing and at time of
adjudication;

137
Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548 (1999) at 556, citing Holmes Fin. Assocs. v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 561, 565 (6th Cir. 1994).
138
TVPRA 2008 § 235(d).
139
See Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: Information for Juvenile Courts, U.S.
CITIZEN
AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Green%20Card/Green%20Car
d%20Through%20a%20Job/Information_for_Juvenile_Courts_-FINAL.pdf.
140
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
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o The court has declared the juvenile dependent
on the court, or has legally committed the
juvenile to, or placed the juvenile under the
custody of, an agency or dept. of a state or an
individual or entity appointment by the state or
a juvenile court located in the U.S.;
o Reunification with one or both parents is not
viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment
or a similar basis found under state law;
o It is not in the best interest of the juvenile to
be returned to the juvenile’s or parent’s
previous country of nationality or country of
last habitual origin.
The child must receive the state court order from a state
court that under state law has jurisdiction over the child’s care,
custody or placement at the time the order is issued.141 State court
jurisdiction is determined under the jurisdictional rules that apply to
the type of proceeding the court is being asked to issue SIJ findings
in. For example, in a custody case it may be difficult for a child who
recently crossed the border to meet the traditional home state
jurisdiction requirement that applies to interstate custody cases. For
children who have recently crossed the border, family court custody
jurisdiction can be difficult to establish. Under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), mere
presence in the state is not sufficient for a state court to have
jurisdiction over child in custody a custody case. The child must be
present in the state for six months for the court to be considered the
child’s home state under the UCCJEA. Until that time the previous
Policy Memorandum: Updated Implementation of the Special Immigrant Juvenile
Perez-Olano Settlement Agreement, U.S. CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (June
25,
2015),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2015/20150625_Perez-Olano_Settlement_Agreement_PM_APPROVED.pdf.
141
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domicile in which the child lived for a period of six is considered the
child’s home state in which the custody action should be initiated.
Under the UCCJEA foreign countries constitute and are treated like
home states for custody jurisdiction purposes. If a child is living in a
state and there are extenuating circumstances that require the court to
exercise emergency jurisdiction the UCCJEA typically allows
temporary emergency jurisdiction of that child which can ripen into
continuous jurisdiction in some states. Cases that involve child abuse
or neglect or domestic violence are the most common examples of
when state courts will exercise emergency jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA.
The child must receive state court orders before the child
reaches the age at which the state court loses jurisdiction over the
child. Under many state laws the point at which the state court loses
jurisdiction over the child will be the age of majority in the state.
There are some family law matters in which the court could continue
to have jurisdiction over a child after the child reaches the age of
majority under state law including, for example, cases involving child
support obligations and enforcement and care for older disabled
children.142 For example, some states allow child support to extend
beyond the age of majority if the child is in college. In this scenario, a
court may have the power to adjudicate the child support and
simultaneously recognize the placement or responsibility of the care
of the child in order to make the requisite SIJ findings.
Under USCIS policies once a child receives an order from a
court with jurisdiction over the child under state statutes, the child is
no longer required to file their SIJ application before turning the age
of majority under state law.143 The fact that the child aged out of the
state court’s jurisdiction after receiving the state court order will not
142
E.g, child support, over 18 year olds who have not yet graduated
high school, children with disabilities; varies by state, be sure to consult local
statutes.
143 See Perez-Olano, et al. v. Holder, et al., 2:05-cv-03604-DDP (C.D.
Cal..); see also Settlement Agreement in Perez-Olano, et al. v. Holder, et al., Case No. CV 053604, in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/laws/legal-settlementnotices/settlement-agreement-perez-olano-et-al-v-holder-et-al-case-no-cv-05-3604us-district-court-central-district-california.
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preclude the child from filing for SIJ status.144 The policies issued by
USCIS in June of 2015 offer important clarification they state that an
SIJ “applicant who is otherwise eligible will remain eligible will
remain eligible even if he or she:
•

Turns 21 years of age after filing the SIJ petition. . . but
prior to USCIS’ decision on the SIJ petition.

•

Ages out of the juvenile’s court jurisdiction prior to filing
the SIJ petition. . .”145

The SIJ policies issued in June 2015 confirm that applicants
for SIJ face two important age related deadlines: 146
•

They must obtain a state court order containing
SIJ findings before the child turns the age of
majority under state law or before the state court
otherwise loses jurisdiction over the child; and

•

The child must file for SIJ status before the child
turns 21 years of age.

Finally, once a child has filed an application for SIJ that meets
these age related filing requirements, the fact that the child turns 21
before their SIJ case has been adjudicated by USCIS will not affect
the approval of their SIJ application. It will also not preclude the
child from filing for and receiving lawful permanent residency based
on the child’s timely filed SIJ application.147 Similarly, if the state
court’s jurisdiction over a child issued SIJ findings comes to a natural
conclusion prior to the child aging out of state court jurisdiction and
USCIS adjudication of the child’s SIJ case or lawful permanent
residency based on an approved SIJ application, USCIS will not
144

Id.

USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0117, Updated
Implementation of the Special Immigrant Juvenile Perez-Olano Settlement
Agreement at 3 (June 25, 2015), reprinted in 92 Interpreter Releases 1165 (July 6,
2015)
available
at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2015/20150625_Perez-Olano_Settlement_Agreement_PM_APPROVED.pdf.
146
Id at 3.
147
Id at 1.
145
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penalize the child. For example, in an adoption proceeding, the case
comes to its natural conclusion when the adoption is finalized and
the child no longer needs the help of the state court. While USCIS
prefers that the child be under the continuous jurisdiction of the
court throughout the USCIS adjudication, USCIS will often accept
orders in cases that have concluded if the placement for the child is
permanent.
A. State Courts With Authority Under Federal Immigration Laws to
Issue SIJ Required Findings
Prior to the TVPRA 2008 amendments only juvenile courts
hearing foster care related child welfare cases could make SIJ
findings. When it is said the state court must have jurisdiction over
the juvenile, it does not mean that the only court that can make the
necessary findings are traditionally “juvenile” courts that have
jurisdiction. Although federal SIJ statute continues to use the term
“juvenile” court, it is clear that the TVPRA 2008 statutory
amendments contemplate broadly opening up the types of state court
cases in which judges can issue SIJ findings. The amendments made
by TVPRA 2008 authorize any state family or juvenile court located
in the U.S. with jurisdiction over the care, custody, placement, or
dependency of a child to make SIJ findings.148 As a result of these
amendments, an SIJ applicant must either be dependent on the state
court or the court must have the jurisdiction to place the juvenile
under the custody of an agency or department of state, or an
individual or entity appointed by a state court.149 Court awards of
custody, guardianship, or placement150 of a child with an individual
148

8 C.F.R. 204.11(a); See also Special Immigrant Juveniles (SIJ) Status, supra

note 80.
USCIS defines juvenile court as: a court in the U.S. that has
jurisdiction under state law to make judicial determinations about the custody and
care of children. Examples include: juvenile, family, orphans, dependency,
guardianship, probate and delinquency courts. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); See also
Special Immigrant Juveniles (SIJ) Status, supra note 109.
150
Placement can include court orders recognizing or sanctioning an
already existing placement. This could occur, for example, in the context of court
issuing a declaratory judgment the recognizes the placement of a 17 year old child
with an adult (e.g. parent, next friend, school teacher) who has been caring for the
child with the recognition of the child’s resident with the caretaking adult providing
149
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could include a parent, grandparent, aunt, uncle, other relative, next
friend or other caretaker or guardian. A wide range of state courts
hearing cases involving children that are authorized under federal
immigration laws to make SIJ findings include:151
•

Adoption

•

Child abuse

•

Child neglect

•

Children in need of supervision

•

Child Support

•

Custody/visitation/modification

•

Delinquency

•

Dependency

•

Divorce

•

Guardianship

•

Legal Separation

•

Motions for declaratory judgement

•

Protection order

•

Paternity

•

Termination of Parent Rights

documentation the child needs to maintain enrollment in school or gain access to
health care or other benefits.
151
See Special Immigrant Juveniles (SIJ) Status, supra note 109.
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B. The Court Must Make a Determination Regarding the Care or
Custody of the Juvenile
There are a wide range of circumstances in which a state
court could, under state law, enter orders that address the custody,
placement, or dependency or orders that provide for the care, wellbeing, and/or the best interests of children. State family courts
regularly encounter children in a range of judicial proceedings and
court dockets. Any proceeding involving a foreign born child who
has not already become a citizen or lawful permanent resident could
be a court case in which an immigrant could appropriately request
and receive SIJ findings.
Many of the youth crossing the border are between the ages
of 15 and 17.152 It can take many months for a recent immigrant child
to make their way to family court. For children who are detained
after crossing the border by immigration enforcement officials the
process from that point forward is as follows. After the child is
apprehended, immigration enforcement officials have 48 hours to
screen the child for immigration relief eligibility that includes
screening for political asylum eligibility and recently began including
screening for human trafficking. As of this writing immigration
enforcement officials at Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) are not routinely
screening children for eligibility for other forms of humanitarian
relief including SIJ and the U visa. After 48 hours in immigration
enforcement detention, the unaccompanied minor child is transferred
to the custody of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). ORR is responsible
for seeking a safe placement for immigrant children placed in their
custody. The length of a child’s stay in ORR custody is usually one
month. During that time ORR identifies a parent, a family member,
or other person willing to take custody and responsibility for the
child. Once a potential custodian is identified, ORR screens them to
determine whether the placement is safe for the child. ORR seeks
agreement from the persons in whom they place custody of the child
Frequently Asked Questions: Unaccompanied Immigrant Children on the
Southern
U.S.
Border,
NATIONAL
IMMIGRANT
JUSTICE
CENTER,
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/frequently-asked-questions-unaccompaniedimmigrant-children-southern-us-border#.VgxVi_lVhBc (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
152
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to provide for care of the child and bring the child to immigration
court proceedings. Placement with of the child with family members
or other sponsors is accomplished without inquiry into and without
regard to the immigration status of the adult family member in whose
custody the child is placed.
Through this process most
unaccompanied minor children are released from government
custody and placed with family members or other sponsors in the
community while the child goes through the process applying for
immigration relief the child qualifies to receive and appearing before
the immigration court in removal proceedings.
Only after placement with a family member or other
custodian would the child need to turn to the state court for orders
regarding custody. In some states the adult in whose custody the
child was placed would need to obtain a state court order in a
guardianship case so that the adult custodian can enroll the child in
school. Additionally, children for whom ORR is unable to locate a
safe placement will remain in federal HHS custody. For children
placed in ORR custody either the agency given custody of the child
or the child with their own attorney may come to court seeking
orders that include SIJ findings. Courts can issue family orders
regarding the care and recognizing the custody of a children in ORR
custody with consent of HHS only required if the state court would
be modifying the custody placement. This process is largely
responsible for why courts may see adolescents coming to state
court to receive court orders mere days before immigrant child
reaches the age of majority seeking a custody, confirmation of
placement, or other court orders regarding the child’s care and
additionally requesting SIJ findings. While it may be unusual for
courts to see custody matters involving children ages 16 or 17, so
long as the state court has jurisdiction under state laws to issue orders
that benefit children courts can sign SIJ orders.
The TVPRA 2008 also modified the “express consent”
requirement to state that, “the Secretary of Homeland Security
(Secretary) must consent to the grant of special immigrant juvenile
status.”153 Through policy memos, USCIS has interpreted this to
mean that the SIJ petition must be “bona fide” and was not “sought
153

Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)

663

2016

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:2

primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status…rather than for the
purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or
abandonment.”154 There are many ways in which state court orders
regarding care or custody benefit older adolescent children serve
legitimate purposes under state family laws. The following are
examples of orders that have a legitimate purpose under state law
beyond immigration relief. An adolescent may seek state court
orders needed to ensure that the child can remain a dependent on
their custodian’s health insurance. The adolescent may need the state
court order to stay enrolled in high school, to enroll in a vocational
school or to receive state funded post-secondary educational grants
or loans. An older child may need a custody order that allows a child
to continue living with their non-abusive battered immigrant parent.
Providing an adolescent with stability as they enter adulthood is a
valid purpose for a juvenile court order that goes beyond the need for
immigration relief. Even if the order will only be valid for a short
time, state family courts have seen the benefits for a child’s
development and protection of issuing orders that implement,
recognize and validate support systems for the child that as a
practical matter will continue beyond the date a child turns the state
law age of majority. Such court sanctioned arrangements do not in
practice terminate on the date the child reaches the state law age of
majority solely because the court’s jurisdiction over the juvenile does.
The Department of Homeland Security CIS Ombudsman recognized
the need for increased guidance on the current interpretation of the
consent function, arguing “(r)ather than retain the elements of
‘express consent’ derived from the 1997 amendments, a proper
implementation of the TVPRA language requires that USCIS verify
whether State court orders contain the necessary factual findings and
whether the State court has articulated the foundation for such
findings.”155 The Ombudsman further advises that securing relief
from abuse and seeking immigration benefits are mutually beneficial
rather than exclusive, noting the current interpretation of primary
purpose “relies on a false dichotomy that suggests it is possible that a
154 USCIS Memorandum, HQOPS 70/8.5 “Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions” (Mar.
24, 2009) citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-405, at 130 (1997).
155 Recommendations from Maria Odom, Esnsuring Process Efficiency and Legal
Sufficiency in Special Immigrant Juvenile Adjudications, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES OMBUDSMAN 7 (December 11, 2015).
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State court action may only focus on either protections against future
harm or securing immigration benefits, when almost always, the court
protections inevitably provide both in tandem.”156
As state courts receive training on the important role of state
family courts in Special Immigrant Juvenile Status courts will likely be
able to identify immigrant children who may benefit from the SIJ
program. In potential cases in which a child may be SIJ eligible,
courts can ask counsel for the child to explore the issue directing
counsel to USCIS produced materials on SIJ status. For example, if
an immigrant minor is before the court without a parent or guardian
present and child does not have a birth certificate, the court may take
notice of potential SIJ eligibility and direct counsel to brief the court
on SIJ. When courts issue SIJ orders for children at younger ages,
this will reduce then number of children coming into court with
urgent cases seeking court orders containing SIJ findings before the
child turns the age of majority under state law.
C. Reunification Is Not Viable With At Least One Parent Based on
the Abuse, Abandonment, or Neglect by That Parent As Defined
by State Law
Once the court has exercised jurisdiction over an immigrant
child and made rulings regarding the care or custody of the child, the
court can include in its court order the findings SIJ statutorily
requires as a prerequisite to a child filing an SIJ petition. These
findings address two matters. The first finding articulates facts of the
child’s case documenting that the child was abused, abandoned, or
neglected by at least one of the child’s parents and that reunification
with that parent is not viable. This finding will be discussed in detail
in this section. The second finding discussing facts that demonstrate
why the court finds it is not the child’s best interests to be returned
to their home country will be discussed in the next section.
When SIJ was created, federal deportation priorities did not
seek to deport unaccompanied youths because “of their age and the
impracticality of deportation” as well as the fact many of them were
156

Id. at 8
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victims of child abuse, abandonment or neglect.157 Congress decided
that state courts were best suited to determine whether a child
suffered abuse, abandonment, or neglect as defined by state family
laws. Determinations as to whether a child has been abused,
abandoned or neglected by a parent are made on a daily basis in child
abuse and neglect, civil protection order, custody, adoption,
delinquency, guardianship and other family court proceedings. State
family courts are well versed in the state law definitions of “abuse,”
“abandonment,” and “neglect” and are well positioned to make
findings as to whether the facts of the case before the court involving
a Special Immigrant Juvenile constitutes abuse, abandonment or
neglect as defined by state law. Cases brought to court for SIJ
findings will include acts of abuse, abandonment or neglect that were
perpetrated by an immigrant child’s parent or parents either inside or
outside of the U.S..
In determining whether the child has been subjected to abuse,
abandonment, or neglect by one or both of their parents, state courts
apply the state law definitions of abuse, abandonment, or neglect
without regard to where the abuse, abandonment, or neglect
occurred. If the actions or inactions regarding the child would be
considered abuse, abandonment, or neglect under the laws of the
state, the court is authorized to enter SIJ findings including in cases
in which all of the abuse, abandonment, or neglect occurred outside
of the U.S..
1. Findings Must be Based on Relevant State Law Definitions of
Abuse, Abandonment, or Neglect. - In entering SIJ findings courts must
apply the state law definitions of abuse, abandonment, neglect or
another similar act against a child under state law to the facts of the
immigrant child’s case that the court is adjudicating. There is no
federal definition of abused, abandoned, or neglected in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Therefore courts should
include citations to the state law definitions of these offenses against
a child in the court order and make findings that detail how the facts
of the specific case before the court constitute abuse, abandonment,
Special Immigrant Status for Alien Foster Children: Joint Hearings on S. 358,
H.R. 672, H.R. 2448, H.R. 2646, and H.R. 4165 Before the Subcommittee on Immigration,
Refugees and International Law of the House Committee of the Judiciary, and the Immigration
Task Force of the House Education and Labor Committee, supra note 51.
157
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neglect or other similar harm to a child under state law. It is legally
incorrect for state court orders to find that abuse, abandonment, or
neglect took place under the under the sections of the INA that
define Special Immigrant Juvenile Status. If a court cites to the INA
for the definitions of abuse, abandonment or neglect rather than state
law the court order will likely be insufficient to support an award of
SIJ to the immigrant child by USCIS. When seeking court orders to
submit with an SIJ application attorneys and courts should avoid
citing to the INA and cite instead to the relevant state code section
that the court is relying upon to make its abuse, abandonment or
neglect findings. Just as the court order needs to include factual
details that are the basis for the court’s the abuse, abandonment or
neglect findings, court orders should include a factual basis for the
findings that parental reunification is not viable. The order should
state the child cannot be reunited with the offending parent
discussing the evidence of abuse, abandonment, or neglect and that
reunificationis not viable. The SIJ statute only requires a state court
to find reunification is not viable with the offending parent; the
statute does not necessitate a termination of parental rights.
Therefore, a child may have contact or visitation with the offending
parent but formal reunification of the parent and child remains not
viable. .
While the definitions of abuse, abandonment, and neglect
vary by state, most state statues recognize neglect, maltreatment,
physical, sexual, and emotional abuse. Every state has a civil and
criminal statute for child abuse and neglect. In delegating the
determination that the child has suffered abuse, abandonment or
neglect to state courts under state laws, the federal statue gave the
state courts the flexibility to make SIJ findings under any definitions
of abuse, abandonment or neglect contained in state law including
but not limited to definitions contained in civil, criminal, protection
order and jurisdictional statutes. This discussion will generally
reference civil statutes, as USCIS does not require the state court to
prosecute the party accused of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, and
does not require the evidence meet the criminal standard or statutory
definition. Most states either include abandonment in their definition
of abuse or neglect. In other states abandonment is defined as a
separate offense.
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a. State definitions158 of abuse will include emotional abuse, sexual
abuse, physical abuse, and sometimes parental substance abuse and omission of
parental responsibility. - The term “abuse” of a child can encompass a
large array of abusive behaviors. Almost every state defines physical,
emotional, and sexual abuse as part of their child abuse statutes.159
The specific acts that constitute these types of abuse vary by statute.
Generally “non-accidental” injuries to a child are considered physical
child abuse. Common examples include intentional physical acts to
induce pain, such as burning, kicking, or hitting. Other states include
acts of omission that result in injury as part of their definition of
physical abuse, such as a not bringing the child to the doctor. In 38
states behavior that threatens a child with harm or creates a
substantial risk of harm is deemed physical abuse.160 In Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, and North Carolina the definition of physical
abuse includes human trafficking. This can be particularly important
because in these states SIJ could provide an additional avenue for
immigration protection for victims of trafficking who are young
immigrant girls when one of the child’s parents was involved in the
trafficking. Some child trafficking victims may seek SIJ relief because
accessing continued presence or a T visa may be more difficult if the
trafficking is not being locally or federally investigated or prosecuted.
Immigrant women and girls face high rates of sexual assault and are
often trafficked as part of that pattern of abuse, in either sex
trafficking or labor trafficking rings. In the states identified, if the
facts amount to human trafficking and the victim’s parent or stepparent had a role in the trafficking, if she is otherwise eligible, she
may be able to apply for SIJ as a result.
Parental substance abuse is included in the state law
definitions of either child abuse or neglect by 24 states.161 Possible
types of behavior that may qualify as child abuse under state law
include:

See state statute for individual definitions.
Georgia and Wisconsin do not include emotional abuse in their
definitions of abuse or neglect.
160 See Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILD WELFARE
INFORMATION GATEWAY (June 2014).
161 Id.
158
159
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•

Prenatal exposure of a child to illegal drugs162;

•

Manufacturing controlled substances in the
presence of a child163;

•

Allowing a child to be present where the
chemicals or tools to manufacture illegal drugs are
kept164;

•

Furnishing a child with drugs or alcohol165; and

•

Using controlled substances that impair a
caregiver’s ability to provide proper care to their
child.166

Attorneys and advocates working with immigrant children
should be aware in states where certain forms of substance abuse
related activities are considered child abuse or neglect, that these
actions or activities can be the basis for findings of child abuse for
SIJ purposes. Immigrant children with parents who have a history of
substance abuse should be screened for parental substance abuse
related offenses.
Sexual abuse and/or exploitation of a child is included as part
of the definition of abuse in every state. Additionally, seven states
identify sex trafficking in their definition of sexual abuse.167 For
purposes of SIJ, the abuse must have been committed by either a
parent or step-parent to qualify for immigration relief. Sexual
exploitation is included in most of the definitions of sexual abuse;
typically it includes behaviors such as allowing or encouraging a
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin. Id.
163 Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. Id.
164 Arizona, Arkansas, and Washington. Id.
165 Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, and Texas. Id.
166 California, Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, and Texas. Id.
167 Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North
Carolina, and Texas. Id.
162
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minor to engage in prostitution or child pornography. For SIJ
purposes, the qualifying abuse, abandonment, or neglect may have
taken place either in the U.S. or abroad, so long as the behavior
described would violate the state statutes in the state in which the
child is seeking the order. USCIS will adjudicate the totality of the
facts, history, and evidence provided in the immigrant child’s
application. The state court in entering its SIJ findings need only
determine if the abuse the applicant is alleging that the court credits
as having occurred would be a violation of that state’s statutes. A
young immigrant girl who fled her home country because her stepfather was sexually abusing her can go to court in any state in the
U.S. and that court can issue an order factually stating that the facts
of what occurred to the child constitutes sexual abuse as defined by
the state law.
Emotional abuse is defined as part of the definition of abuse
or neglect in 33 states and the District of Columbia. Examples of
common statutory language include “injury to the psychological
capacity or emotional stability of the child as evidenced by an
observable or substantial change in behavior, emotional response, or
cognition” and injury as evidenced by “anxiety, depression,
withdrawal, or aggressive behavior.” When discussing cases of
domestic violence, this can include behavioral patterns of coercive
control, witnessing domestic violence perpetrated by one parent on
the other parent, or extreme cruelty.168 The state statutes vary
significantly as to what constitutes emotional abuse, some states
include allowing others to emotionally abuse the child, mental injury
resulting from sexual abuse, and incidents resulting in impairment of
the child’s normal range of behavior.
b. Obtaining SIJ orders based on neglect. - Neglect is typically
defined as the failure to provide a basic need for a child. State law
definitions of what constitutes need differ, but most include failure to
provide a child with food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or
supervision substantially affecting the child’s health, safety, or wellbeing. Neglect statutes differ more from state to state in comparison
to abuse statutes that contain more consistent definitions. Some state
neglect statutes include forms of abuse, or the fact the child was
168

Leslye Orloff et al., supra note 18.
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abused as evidence of neglect. Other states have adopted very broad
definitions of neglect and include homelessness as a means of
neglect, regardless of willfulness of the parent. It is therefore very
important and best practice for courts to include in the court order a
neglected immigrant child will be using to file for SIJ relief the
following:
•

A quote and citation to the state law definition of
child neglect;

•

Specific factual findings detailing the facts that the
court determined constitutes child neglect; and

•

An articulation of the basis for the court’s
conclusion that applying the state law definition
of child abuse to the facts of the case before the
court, the court concludes as a matter of law that
the immigrant child before the court was
neglected by the child’s parent or parent(s).

This detailed approach is best practice for state court orders
in SIJ cases and is particularly important for neglected immigrant
children. The state definition of neglect, for purposes of special
finding needed for the SIJ application, may apply to events that
occurred outside of the U.S.. If an immigrant child was made
homeless by her caretaker parent in her home country, that evidence
is enough for a state court finding of neglect in certain states.169
Other types of neglect some states have adopted in statute are
failure to educate. Failure to educate as required by law is recognized
in state statutes as neglect by 29 states and territories.170 Every state
has different mandatory education requirements. In states that
consider failure to educate neglect, a parent’s failure to comply with
169
Colorado, Connecticut, South Dakota, American Samoa. Definitions of
Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 155.
170
Failure to educate as required by law is statutorily recognized as
neglect by Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming, District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Virgin Islands. Id.
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minimum educational requirements for children is sufficient for a
finding of neglect. Fifteen states and territories include variations of
failure to provide certain types of medical care as child neglect under
state law. This includes the withholding of medical treatment or
nutrition from infants with life-threatening conditions and failure to
provide special medical or mental health treatment that the child
needs as a form of neglect.
Nationwide, neglect statutes include many nuanced forms of
abuse, control, and lack of parental accountability and responsibility.
It is important for attorneys and advocates working with special
immigrant youth to become familiar with the child neglect laws of the
state in which the immigrant child seeking SIJ is living. Knowledge
of state neglect laws will help advocates and attorneys detect
conditions, events, and the treatment by a parent in the child’s home
country that would constitute a form of child neglect under the state
laws of the state in which the court is being asked to provide SIJ
findings. Close analysis of the relevant state statute combined with
detailed questions and focused interviewing of immigrant youth is
necessary to fully evaluate if an immigrant child may be eligible for
SIJ based on neglect by at least one parent.
c. Abandonment. - Abandonment is defined in two distinct
state statutes. First, the majority of states and territories define
abandonment within the state child protection code where address
abuse and neglect is addressed. Thirty-nine states and territories
either include abandonment as part of the definition of abuse or
neglect or define it separately. State courts can find abandonment
took place by one parent in a variety of family court and juvenile
proceedings. States have generally defined abandonment to include:
•

Failure to retain contact with

•

Failure support a child;

•

The fact that the child lacks knowledge as to the
identity of a parent;

•

An articulated intent
responsibility; and
672
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The physical act of leaving the child.171

The second place that the term “abandonment” is defined is
in the family law jurisdictional statute governing custody cases. The
governing jurisdictional statute in custody cases in virtually every
state172 is the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act (UCCJEA) in which abandonment is defined and used as a
means for asserting jurisdiction over the child in custody cases.
Abandonment can be based on either state law definition. Both
definitions can serve as the governing law used by the court to make
its SIJ findings. Abandonment, as defined under state law, is a valid
ground for SIJ findings in any state court proceeding in which the
court has jurisdiction over the child. .
The federal law does not define abandonment and instead for
SIJ purposes relies on state law definitions. USCIS has addressed the
fact that children who entered the U.S. unlawfully to join his/her
parent may be considered “abandoned” by the other parent for SIJ
purposes.173 So long as the individual facts of a case support a
finding of abandonment based on state law, a judicial officer can
make that finding and USCIS can favorable adjudicate an the
immigrant child’s application for SIJ.
The UCCJEA was adopted to ensure stability and full faith
and credit in custody and visitation proceedings. It has been adopted
by almost all of the states and territories and provides guidance on
how and when states should assert jurisdiction over a child based on
factors other than mere presence of the child in the jurisdiction. One
factor included in UCCJEA determinations of abandonment of a
child by a parent. Typically, under the UCCJEA, a child must be
present in the state for at least six months before the court can exert
the preferred home state jurisdiction to adjudicate matters involving
the care and custody of a child
Id.
Adopted by every state except Massachusetts, which still uses the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) instead of the more recent
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Id.
173
ILRC, Primer for One Parent Cases at 11 (citing Amy S. Paulick,
Assistant Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Line, In the
Matter of [Redacted]).
171
172
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An exception to this rule, which almost every state adopted,
is emergency jurisdiction based on abandonment. If a child has been
abandoned and is physically present in the state the court may assert
emergency jurisdiction over a child who has been in the jurisdiction
for less than six months. The UCCJEA defines abandonment as
“left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or
supervision.”174 Every state has adopted this definition of “abandon”
except Ohio, where “abandoned” means the parents of a child have
failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than 90
days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child
after that 90-day period.”175 It is not necessary that the abandonment
be occur at the time of the assertion of jurisdiction. The
abandonment requirement is met when the child is without proper
care from a parent. It is not an assertion of jurisdiction based on
abandonment that can only be made when the child is in imminent
need of protection because of the abandonment. Many children have
been abandoned by parents as babies or young children and do not
come to family court seeking assistance until they have entered the
U.S. and found stability with their other parent or a family member.
They come to court seeking to legal recognition of that stability in a
guardianship, custody, or child support proceeding. If the child has
just re-settled in a new household with a parent, relative, or guardian
and this home life has not been in place for the 6 months to establish
home state jurisdiction for purposes of UCCJEA, the family can
assert emergency jurisdiction based on the child’s presence and
abandonment. The state UCCJEA definition of abandonment can be
applied to the facts and findings of the case, and the court’s findings
would support an application for SIJ.
2. One or Both Parent Requirement. - When seeking SIJ orders,
the qualifying offense need only be committed by one of the
immigrant child’s parents and this finding accompanied by a finding
that reunification with that offending parent is not a viable option
would be sufficient to for SIJ purposes. The child’s other nonoffending parent may be the custodian of the child without affecting
the child’s eligibility for SIJ. SIJ was initially created to assist children
living in long term foster care, Congress decided in 2008 to amend
174
175

UCCJEA art. 1, § 102(1).
47 Ohio Jur. 3d Family Law § 1109.
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that statute in order to provide equal treatment and protection for
children who have been provided a nurturing relationship with the
child’s other non-offending parent.
Although the SIJ statute was amended in 2008 to greatly
expand the SIJ protections to a larger group of immigrant children,
the federal regulations governing the SIJ program have not been
amended to reflect the changes in the new law. Many provisions of
the prior federal regulations governing SIJ were overruled by the
2008 statutory amendments.176 USCIS acknowledges that the law and
the regulation are inconsistent and advises courts to “be familiar with
current immigration law.” Where federal regulations are inconsistent
with and/or have been explicitly overruled by subsequent federal
statutes, courts should apply the most up to date federal laws.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 101(a)
(27) (J) establishes the definition of a Special Immigrant Juvenile.
This definition was last amended by Congress in the Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008.177 The TVPRA
statutory changes supersede portions of the Code of Federal
Regulations relating to SIJ cases.178 USCIS has made it abundantly
clear through policy, memos, and practice that the federal law only
requires findings of abuse abandonment, or neglect by perpetrated by
one parent, not both.179 When identifying SIJ eligible children, USCIS
The Proposed Rule was issued in September 2011, the Final Rule is
expected in the next year. Proposed Rules, Federal Register (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2011/09/15/fr06sept11.p
df.
177
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).
178
8 CFR 204.11 has been amended by statue to redefine eligibility
therefore sections overruled include but are not limited to the following:
§204.11(a), (c)(3), (c)(4), c(5), (d)(2)(i), and (d)(2)(ii).
179
See Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: Information for Juvenile Courts, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Green%20Card/Green%20Card
%20Through%20a%20Job/Information_for_Juvenile_Courts_-FINAL.pdf
(stating an eligible child must be abused, abandoned, or neglected by a parent); See
Immigrant Relief for Abused Children, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Green%20Card/Green%20Card
%20Through%20a%20Job/Immigration_Relief_for_Abused_Children-FINAL.pdf
(stating an eligible child may be living with the non-abusive parent).
176
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lists children living with the non-abusive parent, foster parent, or
legal guardian as part of a non-exhaustive list of eligible family
scenarios in which an SIJ eligible child may be living.
The legal inconsistency between the SIJ statutory
requirements and incorrect information contained in the regulations
that were overruled by the statute amendments in 2008 has led to
confusion among courts and attorneys who have struggled to
understand how to obtain SIJ findings when only parent has abused,
abandoned, or neglected the child. Nebraska and New Jersey have
issued published judicial opinions incorrectly that rely on the
overruled regulations and interpreted the amended statute to require
court findings that both parents must have been at fault for abuse,
abandonment, or neglect in order for state court judges to issue
special findings to be used in SIJ applications.180
Both cases relied on the fact the reunification was possible
with one of the biological parents and therefore the refused to issue
an SIJ finding to the child based abuse, abandonment or neglect by
the child’s other parent. The New Jersey case held the “‘1 or both’
phrase to require that reunification with neither parent is viable
because of abuse, neglect or abandonment of the juvenile.”181 Both
courts also looked to the pre TVPRA 2008 legislative history and the
pre TVPRA 2008 administrative history of the SIJ statute, despite the
plain meaning of the statutory language. The New Jersey court
acknowledged that the legislative history supported the fact the
amended statutory language required one parent but went on to
justify if failure to follow the requirements of the federal statute by
imposing the court’s own view on what is articulated it sees as the
“competing goals” of protecting the non-abusive parent and
protecting against immigration abuse. The New Jersey court created
its own interpretation of the SIJ legislative and regulatory histories to
fit the court’s stated goals.182 There is no legislative history to
support the assertion that Congress intended to preclude children
reunification with the non-abusive parent from SIJ protections. To
the contrary, the statute was amended and the legislative history
In re Interest of Erick M., 820 NW 2d. 639 (Neb. 2012); H.S.P. v.
J.K., 87 A.3d 255 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
181
H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d at 266.
182
Id.
180
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provide evidence that Congress explicitly intended to protect the
immigrant SIJ eligible child’s relationship with the child’s nonabusive parent. The plain meaning of the statute should suffice when
courts are interpreting the “one or both” parent requirement. If the
federal statues was interpreted to mean that “one or both” means
both, the phrase “or both” would be superfluous in the statute.183
The Immigrant Legal Resource Center explains, “Congress
used the disjunctive to indicate that SIJ findings could be made when
reunification is not viable with just one parent, and also could be
made when reunification is not viable with both parents.”184 Further,
if the statute omitted the words “or both” and simply read,
“reunification is not viable with one of the immigrant’s parents,” the
plain meaning of that phraseology would render immigrant youth for
whom reunification was not viable with both parents ineligible for
SIJ. This would clearly be at odds with the purpose of SIJ, which is
to protect vulnerable immigrant children. Lastly, the court’s decision
“did not consider the federal agencies’ interpretation of the SIJ
statute.”185
There are currently four published state court opinions that
interpret the one or both parent requirement consistently with USCIS
published statements and with federal guidance.186 In addition to
statements and brochures clearly identifying the requirement that
only one parent is abusive, USCIS has proposed revisions to the
application for SIJ to reflect USCIS agreement that immigrant
children are eligible for SIJ relief if the one of their parents abused,
abandoned, or neglected the child. The form change would allow an
applicant to check that he or she is eligible based on a non-viability

183
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: A Primer for One Parent Cases,
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER (2014) [hereinafter ILRC, Primer for One
Parent Cases].
184
Id. at 6.
185
Id. at 5.
186
Matter of Mario S., 954 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2012);
Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 973 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
2013); In re Israel O. (2015), 233 Cal. App. 4th 279; Eddie E. v. Superior Court, 183
Cal. Rptr. 3d 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
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with one parent or check a box for both parents, establishing a clear
distinction.187
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement filed a brief in
Baltimore Immigration Court stating “[C]ounsel for USCIS has
confirmed that a child who enters the U.S. illegally to join his/her
parent in the U.S. may be considered “abandoned” for the purposes
of an I-360. However, a child who enters the U.S. illegally to join
both parents may not be considered abandoned.”188 An I-360 is the
immigration form used to file an application for SIJ. The important
distinction made is that if the child is rejoining both parents and is
living together with their parents, then the child has not been
abandoned by either parent. If, however, the child has been
abandoned by one parents and the child is living with the other
parent, the child may file for SIJ.
The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has
stated on two separate occasions that the one or both requirement
incorporated into the SIJ statue in the TVPRA 2008 amendments
means at least one parent, not both. In January 2014, in a publication
about SIJ rules, EOIR clarified the intent of the TVPRA
amendments that “it is only reunification with one parent that must
not be viable, the alien child could potentially be living with one
parent and still qualify for SIJ status.”189 EOIR made it very clear the
one or both, means at least one. The court stated in its opinion, “the
respondent demonstrated that reunification was not viable with one
of his parents, thus, satisfying the requirements of the statute.”190
This EIOR approach is consistent with USCIS practice since the
TVPRA amendments in 2008 became law, USCIS regularly accepts
and grants petitions for SIJ based on only one parent abusing,
abandoning, or neglecting the immigrant child applying for SIJ

187
See AILA InfoNet, USCIS Comment Request on Form I-360, p. 9,
Part
8,
Question
3.A,
available
at
http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=50482&linkid=281819.
188
ILRC, Primer for One Parent Cases, supra note 139.
189
Laura E. Ploeg, Special Immigrant Juveniles: All the Special Rules,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, Jan. 2014, available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILA.
190
ILRC, Primer for One Parent Cases, supra note 179.
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All of the federal agencies responsible for implementing SIJ
statute and regulations, the Department of Homeland Security and
the Department of Justice and each of their components, have
published policy memoranda regarding their consistent statutory
interpretation of the 2008 TVPRA amendments to the definition of
which immigrant children qualify for Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status. State courts are there obliged to defer to the federal
interpretations of these federal agencies.191
D. Best Interest of The Child
The final required finding in SIJ cases is the finding that it is
not in the immigrant child’s best interests to return to the child’s
home country.192 The best interest of the child standard to be applied
by state courts in SIJ cases is the same best interest of the child
factors that courts routinely apply in the child custody and child
abuse and neglect proceedings that the state courts adjudicate. The
best interest of the child standard strives to achieve a safe and
comfortable environment so that every child can develop and
flourish. State best interest of the child laws list number of factors
that courts are to consider when making best interest of the child
determinations. The state best interest of the child statutes include a
non-exclusive list of factor the courts must consider in making best
interests of the child determinations. Courts can also consider other
evidence and factors that arise based on the specific facts of the case
before the court. Common factors listed in state best interests of the
child statutes that courts are required to consider include:

191

•

The wishes of the child as to which parent should
be the child’s custodian;

•

The interaction and interrelationship of the child
with their parent or parents, their siblings, and
any other person who may significantly affect the
child’s best interest;

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,

844 (1984).
192

Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(27)(J).
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•

The child’s adjustment to their home, school, and
community;

•

The mental and physical health of all individuals
involved;

•

The capacity of parents to provide for the child;
and

•

The presence or history of domestic violence in
the home.

SIJ cases are unusual in family law cases because they require
judges to make a best interest determination that is not in the child’s
best interest to return to the home country.193 This type of
comparison of legal protections and services available in the U.S.
with those available in the child’s country of origin has precedents in
U.S. immigration law. One relevant example is the extreme hardship
determination that immigration judges are required to make when
adjudicating Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) cancellation of
removal applications filed by immigrant spouses and children who
have been subject to battering or extreme cruelty be their U.S. citizen
or lawful permanent resident spouses or parents. Some of the factors
immigration judges consider in deciding whether an abused
immigrant child’s or spouse’s removal will cause extreme hardship to
the immigrant applicant spouse or child include: 194

193
The primary types of cases coming before family courts in which the
courts may be called upon to make similar comparisons are international child
custody cases including those that implicate the Hague Convention – The
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, held at the
Hague on October 25, 1980 (the Hague Convention), and its US implementing
legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) 42 USC
§§11601-11610.; see also Nunez-Escudero v Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.
1995) (holding that a child should not be sent back to Mexico due to grave risk to
the child).
194
8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.20(c) and 1240.58(c); See also INS Memorandum
from Paul W. Virtue, INS General Counsel, to Terrance M. O’Reilly, Director of
INS Administrative Appeals Office on Extreme Hardship and Documentary
Requirements Involving Battered Spouses and Children (October 16, 1998),
available at http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/pubs/extreme-hardship-anddocumentary-requirements/.
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•

The nature and extent of the physical and
psychological consequences of the battering or
extreme cruelty;

•

The impact of the loss of access to the U.S. courts
and criminal justice system (including, but not
limited to, the ability to obtain and enforce orders
of protection, criminal investigations and
prosecutions, and family law proceedings or court
orders regarding child support, alimony,
maintenance, child custody, and visitation);

•

The applicant’s or applicant’s child’s need for
social, medical, mental health, or other supportive
services, particularly those related to the abuse or
surviving the abuse, which would not be available
or reasonably accessible in the foreign country;

•

The existence of laws, social practices, or customs
in the foreign country that would penalize or
ostracize the applicant or applicant’s child for
leaving an abusive situation, or for taking action
to stop the abuse;

•

The abuser’s ability or lack thereof to travel to the
foreign country, and the ability, willingness, or
lack thereof of foreign government authorities to
protect the applicant and/or the applicant’s child
from future abuse; and

•

The likelihood that the abuser’s family, friends, or
others acting on the abuser’s behalf in the foreign
country would physically or psychologically harm
the applicant or the applicant’s children if they
were deported.

These factors illustrate some of the types on considerations
courts might entertain in making best interest of the child
determinations in addition to the best interest of the child factors
listed in the state best interest of the child statue. Other factors the
court could consider are the traditional factors that immigration
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courts apply in all cancellation of removal cases including those cases
filed by battered immigrant spouses and children. These factors are
include, but are not limited to:195
•

The age (youth/old age) of the applicant;

•

The children’s ability to speak the native language
of the foreign country and the children’s ability to
adjust to life there;

•

Serious illness of the person or her child that
necessitates medical attention not adequately
available in the foreign country;

•

A person’s inability
employment abroad;

•

The child’s length of residence in the U.S.;

•

Existence of other family members residing
legally in the U.S. and lack of family in the home
country;

•

Irreparable harm arising from a disruption of
educational opportunities;

•

The adverse psychological impact of removal;

•

The impact of separation that could be caused by
removal on both mother and child;

•

The extent to which deportation would interfere
with court custody, visitation, and child support
awards; and

•

The extent to which the child applicant is an asset
to or involved with their community in the U.S.
(i.e., involvement in church/temple/mosque,

to

obtain

adequate

61 Fed. Reg. 13,067 (Mar. 29, 1996) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts.
103, 204, 205, and 216).
195
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children’s school, community, other service
programs).
Courts are required under federal immigration laws to apply
state best interest of the child factors to make SJIS findings regarding
whether it is in the child’s best interests to not return to the child’s
home country. The state law family court judges apply to this
determination is the same law that courts routinely apply in custody
and child abuse and neglect cases. SIJ findings do not require that
courts apply these factors in a direct comparison of risks, options,
and the child’s ability to thrive in the child’s home country and in the
U.S.. Courts may consider country conditions in making this
determination but it is not necessary. It is sufficient to state that it is
not in the child’s best interest to return to the country of origin
because it is in the child’s best interest to be placed in the care or
custody of the petitioner in the state court case. For example, if SIJ
findings are requested in a guardianship case, the state court could
correctly state in the SIJ order, it is in not in the best interest for child
to return to the country of origin because child is in the care of
guardian, which is in child’s best interest. Attorneys representing
immigrant children seeking SIJ determinations may present evidence
in the state court proceedings regarding the services, support, and
educational opportunities the child is receiving in the U.S.. This
evidence and evidence of the abuse, abandonment or neglect that the
child suffered can be presented through testimony of the child,
testimony of the child’s guardians, counselors, therapists, teachers,
health care providers and others who can attest to the child’s
adjustment to and investment in their life in the U.S.. Several of
these witnesses may also be able to attest to the support system the
child has and needs in the U.S. to overcome the impact that the
abuse, abandonment or neglect the child suffered has had on the
child. Attorneys representing immigrant children may also choose to
introduce testimony of the child, witnesses, or other evidence
regarding country conditions in the child’s home country and the
treatment, risks, dangers and options for the child if the child were to
be returned to their country of origin.
In making best interest of the child findings courts may
include in their orders information about the unique facts of the
child’s case that played a role in the court’s ruling that returning the
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child to their country of origin would not be in the child’s best
interests. Like the finding of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, this
factors that courts must consider in making the best interest of the
child determination are to be based on state laws applied to facts of
the case. Some of the facts that the court is considering and ruling
on in SIJ cases are U.S. based fact and some will be facts that took
place abroad or conditions that exist abroad that would affect the
child if the child was returned to their home country. USCIS
recognizes that state juvenile courts are the most appropriate
determiners of fact as they have the most experience making
adjudications that affect the care and custody of children based on
state law including best interest of the child determinations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress’s growing support of kinship care and the removal
of the long-term foster care requirement from the statute show a
desire to keep the immigrant child, when possible, with family
members, friends, and other individuals who are in the best position
to nurture the child applying for SIJ immigration protections. All SIJ
eligible children have suffered trauma as a result of being abused,
abandoned or neglected by at least one of their parents. Both the
family court orders in which state court judges enter orders regarding
the care or custody of the immigrant children including SIJ findings
and the grant of Special Immigrant Juvenile Status by USCIS together
provide critical stability and support for immigrant children. This
approach involving state family courts and USCIS offering protection
from deportation and access to lawful permanent residency for
immigrant children who have suffered abuse, abandonment or
neglect helps children heal, succeed in school and move on with their
lives to become productive and contributing members of our
communities.
Recent immigrant women and girls should be screened early
and often experiences of abuse, neglect, or abandonment that
children suffer perpetrated by their parents and step-parents to detect
SIJ eligibility. This screening may also detect criminal activities
suffered in the U.S. perpetrated by the child other family members or
caretakers that could lead to the child’s eligibility for U visa
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protections.
Continuous screening over time by various
professionals working with immigrant children can uncover abuse
occurring to the child after their arrival in the U.S. and can also result
in the child building enough trust to divulge information about past
abuses that may make the child SIJ eligible.
Courts should receive training to help courts detect cases in
which non-citizen immigrant children before the court may be SIJ
eligible. Training can also help courts craft orders containing SIJ
findings that include sufficient detail about the facts of the case to
provide a ruling from which USCIS adjudicators can see how and
why the court reached its conclusions regarding abuse, abandonment,
or neglect, the viability of reunification with the offending parent and
the child’s best interests. Finally, courts should distribute at
courthouses DHS produced information about Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status and other immigration remedies available for
immigrant crime victims. This will improve access to justice as that
immigrant victims of child abuse, child abandonment, child neglect,
domestic violence, sexual assault, human trafficking and other U visa
covered criminal activities. Immigrant victims who find the courage
to seek help from state courts will learn about their legal rights to
pursue immigration relief offering them the safety, stability and
opportunity to receive protection from deportation and the ability to
live, work, and heal under the protection of U.S. family court and
immigration laws.
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CAUGHT IN THE ACT BUT NOT
PUNISHED: ON ELITE RULE OF LAW
AND DETERRENCE
Francesca R. Jensenius and Abby K. Wood
Most literature on criminal deterrence in law, economics, and criminology assumes that people
who are caught for a crime will be punished. The literature focuses on how the size of sanctions
and probability of being caught affect criminal behavior. However, in many countries entire
groups of people are “above the law” in the sense that they are able to evade punishment even if
caught violating the law. In this paper we argue that both the perceived probability of being
punished if caught and the cultural acceptance of elites evading punishment are important parts
of theorizing about deterrence, particularly about corruption among political elites. Looking at
data on parking violations among diplomats in New York City 1997–2002, we explore how
diplomats from different rule-of-law cultures respond to sudden legal immunity. The empirical
observations provide clear evidence of both the stickiness and the gradual weakening of cultural
constraints.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most literature on deterring criminal behavior assumes that
people who are caught for a crime will be punished. In the classic
deterrence model, deterrence depends on the expected benefit of the
criminal act, weighed against the probability of being caught, and the
size of the sanction if caught. Yet, in many parts of the world, there
are entire groups of people who are not really subject to the rule of
law, as they are able to evade punishment even if caught breaking the
law. Who these groups are, and how large they are, varies from
country to country. De facto immunity from punishment can run with
class status, kinship, wealth, ethnicity, or status as a political elite. For
people who are above the law, no increase in the size of the formal
sanction for committing a crime or corrupt act, and no increase in
detection efforts by the government, will alter their propensity to
engage in criminal or corrupt behavior, because the probability of
being punished if caught is too low for legal enforcement to affect
their behavior.
An important question is how elites respond to de facto
immunity and to changes in the probability of being punished if caught
for a criminal act. Such changes may occur more often than we might
think: Civil wars end and relative power shifts between groups;
constitutional amendments are passed, resulting in less-favored
groups being given formal equality; the presidency changes hands and
with it one family rises while another falls.
In this paper, we explore data from another such change,
which is more easily accessible. We use data from a paper by
Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel to examine the propensity of
diplomats from across the world to accumulate unpaid parking
tickets in New York City, where they for several years enjoyed
diplomatic immunity.1 Dividing diplomats’ countries into four ruleof-law cultures, we show that there is great variation in the reactions
of diplomats from different cultures. Elites hailing from cultures
where it is common to abuse elite privileges were quick to embrace
the opportunity to do so. Diplomats from countries in which elites
Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, Corruption, Norms, and Legal
Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1020 (2007).
1
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tend to be more accountable were more law-abiding. And
interestingly, those diplomats from strong rule-of-law cultures who
started violating in higher numbers over time, did so occasionally
rather than constantly. These findings suggest that both the perceived
probability of being punished if caught and the cultural acceptance of
elites evading punishment are important parts of theorizing about
deterrence, particularly about corruption among political elites.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II explains a concept
implicit in general deterrence theory: the perceived probability of
being punished if caught for a crime, and also discusses the
importance of ethics and culture in constraining behavior. Here we
also describe the data from New York that we use to explore how
political elites from different rule-of-law cultures respond to a zeroenforcement legal environment. In section III, we explain the
typology that divides countries into four categories of corruption
types that we use in our analysis. Section IV presents diplomats’
responses, by group, to entering a zero-enforcement environment.
Section V concludes.
II. RULE OF LAW AND ELITE DETERRENCE
Scholars of law, economics, sociology, and public policy have
built an extensive literature exploring criminal deterrence in various
contexts.2 The basic model in the literature theorizes that general
deterrence from criminal behavior is a function of the probability of
detection, the size of the sanction, and the benefit that the would-be
violator stands to gain if not detected. Scholars have focused
especially on how changes in the perceived or actual probability that a
See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS,
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Gary S. Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Gary S.
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celebrity,
Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and
Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001); Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (2001); Aaron Chalfin &
Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature (May 9, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
2
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crime is detected and changes in the size of the formal or informal
sanction affect levels of deterrence. Yet, the probability of being
punished if caught for a criminal act is also a key determinant of how
people behave, and therefore of the efficiency of deterrence. In a
review of deterrence literature, Steven N. Durlauf and Daniel S.
Nagin conclude that there is limited evidence of an effect of the size
of a sanction in deterring criminal acts, but considerable evidence
that the certainty of a sanction affects behavior.3 They point out that
while there is an extensive literature about how this certainty is
affected by the probability of detection, little is written about the
probability of being prosecuted and sentenced, that is: the probability
of being punished if caught.
It is not an unreasonable simplification to assume that people
are sanctioned when they are caught for a crime when studying nonelites, but it is a heroic assumption to make about elites. Across the
world there is great variation in elite’s propensity of being sentenced
if caught for a criminal act. In some cases, the law actually mandates
prosecution with a probability of zero. For example, sitting heads of
state enjoy de jure immunity from prosecution under international law,
and the U.S. Department of Justice does not consider a sitting U.S.
President to be “amenable to prosecution.”4 Nevertheless, de jure
immunity is a relatively rare phenomenon. Most people in the world
who are immune from punishment do not enjoy de jure immunity –
the law does not protect them. Rather, they enjoy de facto immunity.
De facto immunity covers a broader set of people across the world and
is based on suspects being able to use bribes, friendships, threats,
coercion, or other means of pressure in order to avoid, minimize,
delay, or completely avoid the sanction.5

Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Overview of “Imprisonment and
Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?” 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 9 (2011).
4
Randolph D. Moss, A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and
Criminal
Prosecution,
24
O P.
O.L.C.
222
(2000),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2000/10/31/op-olcv024-p0222_0.pdf.
5
See Brian J. Fried, Paul Lagunes & Atheendar Venkataramani,
Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and
Discrimination in Latin America, 45 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 76 (2010); Michael
Johnston, Corruption, Inequality, and Change, in CORRUPTION, DEVELOPMENT AND
INEQUALITY: SOFT TOUCH OR HARD GRAFT 13 (Peter M. Ward ed., 1989); Brian
3
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The extent to which elites are able to avoid punishment when
caught for criminal acts is closely related to corruption. Polinsky and
Shavell demonstrate the logic of how corruption undermines
deterrence by making it possible to bribe or extort one’s way out of
punishment.6 Missing from the discussion is how the ability to evade
punishment differs based on individual characteristics: we know that
elites are much more likely to be able to evade punishment than nonelites. We also know that there is great cultural variation in the
acceptance of some people being above the law. In some cultural
contexts, elites can literally get away with murder.
While many countries could provide examples of elites
enjoying a high degree of de facto immunity, we offer examples from
India and Brazil to build intuition. In India’s 2014 elections for the
543 seats in the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), more than
one third of the candidates faced criminal charges – and more than
60% of those faced especially serious charges.7 Moreover, Indian
elites are notorious for using their networks and bribes to make sure
their criminal cases join the judicial backlog, which is now 30 million
cases long.8 In Brazil, experimental evidence suggests that, when
compared to lower-class drivers, upper-class drivers are both less
likely to be stopped when committing a traffic violation and more
likely to receive only a warning during traffic stops that do occur.9
There is great variation in which groups of elites are above
the law both between countries and within countries – people with a
J. Fried, Paul Lagunes & Atheendar Venkataramani, Corruption and Inequality at the
Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America, 45 LATIN
AM. RES. REV. 76 (2010); Joel S. Hellman & Daniel Kaufmann, The Inequality of
Influence (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
6
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 2.
7
Lok Sabha Elections 2014 Analysis of Criminal Background, Financial,
Education, Gender and other details of Winners, report by the Association for
Democratic Reform, May 18, 2014, http://www.adrindia.org/research-andreport/election-watch/lok-sabha/2014/lok-sabha-2014-winners-analysis-criminaland-finan.
8
Ram Mashru, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: India’s 30 Million Case
Judicial
Backlog,
THE
DIPLOMAT,
Dec.
25,
2013,
http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/justice-delayed-is-justice-denied-indias-30million-case-judicial-backlog/.
9
Fried, Lagunes & Venkataramani, supra note 5.
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high socioeconomic status, from historically advantaged ethnic
groups, families or castes, or those who hold government positions,
could all enjoy de facto immunity. Our main point is that for these
elites, neither the size of the formal sanction for committing a crime
nor the detection efforts by the government are the main
determinants of whether they choose to commit a crime.
1. Culture, Institutions, and Ethics
Not all those who have an opportunity to go unpunished will
take advantage of their impunity. Both personal ethics and grouplevel culture could serve as constraints. For example, while it is well
known that some civil servants and politicians in India take kickbacks, speed money, and bribes, many officials are also proud to say
that they never do so.10
Whereas the institutional framework we examine in the
deterrence literature is usually quite clear, the cultural and ethical
mechanisms are not only less tidy, but also less explored in political
science and economics. The line between culture and institutions is
also quite fuzzy. Many aspects of culture can be thought of as a series
of informal institutional rules, some of which work to improve
governance, and some of which work against good governance.11
Moreover, many sanctions are informal, rather than formal,12 such
that an elite who takes advantage of her immunity might still be
ostracized by fellow elites who think that her behavior reflects poorly
on them as a group. But the concept of informal institutions does not
capture all of culture, and does not fully explain the mechanism by
which individuals bring their culture to a new institutional
See Francesca Refsum Jensenius, Power, Performance and Bias:
Evaluating the Electoral Quotas for Scheduled Castes in India (2013) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with University of
California, Berkeley) (interviews with politicians and civil servants in Himachal
Pradesh, Delhi, and Uttar Pradesh in 2010 and 2011).
11
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM LATIN
AMERICA 11 (Gretchen Helmke & Steven Levitsky eds., 2006).
12
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The
Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27
CRIMINOLOGY 721 (1989).
10
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environment, or how culture affects behavior, particularly where
host-environment and home-environment cultural norms conflict.
Social psychologists have long studied acculturation,
emphasizing that a mix of both the person and the situation predicts
behavior.13 Cultures condition the availability and accessibility of
different implicit theories that people use to interpret the social
world. The nature of the situation is comprised, in part, by whether
there is cultural consensus on what the situation is and what the right
course of action will be in a given situation.14 For example, cultures
might vary on interpersonal levels of agreement on whether a certain
behavior – like a political elite not paying a parking ticket – is
acceptable for a given person.15
2. Constraint Decay and Zero-Enforcement Environments
The data we use in this paper are from a study that examines
how diplomats in New York City who had enjoyed legal immunity
responded to a sudden legal crackdown on illegal parking.16 The part
of the data we focus on is the information about parking violations
among diplomats in the pre-crackdown zero-enforcement
environment. Some of these elites neither had de jure nor de facto
immunity in their home countries. For them, moving to New York
City therefore meant a change in the probability of being sanctioned
– providing immunity where none was enjoyed before. For other
elites, who enjoyed immunity in their home countries, there was little
change in their relationship to the law when entering a zeroenforcement environment – they remained above the law. The result
of the legal crackdown studied by Fisman and Miguel was clear:
enforcement worked. In this paper we are more interested in further

13
Walter Mischel, On the Interface of Cognition and Personality: Beyond the
Person–Situation Debate, 34 AM. PSYCHOL.OGIST 740 (1979).
14
Shane T. Mueller & Elizabeth S. Veinott, Cultural Mixture Modeling: A
Method for Identifying Cultural Consensus, 4 ARA TECH. REV. 39 (2008).
15
See generally Ying-yi Ho Hong & Desiree YeeLing Phua, In Search of
Culture’s Role in Influencing Individual Social Behaviour, 16 ASIAN J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 26
(2013) (providing a brief review of the literature).
16
Fisman & Miguel, supra note 1.
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exploring the variation in the behavior of the diplomats from
different legal cultures in the zero-enforcement environment.
A rational choice analysis of a zero-enforcement environment
would predict that, on average, elites would violate the law often, or
at least as often as the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs,
showing at least a partial convergence on a high-violation
equilibrium. A theory of cultural constraints would predict that elites
in a zero-enforcement environment would continue to follow the
norms to which they were accustomed.
But we might imagine that there is a “constraint decay” that
could happen over time, as those who initially are constrained by
culture enter a new environment in which the previously stigmatized
behavior is not stigmatized. This happens regularly in the noncriminal context, as people move from more conservative cultures
spheres to more liberal cultures spheres. It happens in the criminal
context, too, as people travel between jurisdictions that criminalize
certain behaviors (say, possession of marijuana, or consuming alcohol
below a certain age) and those that do not. And finally, it can happen
as elites gain or lose de facto legal immunity.
Our idea of “constraint decay” is similar in nature to what
Nagin refers to as “stigma erosion,” but it is on the opposite end of
the enforcement spectrum.17 Stigma erosion is the gradual decline in
the stigma associated with a behavior after an enforcement change
occurs and behavior becomes newly stigmatized. Here, we examine a
context in which the constraint comes from the culture or
institutions of a previous environment, and we explore whether those
constraints decay over time in a zero-enforcement environment.
There a several ways in which constraint decay could occur.
One is through personal experience, or what is increasingly discussed
as Bayesian updating.18 As a person acts with impunity in a way that
would constitute a violation under the prior regime, the prior
Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the TwentyFirst Century, 23 CRIME AND JUST. 1, 23 (1998).
18
See Shamena Anwar & Thomas A. Loughran, Testing a Bayesian
Learning Theory of Deterrence Among Serious Juvenile Offenders, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 667
(2011).
17
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constraint will slowly erode. In some conservative cultures, members
of the opposite sex are to avoid physical contact, including shaking
hands. In a culture in which no such constraint exists, people from
the conservative cultures might start to shake hands with members of
the opposite sex in order to facilitate other goals (such as business
opportunities or social integration), and the hesitation to offer one’s
hand will decrease with each new handshake that occurs without
social sanction. Or, in the wake of the legalization of possession of
small amounts of marijuana by the City of Denver, Colorado,
someone might smoke marijuana openly in their front yards and
experience no sanction from a nearby police officer. Each time that
happens, they learn that there really is no sanction for possessing and
consuming small amounts of marijuana in that jurisdiction.
Similarly, in an enforcement environment in which political
elites enjoy immunity from parking tickets, elites that are accustomed
to having to pay parking tickets in their home environment could
shed their hesitation from parking illegally over time, as their number
of unpaid parking tickets accumulated without sanction.
Another pathway by which constraint decay could occur is via
the observation of the experiences of others. With the handshake
example, people from conservative cultures would observe
handshakes between men and women without any social disapproval
shown. They do not have to actually take the “risk” of shaking hands
with someone of the opposite sex to learn that no social sanction
exists. Similarly, when it comes to elites, we can imagine them
changing their behavior solely based on the experiences of others
who have been in the new legal environment for a longer time.19

Constraint decay should happen faster for people who have fewer, or
less intense, ties to the home culture upon arrival in the new environment so that
the cultural norms of the home culture are not being consistently refreshed. For
example, a 20 year old college student from the United States (where the drinking
age is 21), who goes to Mexico on a church-related mission project with several
other members of the home church, is much less likely to drink alcohol while in
Mexico (where the drinking age is 18), than if she traveled to Mexico alone for a
study abroad program. The number and intensity of cultural ties among the elite
diplomats we study is impossible for us to observe with our data, so we leave this
hypothesis for others to test.
19
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Our notion of constraint decay can serve to reconcile the
predictions of rational choice theory and a theory of fixed cultural
constraints. If constraint decay drives behavior of elites in a zeroenforcement environment, then we should see a gradual increase in
violations among people from different rule-of-law-cultures over
time, but also a persistence in cultural differences. We might observe
it happen via the experience pathway, such that each ticket predicts
that the next ticket will happen with a shorter delay. And we might
simply observe it happen over time, regardless of the number of
tickets accumulated, which is consistent with the informal contacts
pathway.
III. DATA AND MEASUREMENT
The variation in the legal enforcement of unpaid parking
violations for diplomats in New York City provides an excellent
opportunity to explore what happens to elites from different rule-oflaw cultures in a zero-enforcement environment. Due to the legal
immunity of diplomatic personnel, the City of New York experienced
enormous amounts of illegal parking and unpaid parking tickets by
diplomats in the city. Illegal parking presented particular challenges
when the illegally parked diplomatic cars blocked fire hydrants and
access to handicapped parking spots, in addition to blocking traffic
by double-parking. The police would issue parking tickets every time
they found an illegally parked car from a diplomatic mission,20 but if
the mission did not voluntarily pay the ticket, the police had no
further way of sanctioning the parking violations, since diplomats
could not be taken to court for failing to pay the ticket. As of 2002,
UN diplomats owed the City $18 million because of the 150,000
unpaid parking tickets that they had accrued.21

20
As we explain below, the vast majority of diplomats had no unpaid
tickets over the time period, and we can assume, given the difficulties of parking in
New York City, that many did receive parking tickets over the same time period
and paid them. Hence, ticketing cars with diplomatic plates was a rational strategy
for the NYC parking enforcers.
21
Fisman & Miguel, supra note 1, at 1024.
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When it came to parking, diplomats from across the world
who came to New York City found themselves in a legal
environment where they were above the law. To limit the extensive
abuse of illegal parking, the City of New York enforced a legal
crackdown on diplomatic parking violations in October 2002. The
particular form of the enforcement was not to issue more tickets, but
instead to revoke diplomatic license plates on diplomatic cars that
had accumulated three or more parking violations that went unpaid
more than 100 days.
Using a dataset of month-wise unpaid parking violations for
diplomats in New York City, Fisman and Miguel showed a strong
correlation between the score on a commonly-used, unidimensional
country-level corruption index and the propensity for diplomats from
that country to park illegally in this zero-enforcement environment.22
They also analyzed individual-level data and demonstrated that the
number of unpaid violations per month increased with tenure in New
York City. While the emphasis in their article is on the impressive
effect of enforcement after 2002 – when the New York police started
towing cars that had an unpaid parking ticket – it is also an excellent
empirical example of what Durlauf and Nagin describe as a sudden
change in the certainty of punishment. The data are interesting because
they provide a unique insight into petty violations among elites from
across the world, rather than the more commonly studied college
students and non-elite criminals.23 Finally, it provides evidence of
what happens when individuals from various contexts encounter a
situation where it is common and fairly acceptable to commit an
infraction.

Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance
Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH,
(May 2005), http://go.worldbank.org/2GF3HGVDO0. (The “Kaufmann”
corruption index is one of the most common unidimensional ways to analyze
corruption. It is based on the work of Daniel Kaufmann and coauthors. Kaufmann
was Director of the World Bank Institute when the score was developed).Daniel
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance
Indicators for 1996-2004 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper, May 2005),
http://go.worldbank.org/2GF3HGVDO0.
23
Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 3, at 16.
22

696

2016

Jensenius & Wood

4:2

In this paper, we use data from the pre-enforcement time
period to gain insight into what happens when political elites from
different cultures arrive in a zero-enforcement regime. The data
include the monthly number of parking violations for 1,995
diplomats present in New York for some or all of the time December
1997 until October 2002 – adding up to a total of 17,972 violations
or an average of about 1 violation per diplomat per month across
these years.
1. Rule-of-Law Cultures
Fisman and Miguel found that the overall corruption score of
a country was strongly correlated with unpaid parking violations, but
why was this the case? Why should the overall level of corruption in a
society result in diplomats feeling comfortable breaking the law while
abroad? Why should the habit of business elites in a country paying
their way to contracts, or bureaucrats extorting grease payments for
provision of simple services, or police extorting the citizenry, predict
these elites feeling comfortable parking illegally and not paying for
the parking ticket afterwards? We posit that it is not the level of
corruption in the country per se, but rather the rule-of-law culture and
the extent to which elites are used to (and comfortable with) being
above the law that predicts their behavior.
Measuring the cultural background of diplomats and their
perceived probability of being punished for a crime is not an easy
task. Corruption measures incorporate much more than the rule of
law, and rule of law measures incorporate much more than just the
“thin” concept of whether the government is subject to the law. A
growing literature calls into question the usefulness of existing
measures of the rule of law itself finding that they are both underand over-inclusive for measuring both “thick” and “thin” concepts of
the rule of law.24 General measures of the average rule of law in a

See generally THOMAS CAROTHERS, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Thomas Carothers ed. 2006); Gillian K.
Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Microfoundations of the Rule of Law, 17 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 21 (2013); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Matthew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast,
The Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455 (2009); Melissa A. Thomas, What Do
24
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country do not capture the perceived probability of being punished
for the elite in a country. Our ideal measure might take into account
perceptions of whether the law governs the governors and whether
the judiciary is independent from other branches of government. It
would be less concerned with other aspects of existing measures, like
civil rights protection.25
To approximate the concept we are interested in, we turn to
an interesting effort to measure corruption that emphasizes the role
and importance of elites specifically. Michael Johnston proposed four
“Syndromes of Corruption,” or clusters of country corruption in
multidimensional space.26 His four clusters present an intuitive,
facially valid, description of elite subjection to the rule of law –
indeed, his conception of corruption, on which his clusters are based,
is “uses of and connections between wealth and power that
significantly weaken open, competitive participation and economic
and political institutions, or delay or prevent their development”, in
other words, elites’ uses of their elite status in ways that, even if not
illegal, undermine the country’s institutional frameworks.27
In creating the four syndromes, Johnston conducted a cluster
analysis on data for 97 countries. He used the Polity score to measure
the level of democracy in 1992 and 2002, the World Economic
Forum’s 2002 score for institutional and social capacity, the Heritage
Foundation’s 2002 measure of property rights, and the Economic
Freedom in the World ranking from the Fraser Institute from 1990

the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure, 22 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 31 (2010); SvendErik Skaaning, Measuring the Rule of Law, 63 POL. RES. Q. 449 (2010).
25
In recent years the World Justice Projects has made great gains in
creating such a measure. However, these measures are not available for the time
period of the parking data we use.
26
MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH,
POWER, AND DEMOCRACY, 3 (2005); See also Mark David Agrast, et al., Rule of Law
Index
2011,
WORLD
JUSTICE
PROJECT
2011,
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Rule_of_Law_Index_2011
_Report.pdf (A more recent measure which could be used to operationalize elite
law abidingness now exists: the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, which
measures rule of law according to multiple dimensions, one of which is the
likelihood that elites are punished).
27
Johnston, supra note 27, at 12.
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and 2001.28 Democratic development and institutional and social
capacity would all tend to improve the rule of law, moreover,
impressions of elite legal compliance probably inform the measures
that are survey based. Using data from 1992 and 2002 allowed
Johnston to measure rates of change in these countries, as some of
the countries democratized and liberalized after their transitions from
communism and authoritarianism. Based on these data, Johnston
identified four groups of countries, which he described as Influence
Markets, Elite Cartels, Oligarchs and Clans, and Official Moguls.29
Importantly, the groups of countries cut across region, and one of
their most important distinctions is the status and power of elites in
each country.
Influence Markets (IMs) are eighteen countries that have a
generally high level of human development, are established
democracies, and have a strong rule of law. Leaders face competition
and are constrained from acting arbitrarily, economies are free, and
society is generally able to focus on quality of life, rather than
survival. These countries are called Influence Markets because the
rich generally have access to and influence on power, but the
institutionalization of the state does not allow corruption to violate
the established institutions. In Johnston’s words, “often politicians
serve as middlemen, putting their connections out for rent in
exchange for contributions both legal and otherwise.”30 Influence
markets include Japan, Austria, Uruguay, Finland, Germany, and
Costa Rica, among others. In terms of our discussion, elites’
perceived probability of being punished if caught in Influence
Markets countries probably does not vary much across individuals,
and is close to one for almost all people.
Elite Cartels (ECs), which include Argentina, Belgium,
Botswana, Greece, Israel, and South Korea, among others, are less
28
For more information about Johnston’s methodology, see his
description in Johnston, supra note 27. Our efforts to re-cluster his data by
systematically dropping one indicator at a time have resulted in poorer separation
between clusters.
29
See infra p. 33 Appendix A (providing a full list of the countries, the
rule-of-law cultures to which they pertain, and the distance from the statistical
center of the cluster identified by Johnston’s ANOVA).
30
Johnston, supra note 27, at 42.
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tightly clustered in Johnston’s data, but do share plenty of
commonalities. Namely, “the rules of the game” are less certain in
these twenty-one countries. Elites inside and outside of government
are less constrained by the rule of law, and “relatively established
elites collude within a moderately strong institutional framework.”31
The citizens of these countries are “relatively affluent,” and their
markets are relatively stable and open. However, institutionalization
of government is less well-developed or less-well controlled than in
the IM countries. Because of rapid industrialization or
democratization, elites in these countries find alliances across sector
lines and across the public/private sector divide. Black markets are
more prominent in Elite Cartels than in Influence Markets. In terms
of our discussion, we might expect the probability of being punished
to have a higher variance in ECs than in IMs but to still be fairly
close to one for most people. South Korea is a typical example: the
“rules of the game” are not as predictable as in IM countries, yet two
sons of two different South Korean presidents recently served time
in prison for corruption.32
Oligarchs and Clans (OCs) comprise thirty countries,
including Albania, Bangladesh, Colombia, Ghana, India, Nepal,
Turkey, Russia, and the Philippines. Oligarchs and Clans countries
have reformed politics and economics to a degree, but their
institutionalization has not caught up with their success in those
areas. Rule of law is uncertain in Oligarchs and Clans countries. As a
result of under-institutionalization, political elites will be “ill-equipped
to resist [. . .] abuses.”33 Political and civil rights are not always
guaranteed as a result. Security is low, which results in capital flight,
and political regimes are unstable. Regulation is “extensive and of
dubious quality”, and black markets are extensive.34 People are
generally poor in these countries, and primary exports are relied upon
heavily. In the case of our example, the perceived probabilities of
Id. at 45.
See Caroline Gluck, S. Korean President’s Son Jailed, BBC NEWS WORLD
EDITION (Nov. 1, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2384707.stm;
Nicholas D. Kristof, Seoul’s Mighty, Once Immune, Now Feel the Arm of the Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/14/world/seoul-smighty-once-immune-now-feel-the-arm-of-the-law.html.
33
Johnston, supra note 27, at 45.
34
Id. at 57.
31
32
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punishment for elites in OC countries will vary according to the
would-be offender’s connections to the Oligarchy or Clan that is in
power. Diplomats at the UN Headquarters are likely to be wellconnected to the elite and their home-country expectation of
punishment is therefore likely to be low.
The twenty-nine Official Mogul countries (OMs) are similar
to Oligarchs and Clans countries in that they are riddled with black
markets and poverty with ineffective governance and corruption
controls. However, in these countries, political elites are not
accountable to the people and are therefore effectively immune from
accountability. “[P]olitical power is personal, and is often used with
impunity.”35 Of all the groups, Official Mogul countries offer the
least protection of civil and political rights. They are also heavily
dependent on primary exports, and foreign aid that enters the
country can easily be skimmed off by elites. These countries include
countries like Chad, China, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait,
Morocco, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. In terms of our model, it is clear
that the perceived probability of being punished for a crime for
members of the elite is close to zero. Elites from these countries are
therefore likely to be used to being above the law and feel quite
comfortable with this state of affairs.
When we divide the data for New York diplomats between
December 1997 and October 2002 according to the four rule-of-law
cultures, the data includes 516 diplomats from 17 IM countries, 427
diplomats from 21 EC countries, 566 diplomats from 29 OC
countries and 485 diplomats from 27 OM countries.36

Id. at 46.
Dividing the data into rule-of-law cultures reduces the amount of
information analyzed, because whereas the original parking tickets data included
151 countries, Johnston only has complete data on 95 of those countries. Most of
the countries that are omitted are small, but there are some exceptions such as
Israel and Saudi Arabia that we would like to be able to analyze but cannot for lack
of data. Overall, the patterns in the data do not change much in this reduced form.
Johnston’s sample has a mean corruption level of -0.19, which is slightly less
corrupt (around four percent less corrupt) than the parking ticket data’s mean of 0.009. This is a tiny difference in the data – it is 0.2 standard deviations on the
corruption indicator, and in the original dataset, there are only a few countries
between the original mean (-0.009) and the new mean (-0.19). In the Appendix we
35
36
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In the following sections we use these data to explore or ideas
about rule-of-law cultures and constraint decay.
Our first hypothesis is that because of the varying levels of
elite subjection to the rule of law among the four rule-of-law cultures,
on average, 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" , where 𝑉 is the mean number
of violations per diplomat per month, and the subscripts define the
group of countries. In other words, there should be a clear difference
in the behavior of diplomats from different cultures.
Our second hypothesis is about changes in diplomat behavior
over time. According to a Rational Choice perspective we should
expect to see that as diplomats’ time in New York increases, the
importance of the rule-of-law culture of origin rapidly disappear, such
that 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" . A culturalist explanation would, on
the other hand, would predict little change in behavior over time.
Based on our discussion we would rather expect to see cultural
differences persist (𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" ) but weaken as the
diplomats’ home-country cultural constraints fade over time.
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this section we will look at overall patterns, patterns over
time, and individual-level patterns in parking violations based on the
four rule-of-law cultures introduced in the previous section. We
begin our analysis by calculating the average number of parking
violations per diplomat per month, by group, as illustrated in Figure
1.
As is clear in Figure 1, there was considerable variation in the
average monthly number of violations across diplomats from
countries with different rule-of-law cultures for the period 1997–
2002. The differences in means between the four groups are reported
in Table 1. A series of two-sample permutation tests comparing the
differences in average monthly violations per diplomat between the
different groups of countries indicate that there are clear differences
in the behavior of diplomats from different cultures. In particular it
should the full list of countries in each group, how the groups related to the
Kaufman corruption score and also how it relates to Rule of Law measures.
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should be noted that the OC and OM countries (which have very
similar scores on corruption indices) differ significantly from each
other.37

Average violations per month per diplomat

Figure 1: Average number of parking violations per diplomat
per month, by group (1997-2002)
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We include in the appendix a box plot of both corruption indicators
and rule of law indicators by cluster. See Figures B.1 and C.1.
37
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Table 1: Mean violations per diplomat per month (19972002), by legal culture

IM
EC
OC
OM

Mean by Difference P-value
group
0.14
–
–
0.70
0.56
<0.01
1.06
0.36
<0.01
1.91
0.85
<0.01

Note: The comparison is between the group of countries on the
reporting line and the one listed above it. Data is individual-level
diplomat data on monthly violations aggregated to the country
group. P-values are from two-sample permutation tests with
10,000 permutations, using the perm.test() package in R.

But did all the diplomats start violating the law in this zeroenforcement environment? Table 2 shows the data for the diplomats
present in NYC between December 1997 and 2002. We present
diplomats’ average number of violations per month during the whole
time they were in the city. In this case the sample size given is for
diplomats, not diplomat-months.
We can see that among the diplomats from IM countries about
92% never accumulated unpaid parking tickets even once during their
stay in New York; about 7% let tickets go unpaid on average between
0 and 1 times per month and four diplomats had an average of more
than one unpaid violation per month.
Table 2: Percentages of diplomats with different average
numbers of violations per month
Average monthly
violations
0
(0,1]
(1,3]
(3,5]
>5

IM
(N=516)
92.4
6.8
0.8
0.0
0.0

EC
(N=427)
77.3
17.1
4.0
0.5
1.2
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OC
(N=566)
79.5
11.8
4.4
2.7
1.6

OM
(N=485)
61.2
21.6
11.6
2.7
2.9
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Interestingly, there is a major jump from the behavior of
diplomats from IM countries to EC countries. In the case of EC
countries, about 77% of the diplomats always paid their tickets, while
the rest failed to pay, at least occasionally. The trend we see is that
many of the diplomats from EC countries seemed to have adapted to
the new cultural environment by violating a bit, while few of them
were extreme violators. Among the diplomats from OC countries, on
the other hand, about 79.5% never violated, but there were a few
extreme violators that pulled up the average for the rest.
Looking finally at the diplomats from the OM countries, the
difference is striking: Among the diplomats from the OM countries
about 39% failed to pay parking tickets during their time in New
York City, and several of the diplomats failed to pay more than five
tickets every single month. Coming from a culture where they were
used to being above the law, and being placed in a zero-enforcement
environment, the diplomats from OM countries seem to have felt the
least compelled to follow parking regulations by paying their parking
tickets, or, put another way, the most willing to take advantage of
their immunity.
This provides empirical support in favor of our first hypothesis:
there is a clear rank-ordering in both the number of violations and
the number of diplomats choosing to violate.
We now turn to our hypotheses about convergence and cultural
constraints over time. In Figure 2 we look at the average monthly
number of violations for diplomats broken down by how long they
had been in New York. If diplomats behave purely rationally, then
we should observe them adapting quickly to the zero-enforcement
environment. Whatever their number of violations in the early days,
we should see a convergence at a relatively high level of violations
across groups. If diplomats behave purely according to their home
country cultures, we should see stable cultural differences in the
number of violations, which persist over time. However, if constraint
decay occurs, then we should see cultural differences at the outset,
with an upward creep in the number of violations over time.
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Figure 2: Average number of violations over time, by rule-of-law
culture
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As we show in Figure 2, cultural constraints appear to be present,
but they also seem to decay over time. Interestingly, few of the new
diplomats accumulated unpaid tickets during their first three months
in the city. As expected, the diplomats from OC and OM countries
were quicker to start taking advantage of the zero-enforcement
environment, increasing violations after only three months in New
York City. The diplomats from IM and EC countries seem to have
been more constrained by their cultures, although these constraints
gradually seemed to have weakened over time, with violations
accumulating after 6-12. 38 We view the gradual increase in unpaid
parking tickets in IM and EC countries as evidence of considerable
38
The separation is much clearer than if we run the simple quantiles of
the corruption index, implying that the typology of rule-of-law cultures gives more
explanatory power than the corruption score. Also, in this picture the difference in
the number of violations in OM and OC countries does not look as stark as in in
the previous table. The reason is that more of the diplomats from the OM
countries had stayed in NYC for more than one year. Their overall average was
therefore pulled up by all the frequent violators who had lived in the city for a long
time. We break down the length of diplomatic stay by rule-of-law culture in the
appendix. See Figure D.1.
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constraint decay: the cultural view that it is ethically wrong to take
advantage of one’s elite status dissipated when enough of others in
this new environment violated on a regular basis. At the same time,
Table 2 reminds us that less than 1% of all IM diplomats
accumulated more than one unpaid ticket per month on average.
Substantial cultural constraints remained.
Data on repeat violators helps to complete the picture. We
reduce the data to only the sub-sample of violators who left more
than one ticket unpaid during the time in New York. Among these
repeat violators, the average number of violations the first month they
violated at all was less than 1.5 for IM and EC diplomats. For OC and
OM diplomats it was 2.25 and 2.34, respectively, and these numbers
increased to 3.33 and 2.89 in the second month. Repeat violations
among diplomats from IM and EC countries held more or less steady
in their second month. Looking at how fast diplomats started to
violate, 20% of repeat violators from IM counties accumulated at
least one parking ticket during their first month in the city, a number
that was closer to 30% for the diplomats from EC, OC and OM
countries. On average, repeat violators received their first ticket after
they had spent about three months in the city, with the exception of
diplomats from OM countries, who got their first ticket after less
than two months in the city. Diplomats from IM countries were the
slowest to repeat violations, and diplomats from OC and OM
countries were the fastest. We summarize these results in Table 3.
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Table 3: Violation Behavior Among Repeat Violators

Percent of Diplomats
who were Repeat
Violators
Average Month of
First Violation
Average Number of
Violations, First
Month Violating
Average Number of
Violations, Second
Month Violating
Average Number of
Months between First
and Second Violation
Average Number of
Months between
Second and Third
Violations

IM
(N=34)
21.21

EC
(N=79)
29.11

OC
(N=88)
28.41

OM
(N=146)
30.82

3.03

3.38

3.5

1.80

1.15

1.49

2.25

2.34

1.14

1.57

3.33

2.89

8.10

5.81

4.27

3.49

5.15

3.32

2.41

2.81

Based on our theoretical discussion we believe that for OC and
OM diplomats, a home-country cultural background that views them
as largely above-the-law increased their readiness to “hit the ground
violating”, when compared to diplomats from IM, and to perhaps a
lesser degree, EC cultures.
The data we have presented in the previous sections reveal
several interesting patterns. First, we can to a large extent predict the
behavior of diplomats based on their rule-of-law culture. Diplomats
from OM and OC cultures were less likely to have entered New York
with any constraints on their immunity, and they were quick to start
violating the law. They also responded with frequent violations.
Second, even for diplomats from IM and EC countries, the
propensity to break the law increased over time, suggesting that their
cultural constrains decayed over time.
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Even so, it is important to note that most diplomats actually
complied with the law. Even in a zero-enforcement environment,
most diplomats paid their parking tickets, and among those who did
violate, most violated only once. In light of zero-enforcement and
constraint decay, a large proportion of diplomats seem to have seen it
as legitimate to violate occasionally, but not constantly.
Together these findings point to interesting interactions between
rule-of-law cultures and institutional constraints. Members of a
society might vary in their probability of sanction even if caught redhanded, and deterrence might function quite differently for elites
than for others.
V. CONCLUSION
Rule-of-law cultures and the social status of the actors
involved are both important and under-theorized considerations of
corruption deterrence. While deterrence is often thought of in terms
of the probability of detection and the size of the sanction, the
probability of punishment conditional on being caught is a missing
piece of the theory, and one that we hope to have illuminated in this
paper. This is particularly important in the case of elites, as there are
many groups and individuals across the world that may go
unpunished even in countries with otherwise well-functioning legal
systems.
When diplomats from across the world found themselves to be
effectively immune from punishment for parking illegally, diplomats
from some countries – namely those where elites are accustomed to
being able to evade punishment for criminal acts – took advantage of
the zero-enforcement environment. While existing theories of
deterrence would predict that all diplomats would abuse this rule to
the same extent, or that culture would dominate and levels of
violations would remain unchanged, we see instead that the
diplomats from countries in which elites tend to be more accountable
were more law-abiding. Some diplomats from strong rule-of-law
cultures also started violating in higher numbers over time, as their
cultural constraints decayed.
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Our study has focused on a rarified example – that of political
elites from all over the world living in a zero-enforcement
environment – but it joins other cross-cultural socioeconomic studies
that find cultural differences in economic behavior.39 Future research
on the mechanisms underlying the differences in behavior between
elites and non-elites would deepen our understanding about how
people behave in new institutional settings.

See, e.g., Joseph Henrich, et al., Economic Man in Cross-Cultural
Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. AND BRAIN
SCIENCES 795 (2005).
39
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A. APPENDIX: RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES
Table A.1: Influence Markets

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Influence Market (IM)
Distance from
Country name
Cluster Center
New Zealand
0.91
Germany
2.32
Switzerland
13.65
Netherlands
3.87
Sweden
8.76
Ireland
8.30
Austria
3.60
Australia
7.28
UK
1.29
Costa Rica
3.84
Denmark
3.65
Canada
2.78
USA*
3.86
Uruguay
9.90
France
9.24
Finland
8.24
Norway
7.66
Japan
2.92
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Table A.2: Elite Cartels

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Elite Cartel (EC)
Distance from
Country name
Cluster Center
Czech Rep
2.49
Slovak Rep
2.31
Greece
9.01
Chile
2.34
Paraguay
4.65
Panama
5.72
South Africa
5.52
Spain
7.39
Israel
6.88
Italy
2.98
Hungary
5.75
Namibia
4.57
Korea South
3.22
Portugal
2.63
Botswana
3.64
Belgium
9.07
Poland
3.75
Bolivia
8.03
Zambia
10.62
Brazil
5.54
Argentina
5.72
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Table A.3: Oligarchs & Clans

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Oligarchs & Clans (OC) Distance from
Country name
Cluster Center
Sri Lanka
9.49
Malaysia
7.20
Mexico
7.10
Malawi
2.48
Russia
12.69
Peru
11.62
Pakistan
14.73
Romania
4.25
Philippines
4.14
Nicaragua
2.86
Nepal
3.08
Senegal
7.90
Niger
9.07
El Salvador
2.31
Ecuador
3.99
Benin
1.64
Guatemala
3.63
Ghana
6.99
Turkey
3.24
Bangladesh
9.41
Albania
8.67
Colombia
4.81
Venezuela
8.28
India
3.72
Thailand
7.53
Madagascar
6.79
Jamaica
9.04
Trinidad & Tobago
8.89
Bulgaria
3.69
Honduras
2.99
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Table A.4: Official Moguls

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Official Mogul (OM)
Distance from
Country name
Cluster Center
Tunisia
2.36
Syria
12.33
Zimbabwe
8.38
Uganda
13.63
Togo
3.96
United Arab Emirates
7.44
Tanzania
5.66
Rwanda
2.94
Gabon
5.50
Egypt
5.58
Central Africa Republic
10.60
Indonesia
9.59
Haiti
2.54
Guinea-Bissau
7.93
Cameroon
2.82
Algeria
5.87
Congo Rep of
11.17
China
6.12
Morocco
7.79
Malawi
13.85
Kuwait
5.56
Oman
8.63
Nigeria
10.03
Ivory Coast
7.20
Iran
11.66
Chad
2.94
Myanmar
11.53
Jordan
13.77
Kenya
2.11
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B. COMPARING RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES AND THE CORRUPTION
INDEX

0

●
●

●

−1

●
●

●

−2

Corruption Measure

1

Figure B.1: Level of corruption among the countries belonging
to countries in each of the rule-of-law cultures

IM

EC

OC

OM

Syndromes

How do the rule-of-law cultures relate to the Kaufman
corruption index used by Fisman and Miguel? Figure B.1 shows
corruption levels by rule-of-law culture. As can be seen in Figure B.1,
the Influence Markets’ mean level of corruption is much lower than
for the other groups, the mean level for the Elite Cartels is slightly
higher, while the Official Moguls and Oligarchs and Clans have a
similar and high level of corruption. While the Oligarchs and Clans
and Official Moguls have a fairly low variance on the corruption
index (0.12 and 0.29, respectively), Influence Markets and Elite
Cartels have a much higher variance of corruption levels, 0.44 and
0.51, respectively. Since the Official Moguls and Oligarchs and Clans
have similarly high levels of corruption, using only corruption as an
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indicator would predict a similar level of parking violations by
diplomats from the countries from these rule-of-law cultures.
However, as we observe in the analysis in the main text, diplomats
from the two groups of high-corruption countries behave differently,
lending credence to the idea that rule of law is not adequately
captured by corruption measures.
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C. RULE OF LAW INDEX AND RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES
We do not pursue a strategy involving a new rule of law typology
here because of the under-conceptualization and difficult
operationalization of rule of law over the time period. Specifically, we
lack quality data underlying the 2002 Rule of Law indicator measure
from the World Bank Institute, but even if it existed, is it largely built
on overlapping indices that do not separate nicely into clusters for
analysis. Instead, we show here that the rule-of-law cultures overlap
with the 2002 rule of law indicator in a very similar way as we saw in
Figure B.1, though the pattern is more muted.

0
−1

Rule of Law Measure

1

2

Figure C.1: Syndromes by Rule of Law Measure

IM

EC

OC

OM

Syndromes

We believe that future scholars will be able to better approximate
rule of law measures – both “thick” and “thin” concepts. The World
Justice Project has already made great gains. Its data, unfortunately,
does not overlap with the time period under analysis here.
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ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL
PROPERTIES*
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Worldwide, many cultural properties have been wrongfully exported to other countries in times
of war and colonization. Furthermore, cultural properties are currently constant targets of illegal
transaction due to their substantial economic value. Illicit trade in cultural properties is now the
third largest black market after drug and firearms. There are several international treaties
aimed at combating the illicit export and enabling the restitution of cultural properties. Despite
these efforts, more legislative and judicial cooperation between countries will be necessary to truly
solve the problem. This article reviews international legal instruments for restitution of illegally
exported cultural property, and suggests some new judicial principles that should be applied by
domestic courts for supplementing drawbacks of international treaties. The author suggests to
adopt “lex originis” rule for choice of governing law instead of traditional “lex rei sitae” rule
and to apply to shifting burden of proof to a certain extent to find a solution for disputes over
cultural properties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, two significant incidents occurred regarding the
restitution of cultural properties: Korea recovered 297 volumes of the
royal Uigwe1 that had been carried away by French soldiers from the
Oegyujanggak2 during the French Invasion of 1866 and stored in the
Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BnF)3; and Turkey recovered the
Bogazköy Sphinx, which was the object of a long-running dispute
between Turkey and Germany, from the Pergamon Museum in
Berlin, Germany.4 Those cases captured the world’s attention.
The cultural properties in those cases were illegally exported
during the Imperial Period. The matter of restitution of cultural
properties is mostly recognized as pertaining to cultural properties
illegally exported during World War I, World War II, or the period
when imperialism was rampant, as these types of cultural properties
are at the center of a significant portion of restitution disputes.
According to the Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea, as of
2015 a total of 160,342 pieces Korean cultural properties reside
overseas. Among those cultural properties, approximately 75,000
pieces are thought to have been illegally exported to an estimated 20
countries.
Most of those cultural properties were illegally exported
during the Japanese colonial period, the U.S. military government
period, and the historical turmoil of the Korean War. Most cultural
1
The Uigwe are Royal Records of the State Rites of the Joseon
Dynasty, which ruled the Korean peninsula from 1392 until 1897. Douglas Cox,
Case Note, “Inalienable” Archives: Korean Royal Archives as French Property under
International Law, 18 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROPERTY 410 (2011).
2
The Oegyujanggak was the Royal Library of the Joseon Dynasty,
located outside of the royal palace. Id. at 411.
3
See S. Korea welcomes accord with France on transfer of ‘Oegyujanggak’ royal
books,
KOREA
HERALD,
Mar.
17,
2011,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/03/17/34/0301000000AEN2011
0317001800315F.HTML; see Cox, supra note 1, at 409-23 (for a case study of the
Uigwe).
4
Çorum - Anatolia News Agency, Hattu a reunites with sphinx,
HURRIYET
DAILY
NEWS,
Nov.
7,
2011,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hattusa-reunites-withsphinx.aspx?pageID=238&nID=7062&NewsCatID=385.
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properties plundered and illegally exported during the age of
imperialism have not been returned so far. Even so, the restitution of
cultural properties is becoming a bigger global issue. However, not all
cultural properties were exported during past, unfortunate periods.
Cultural properties are currently constant targets of illegal transaction
stemming from their inherently enormous value. According to the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ), illegal cultural properties
make up the third largest concentrated black market— after the
illegal drug and firearms markets.5 In particular, illegal transactions of
cultural properties in the Middle East are reported to be a basis for
funding terrorist groups.6,7
With the development of means of communicating and
conducting transactions, the current illegal trade of cultural properties
has grown to include not only criminal organizations, but also
ordinary people. For example, the illegal transaction of cultural
properties is frequently carried out using online auction sites such as
eBay8 and international parcel delivery services.9 This situation is

5
Noah Charney et al., Protecting Cultural Heritage from Art Theft:
International Challenge, Local Opportunity, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. (U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, D.C.), Mar. 2012, https://leb.fbi.gov/2012/march/protecting-culturalheritage-from-art-theft-international-challenge-local-opportunity.
6
See Kimberly L. Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves: Organized Crime and
the Illicit Antiquities Trade, 45 IND. L. REV. 601, 609-611 (2012); Russell Howard et
al., Digging in and Trafficking out: How the Destruction of Cultural Heritage Funds Terrorism,
8 CTC SENTINEL 14, 14-17 (2015); Janine di Giovanni et al., How does ISIS fund its
reign
of
terror?
NEWSWEEK,
Nov.
6,
2014,
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/how-does-isis-fund-its-reign-terror282607.html.
7
On Feb. 12, 2015, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2199
at its 7379 meeting. Resolution 2199 condemns the destruction of cultural heritage
in Iraq and Syria, particularly by ISIL and ANF, and also decrees that all Member
States shall take appropriate steps to prevent the trade in Iraqi and Syrian cultural
properties and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and
religious importance that have been illegally removed from Iraq since Aug. 6, 1990
and from Syria since Mar. 5, 2011, including by prohibiting cross-border trade in
such items. United Nations, Press Release, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2199
(2015), Security Council Condemns Trade with Al-Qaida Associated Groups,
Threatens
Further
Targeted
Sanctions,
Feb.
12,
2015,
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11775.doc.htm.
8
Kurt Siehr, Unidroit Convention of 1995 and Unclaimed Cultural Property
without Provenance, 2013 ELTE L. J. 89, 95 (2013).
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additionally problematic given the people involved in such
transactions are often unaware that the transactions run afoul of the
law.
International societies agree on the necessity of preventing
illegal transactions of cultural properties and returning them to their
source countries. In response to this increasing problem, they have
established various international norms, such as the 1970 UNESCO
Convention10 and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.11 However,
some disputes over the restitution of cultural properties cannot be
resolved through such conventions. Those disputes can be resolved
through diplomatic channels, mutual agreements, or decisions of
domestic courts.
Although each country usually has a national law to prevent
illegal exportation of cultural properties, few nations have any special
act applicable to disputes over the restitution of cultural properties.
Therefore when a lawsuit for the restitution of illegally exported
cultural properties is filed in a domestic court, the competent court
has no option but to apply general legal principles applicable to a
lawsuit over other goods. However, if the court applies general legal
principles, it might overlook the unique characteristics of cultural
properties. Cultural properties differ from typical goods given that
the property contains special relevance to the historical, spiritual, and
cultural identity of a state unlike other goods. This intrinsic and
specialized value exemplifies why cultural properties should not be
distributed by normal market forces.

9
Crime ring busted for smuggling Korean relics overseas, DONG-A IIBO, Apr.
27, 2012, http://english.donga.com/List/3/all/26/403691/1.
10
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970, Nov. 14,
1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 321, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter 1970
UNESCO Convention]. The Convention has been in force since Apr. 27, 1972,
with
131
State
Parties
as
of
April
2016.
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E
(last
accessed May 4, 2016).
11 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, June 24, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter 1995 UNIDROIT Convention].
The Convention has been in force since July 1, 1998, with 37 State Parties as of
April 2016. http://www.unidroit.org/status-cp (last accessed May 4, 2016).
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Based on such a viewpoint, this paper suggests some legal
principles that could be applied to international disputes over
restitution of cultural property, particularly in the global context.
Chapter II examines the meaning and characteristics of cultural
property. Chapter III reviews international legal instruments for
prevention of illegal exportation of cultural property and restitution.
Chapter IV identifies some problems posed in cases where a lawsuit
over restitution of cultural property is filed in a domestic court, and
suggests new judicial principles to solve the problems. Chapter V
summarizes the conclusions.
II. THE MEANING OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
A. The Definition of Cultural Property
At the outset, it is imperative to clarify what should be
identified as cultural property. The classification of the property itself is
a preliminary question to all legal challenges in the restitution of
cultural property issues. It is difficult to establish a universal
definition of cultural property. Broadly stated, the term cultural property
refers to objects with artistic, ethnographic, archaeological, or
historical value.12 Cultural property includes art, artifacts, antiques,
historical monuments, rare collections, religious objects of
importance to the cultural identity of a group of people, and other
items representing significant historical, artistic, and social
accomplishments.13
The word property has a semantic nuance limited to tangible
things. However, a product of the cultural activities of a human being
or tribe contains a myriad of intangible things. Therefore, the term
cultural heritage is sometimes used as a broad concept encompassing
not only tangible, but also intangible cultural products.14 Also, the use
of word property in relation to cultural property slants considerably
12
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES:
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART AND LAW 27 (2nd ed. 2009).
13
Christine K. Knox, Note: They’ve lost their Marbles: 2002 Universal
Museums’ Declaration, the Elgin Marbles and the Future of the Repatriation Movement, 29
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 315, 317-318 (2006).
14
Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural
Property’?, 1 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 307, 307-08 (1992).
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toward economic value and connotes protection of the rights of the
possessor.15 Thus, the term cultural object is sometimes used instead of
cultural property to exclude the implication of ownership. Because
uniform standards have not been established for the definition of
cultural property, and each country defines the term according to its
national laws or classification by its experts.16 The terms are
commonly used interchangeably without strict differentiation. Since,
in the interest of brevity, all the legal definitions of cultural property
by each state cannot be reviewed, this section focuses on the
definitions in major conventions.
It is noted that the 1954 Hague Convention17 is the first time
the term cultural property was employed in an international legal
context.18 The 1954 Hague Convention compromised in defining
cultural property by using an illustrative definition in the form of lists
of cultural properties as objects of protection. Article 1 of the 1954
Hague Convention describes the objects entitled to consideration as
cultural properties regardless of their origin and ownership.19 By
Id. at 307, 309-10.
ART LAW HANDBOOK 391 (Roy S. Kaufman ed., 2000).
17
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954, May
14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention]. The Convention
has been in force since August 7, 1956 with 127 States Parties as of April 2016.
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E
(last
accessed May 4, 2016)
18
Manlio Frigo, Cultural property v. cultural heritage: A “battle of concepts” in
international law?, 86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 367, 367 (2004).
19
See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 17, at 242. [Definition of
cultural property].
For the purpose of the present Convention, the term ‘cultural
property’ shall cover, irrespective of origin or ownership:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the
cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of
architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular;
archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of
historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books
and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest;
as well as scientific collections and important collections of
books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined
above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or
exhibit the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph
15
16
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contrast, Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention provides a
specific definition of cultural property.20 As regards the notion of
cultural property, Cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism
(a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives,
and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict,
the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a);
(c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property as
defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as ‘centers
containing monuments’.
20 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, at 234-35.
For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘cultural property’ means property
which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as
being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science
and which belongs to the following categories:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and
anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science
and technology and military and social history, to the life of
national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artist and to events of
national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or
archaeological sites which have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely
by hand on any support and in any material (excluding
industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated
by hand);
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any
material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any
material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and
publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific,
literary, etc.) singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic
archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old
musical instruments.
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have been a source of contention,21 and international conventions
properly consider both views. The 1954 Hague Convention defines
cultural property as objects of protection from the standpoint of
cultural internationalism.22 Although the 1970 UNESCO Convention
embraces both cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism, it is
generally perceived to have favored cultural nationalism.23 This
understanding is supported by the preamble of this Convention:
Cultural property constitutes one of the basic
elements of civilization and national culture, that its
true value can be appreciated only in relation to the
fullest possible information regarding origin, history
and traditional setting, and that it is incumbent upon
every State to protect the cultural property existing
within its territory against the dangers of theft,
clandestine excavation, and illicit export.24
This expression puts stresses on the national characteristics of
cultural property.
Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention enumerates 11
abstract categories in its definition of cultural property and
commissions a concrete definition of cultural property to a special
designation within each state. That is, among the items enumerated
from (a) to (k), only those “specifically designated” by each state are
acknowledged as cultural properties.25 In other words, the 1970
UNESCO Convention vests each country with broad discretion to
determine what should be protected as cultural properties.
Accordingly the State Parties deem which specifically designated
items will be protected as cultural properties under their national laws
pursuant to this Convention. In addition to the categories provided
in Article 1, Article 4 establishes five categories of cultural
properties.26 Article 4 protects items that are worth protecting, but
21
John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80
AM. J. INT’L L., 831, 831-833 (1986).
22
Id. at 833.
23
Id. at 842.
24
See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, at 232.
25
See supra text accompanying note 20.
26
See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, at 237-38:
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not specifically designated as cultural property under national law per
Article 1.
The most controversial issue in the drafting of the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention was how to define cultural objects.27 Some
advocated a comprehensive definition, while others sought a concrete
and enumerative definition. Ultimately, the Convention used an
eclectic approach.28 Particularly, the Convention adopted a
comprehensive clause for the definition of cultural property in Article
229 and enumerated concrete objects to be regarded as cultural
property in the Annex.30

The States Parties to this Convention recognize that for the
purpose of the Convention property which belongs to the
following categories forms part of the cultural heritage of each
State:
(a) Cultural property created by the individual or collective
genius of nationals of the State concerned, and cultural property
of importance to the State concerned created within the territory
of that State by foreign nationals or stateless persons resident
within such territory;
(b) cultural property found within the national territory;
(c) cultural property acquired by archaeological, ethnological or
natural science missions, with the consent of the competent
authorities of the country of origin of such property;
(d) cultural property which has been the subject of a freely
agreed exchange;
(e) cultural property received as a gift or purchased legally with
the consent of the competent authorities of the country of origin
of such property.
27 IRINI A. STAMATOUDI, CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW AND RESTITUTION:
A COMMENTARY TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND EUROPEAN UNION
LAW 72 (2011).
28
Id.
29 See 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, at 464, which states:
For the purposes of this Convention, cultural objects are those which, on religious
or secular grounds, are of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history,
literature, art or science and belong to one of the categories listed in the Annex to
this Convention.
30 Id. at 473. The Annex states:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and
anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science
and technology and military and social history, to the life of
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B. Cultural Property as res extra commercium
Things (goods) can be classified according to diverse
academic criteria. One type of classification is the characterization of
goods as res in commercio (a thing inside commerce) or res extra
commercium (a thing outside commerce).31 Res in commercio includes
objects that can be transacted under private laws; contrariwise res
extra commercium objects cannot be so. Most countries have cultural
property protection–related laws, which prohibit the transfer or
distribution of cultural property. The origin of such provisions needs
some explanation.
The classification of objects into res in commercio and res extra
commercium dates back to the Institutiones and Digesta of the Corpus iuris
civilis issued from 529 to 534 by order of Justinian I, Eastern Roman
Emperor.32 The Corpus iuris civilis classifies objects into those subject
national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of
national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or
archaeological sites which have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on
any support and in any material (excluding industrial designs and
manufactured articles decorated by hand);
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and
publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific,
literary, etc.) singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic
archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old
musical instruments.
31
AMAILE WEIDNER, KULTURGÜTER ALS RES EXTRA COMMERCIUM IM
INTERNATIONALEN SACHENRECHT 15 (2001).
32
Id. at 15.
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to human law (res humani iuris) and those subject to divine law (res
divini iuris). Res divini iuris, things that build the relationship between
god and man, were regarded as res extra commercium and could never
be alienable in any case.33 Things among res humani iuris could also be
regarded as res extra commercium, such as res publicae, which belongs to
the state; res communes omnium, which refers to natural things such as
air, sea, and rivers; and res in patrimonio Caesaris, which refers to
Caesar’s Legacy.34 In the case of artworks, the Corpus iuris civilis
established some as res divini iuris and others as res publicae, both of
which were res extra commercium. The remaining artworks could be
transacted as res private, which were personal belongings.35 The
current classification of things and the concept of cultural property
under the cultural property protection–related laws of each country
thus fundamentally originated in the Corpus iuris civilis. Res sacra under
Canon Law succeeded res extra commercium for artworks under the
Corpus iuris civilis. Afterwards, first in Europe, Greece promulgated a
cultural property protection law in 1834, followed by France in 1887,
Italy in 1902, and Germany in 1955.
Currently, most states acknowledge inalienability for certain
types of cultural properties according to their own cultural property
protection–related laws. Nowadays, the idea of cultural properties as
res extra commercium means the property can be inalienable and
imprescriptible under private law. Furthermore, the property can be
state-owned under public law and thus be forbidden goods for export
and import under international trade law.36
In Korea, Article 21 of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act
forbids the export of cultural properties. Article 54 of the same Act
prohibits any transfer or establishment of private rights for stateowned cultural properties. The foundation of those provisions is in

Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 18-19.
35
Id. at 19-21; MARC WEBER, UNVERÄUßERLICHES KULTURGUT IM
NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN RECHTSVERKEHR 6 (Dr. Wilfried Fieldler,
Dr. Dr.h.c. Erik Jayme, Dr. Kurt Sieher, eds., 2002)
36
WEIDNER, supra note 31, at 35-43. See also Kurt Siehr, Legal Aspects of
the Mystification and Demystification of Cultural Property, 16 ART, ANTIQUITY & LAW
173, 202-203 (2011).
33
34
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the classification of res extra commercium for artworks under the Corpus
iuris civilis.

III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR RESTITUTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY
A. Multilateral Conventions
1. The 1954 Hague Convention
World War I and World War II brought unprecedented
plunder and destruction of cultural property to the world, which
clarified a need to establish an international convention to protect
cultural heritage in time of war. In 1954 at The Hague, the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict37 and a separate optional protocol called the First
Protocol were adopted. The 1954 Hague Convention and the
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, which constitute
an integral part of it, are the basic and comprehensive international
treaty focusing on the protection of cultural property during wartime
or armed conflict.38 The 1954 Hague Convention is supplemented by
the First Protocol,39 adopted with the Convention, and the Second
Protocol,40 adopted in 1999. It is also influenced by incidents that
took place in Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 17.
John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the
Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part Two), 28 ENVT’L L. & POL’Y J.
1, 38 (2004).
39
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, The Hague 14 May 1954 [hereinafter First
Protocol] First Protocol of has been in force since 7 August 1956 with 104 States
Parties
as
of
April
2016.
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=15391&language=E
(last
accessed May 4, 2016).
40
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, March 26, 1999
37
38
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The major content of the 1954 Hague Convention about the
restitution of cultural property is contained in the First Protocol.
Each signatory state agrees to prevent the exportation of cultural
property from any territory it occupies during an armed conflict41; to
take into its custody cultural property imported into its territory
either directly or indirectly from any occupied territory42; and to
return, at the close of hostilities, to the competent authorities of the
territory previously occupied, cultural property in its territory.43
Cultural property taken from the territory of a signatory state and
deposited by it in the territory of another signatory state for the
purpose of protecting such property against the dangers of an armed
conflict shall be returned by the latter at the end of hostilities to the
competent authorities of the territory from which it came.44
2. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
Given the 1954 Hague Convention was promulgated on the
premise of a special situation, the protection of cultural property in
the event of armed conflict, international society started debating the
need to establish a more comprehensive international instrument
applicable for a broader protection of cultural property.
Immediately after World War I, the League of Nations
debated the matter of plunder of cultural property.45 UNESCO
prepared a draft convention about the restitution of artistic,
historical, or scientific objects illegally transferred in cooperation with
the Office International des Musées (OIM).46 However, this attempt failed
to advance further because of the outbreak of World War II in 1939,
and afterward, UNESCO could not help concentrating on the 1954
[hereinafter Second Protocol]. The Second Protocol has been in force since 27
April
1972
with
68
State
Parties
as
of
April
2016.
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=15207&language=E
(last
accessed May 4, 2016).
41
First Protocol, supra note 39, at Part I.
42
Id. at Part I.2.
43
Id. at Part I.3.
44
Id. at Part II.5.
45
PATRICK J. O’KEEFE & LYNDEL V. PROTT, CULTURAL HERITAGE
CONVENTIONS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS 64 (2011).
46
PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE 1970 UNESCO
CONVENTION 3 (2nd ed. 2007).
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Hague Convention.47 As newly independent and East European
countries with particular interest in the restitution of cultural property
increasingly participated in that Convention, UNESCO came to face
new challenges. In particular, Mexico and Peru posed problems of
unlawful trade in cultural property during the 11th General
Conference of UNESCO in 1960, and it became clear that the First
Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention alone could not deal with
these problems comprehensively.48 Accordingly, UNESCO adopted
the Recommendation on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Export, Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property in 1964 as a
preliminary step.49 A convention draft based on that
Recommendation was circulated to collect the opinions of member
states in 1968, and the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Export, Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property was adopted on November 14, 1970 by the General
Conference of UNESCO at its 16th session. This is called the 1970
UNESCO Convention, and it established an international normative
framework to prevent the illicit traffic of cultural property during
peacetime.50
This Convention, which contains a preamble and 26 articles,
protects cultural property from illicit trade by means of
administrative enforcement and international cooperation, rather
than by private law. The major contents of this Convention are as
follows: (a) the Convention acknowledges that the import, export, or
transfer of ownership of cultural property effected contrary to the
provisions adopted under this Convention is illicit51; (b) member
states undertake to set up national services and establish a list of
important public and private cultural properties to be protected52; (c)
they undertake to introduce an appropriate certificate for the export
of cultural property53; (d) they agree to take the necessary measures
O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 45 at 64.
O’KEEFE, supra note 46 at 5.
49
Id.
50
Jennifer N. Lehmen, The Continued Struggle with Stolen Cultural Property:
The Hague Convention, The UNESCO Convention, and The UNIDROIT Draft Convention,
14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 527, 538 (1997).
51
1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, art. 3.
52
Id. at art. 5.
53
Id. at art. 6.
47
48
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against the acquisition or import of illegally removed cultural
property54; (e) they undertake to impose penalties or administrative
sanctions on any person involved in the illicit import or export of
cultural property55; (f) they undertake to participate in a concerted
international effort to determine and carry out the necessary concrete
measures under the Convention56, and (g) the Convention regards the
export and transfer of ownership of cultural property under
compulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a
country by a foreign power as illicit.57
3. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention
Problems with the 1970 UNESCO Convention underlay the
emergence of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.58 First, the 1970
UNESCO Convention was not self-executing, and thus the signatory
states had to adopt domestic legislation to implement it.59 In other
words, unless the signatory states to the UNESCO Convention
legislate domestic laws, the Convention does not become effective to
the signatory states directly. Second, with respect to the
implementation of the Convention, the signatory states can adjust the
provisions or measures of the Convention pursuant to their domestic
laws or regulations. Thus, the contents or level of scrutiny of the
Convention adopted by each signatory state lack uniformity. This
becomes an impediment to achieving purposes of the Convention.60
Third, Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention defines cultural property
only as cultural properties specifically designated by each member
state, leaving undiscovered or unexcavated cultural property

Id. at art. 7.
Id. at art. 8
56
Id. at art. 9.
57
Id. at art. 11.
58
Nina R. Lenzner, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does
The UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the
UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L., 469, 490-91 (1994); Carol A.
Roehrenbeck, Repatriation of Cultural Property-Who Owns the Past? An Introduction to
Approaches and to Selected Statutory Instruments, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO 185, 196
(2010).
59 ANDREA
F. G. RASCHÈR, KULTURGÜTERTRANSFER UND
GLOBALISIERUNG 53 (2000).
60
Id. at 61.
54
55
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unprotected.61Fourth, because the UNESCO Convention operated
mainly in terms of public law, it had limitations to stipulating clear
regulations in terms of private law, such as good faith acquisition.62
To solve those problems, UNESCO requested the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) to
complement the regulations of private laws for a substantial
implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.63 Accordingly, a
preliminary draft was prepared by an expert study group, mainly
written by Austrian professor Gerte Reichelt. The Diplomatic
Conference to adopt the draft convention was held in Rome under
the auspices of the Italian government in June 1995, and the current
1995 UNIDROIT Convention64 was adopted through the voting of
member states on July 24, 1995. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention
was intended to solve the problems inherent in the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, to embody the regulations of the UNESCO
Convention, and to establish uniform rules among states that would
facilitate the effective restitution of unlawfully possessed cultural
properties in terms of private law.
The adoption of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention does not
reduce the meaning or function of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
Whereas the UNESCO Convention aimed to “prohibit” and
“prevent” the export, import, and transfer of ownership of stolen or
illegally exported cultural properties, the UNIDROIT Convention
focuses on the “restitution” or “return” of stolen or illegally exported
cultural properties. So, the directing points of these two conventions
differ. Besides, the UNESCO Convention authorizes the contracting
“state” to take mainly “administrative” measures to prevent the
export and import of unlawful cultural properties, whereas the
UNIDROIT Convention gives the “owner” or “state” “judicial”
61
Ian M. Goldrich, Balancing the Need for Repatriation of Illegally Removed
Cultural Property with the Interests of Bona Fide Purchasers: Applying the UNIDROIT
Convention to the Case of the Gold Phiale, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 118, 137-138 (1999);
Kathleen Anderson, The International Theft and Illegal Export of Cultural Property, 8
NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 411, 421 (2002).
62
RASCHÈR, supra note 59, at 65.
63
Lyndel V. Prott, UNESCO and UNIDROIT: A Partnership Against
Trafficking in Cultural Objects, 1 UNIF. L. REV. 59, 61 (1996).
64
See 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11.
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powers to demand restitution or the return of cultural properties. In
this sense, the two Conventions have complementary goals.65
The features of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are
summarized as follows: First, the UNIDROIT Convention enables
claimants to demand the restitution of unregistered cultural
properties or privately owned cultural properties, unlike the
UNESCO Convention.66 Second, the UNIDROIT Convention does
not allow the good faith acquisition of stolen or illegally exported
cultural properties. Instead, such cultural properties should be
compulsorily returned.67 Third, it stipulates that a fair and reasonable
compensation should be paid to an acquirer in good faith instead of
unconditional restitution.68 Forth, the Convention imposes limitation
periods within which claimants must demand the return or restitution
of cultural property.69
B. Bilateral Agreements
1. Overview
Because multilateral conventions must contain common
concerns among all stakeholder countries, agreeing on concrete
content is difficult. In contrast, bilateral agreements can express the
interests of both parties; therefore, bilateral agreements are more
effective than a multilateral convention in attaining specific goals. In
cases where the return of a specific cultural property emerges as an
issue between country A and country B, the best way to solve the
problem is generally to conclude a bilateral agreement on the return
of the cultural property in dispute. For instance, Korea recovered the
Oegyujanggak Uigwe, stored previously in the BnF, through an
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Restitution of the Oegyujanggak
Uigwe between France and Korea in 2011.70 That same year, Korea
recovered another Uigwe of the Joseon Dynasty, which had been held

65
66
67
68
69
70

STAMATOUDI, supra note 27, at 67.
1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, at art. 3, 5.
Id.
Id. at art. 4, 6.
Id. at art. 3, 5.
See supra notes 1-3.
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in the Kunaicho of Japan, by an Agreement on the Return of
Historical Archives between Japan and Korea.
Bilateral agreements not only target the restitution of specific
cultural property, but can also comprehensively handle overall
matters related to the restitution of cultural property between two
countries. There are many agreements which exemplify what can be
covered by a bilateral agreement. In the Belgo-Zairian Cultural
Agreement, concluded in 1970, Belgium agreed to return to Zaire71 all
the ethnological and artistic cultural properties acquired during the
colonial period.72 The Treaty on the Return of Stolen Cultural
Property, established in 1970 between the U.S. and Mexico,
concluded in 197073 stipulates that, e.g., when the Mexican
government requests the U.S. government to return stolen cultural
property, the U.S. government shall recover and return it to the
Mexican government.74 Similarly, in 1997 the U.S. and Canada
concluded an agreement prohibiting the import and export of objects
of archaeological and ethnological value75 in accordance with the
UNESCO Convention.
Bilateral agreements are effective in preventing illicit trade of
cultural property between neighboring states. Because of the wide
perception that multilateral conventions have little effect on the
restitution of cultural property, the adoption of bilateral agreements
is increasing.
Known as “Democratic Republic of the Congo” since 1997.
Huguette van Geluwe, Belgium’s Contribution to the Zairian Cultural
Heritage, 31 MUSEUM 32, 35 (1979); Treaty of Cooperation Between the United
States of American and the United Mexican States Providing for the Recovery and
Return of stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Propertties, July 17, 1970,
22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088.
73 Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen
Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 494,
T.I.A.S. No. 7088.
74
Regarding the meaning of this Treaty, see Michael S. Blass, Legal
Restrictions on American Access to Foreign Cultural Property, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177,
1193-1194 (1978).
75
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government
of the Unites States Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Certain
Categories of Archeological and Ethnological Material, April 10, 1997, CA1 EA
97T08 EXF.
71
72
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2. Exkurs: Agreement on Cultural Property Between the Republic
of Korea and Japan
A typical example of a bilateral agreement on the restitution
of cultural property signed by Korea is the Agreement on the Art Objects
and Cultural Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea76 in 1965.
After Korea’s emancipation from Japanese colonization in 1945,
Korea and Japan held seven rounds of bilateral talks from 1951 to
1965, culminating in the Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the
Republic of Korea,77 which stipulated normalization of their relations.78
Based on that Treaty, the Agreement on Cultural Property Between
Korea and Japan, which has a preamble, 4 articles of text, and an
annex, was also signed.
Among the contents of this Agreement, the significant article
related to the restitution of cultural property is Article 2: “The
Government of Japan shall, in accordance with the procedure to be
agreed upon between the two Governments, turn over to the
Government of the Republic of Korea the art objects enumerated in
the Annex within six months after the entry into force of the present
Agreement.”79 Article 2 mentions the subject, object, procedure, and
time of the turnover of cultural property.80

76
Agreement on the Art Objects and Cultural Co-operation between
Japan and the Republic of Korea, June 22, 1965[hereinafter Agreement on
Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan], translated in “The World and
Japan” Database Project at the University of Tokyo, available at
http://www.ioc.utokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPKR/19650622.TNE.html,
(last visited May. 4, 2016).
77
Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea,
June 22, 1965, translated in “The World and Japan” Database Project at the
University
of
Tokyo,
available
at
http://www.ioc.utokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19650622.T1E.html,
(last visited May. 4, 2016).
78
See Geoffrey R. Scott, Spoliation, Cultural property, and Japan, 29 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 803, 854-57 (2008) (discussing the background and proceeding of this
Treaty).
79
Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan, supra
note 76.
80
Id.
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The subject of the turnover is the Japanese government, and
the subject of the takeover is the Korean government. The objects of
transfer are cultural properties enumerated in the Annex. The Annex
specifies a list of cultural properties totaling 1,432 pieces, including:
ceramic ware, archaeological relics, stone-made art objects, books,
and articles related to the postal service and telecommunications. The
procedure of turnover complies with a mutual agreement between
Korea and Japan.81 The time of turnover is stipulated as within six
months of the entry into force of the Agreement.
However, this Agreement has the following problems: First,
because the cultural properties exported to Japan during the colonial
period were illegally exported, the action to be taken should be
expressed as ‘recovery (回收)’ or ‘restitution (返還),’ but it is instead
neutrally expressed as ‘turnover (引き渡).’ This fails to make clear
the illicitness of the original export of the cultural property to Japan.
Second, this Agreement limits the cultural properties for turnover to
the 1,432 pieces of cultural property enumerated in the Annex.
After the Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea
and Japan was signed in 1965, the 1970 UNESCO Convention and
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention were concluded. There is a need
to review the correspondence between the Agreement on Cultural
Property Between Korea and Japan and the two Conventions.
Although both Korea and Japan signed the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, neither of them signed the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention. I here review the relationships among those three
treaties as if both Korea and Japan had signed the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention.
The Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and
Japan is a bilateral agreement, and the 1970 UNESCO Convention
and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are multilateral conventions.
Therefore, the Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and
Japan is special law (lex specialis), and the 1970 UNESCO Convention
and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are general law (lex generalis).
According to the principle of Lex specialis derogat legi generali,82 the
81
82

Id. at art 2.
Latin maxim meaning “Special law repeals general laws.”
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Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan should be
applied over both Conventions. In terms of enforcement date, the
Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan
corresponds to prior law, and the 1970 UNESCO Convention and
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention correspond to posterior law.
Thus, according to the principle that Lex posterior derogat legi priori,83
the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention should be applied over the Agreement. Although those
ideas seem contradictory, they are actually not. If only the cultural
properties in the Annex to the Agreement on Cultural Property
Between Korea and Japan are targeted, this Agreement will take
precedence as lex specialis. However, if cultural properties illegally
exported to Japan other than those enumerated in the Annex are
included, then the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention take precedence as lex posterior.
IV. NEW JUDICIAL PRINCIPLES
A. International Conventions, National Laws and Domestic Courts
As of 2015, 129 states have signed the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, and only 37 states have signed the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention.84 The difference between those two numbers is caused
by a considerable difference in normative aspect rather than the gap
between the enforcement dates of these two conventions.
Under the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the subjects of its
rights and obligations are the governments of signatory states, which
should meet its requirements. In contrast, under the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention, not only signatory states, but also
organizations and individuals, obtain rights or obligations for
restitution of cultural properties. In other words, the 1970 UNESCO
Convention has the nature of public and administrative law85,
whereas the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention has the nature of private
law centered on the restitution relationship between the current

83
84
85

Latin maxim meaning “Posterior law abrogates prior laws.”
See supra notes 10 and 11.
RASCHÈR, supra note 59, at 65.
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possessor and original owner.86 In determining whether cultural
property is illicitly acquired or not, the 1970 UNESCO Convention
stipulates that the national laws of contracting states should be
applied,87 whereas the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention directly
specifies ‘theft’ and ‘illicit export’ as the object of regulation.88 The
two conventions also show a great difference in the binding force of
their provisions. Since the 1970 UNESCO Convention is not selfexecuting, it secures no executive power against non-implementation.
On the contrary, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention is self-executing
and a competent court in a signatory state can directly apply the
Convention’s provisions as governing law.89
This difference works as an important factor when each state
decides to join the convention. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
concnerns mainly the intent of signatory states’ administrative actions
for protecting cultural property, and so it is not difficult to
implement. Besides, because the Convention is not self-executing,
signatory states do not have to worry about normative binding power
or feel a great burden in signing this Convention. However, since the
1995 UNIDROIT Convention has direct effects on not only the
governments of signatory states, but also common individuals, it can
collide with domestic legal systems such as civil law. Thus, states have
shown reluctance to sign the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention until the
relations between its provisions and those of national laws have been
properly established.90 Thus, notwithstanding the international
convention to prevent illicit traffic in cultural property, national laws
still play an important role in tackling disputes over the restitution of
cultural property.

86
Zsuzsanna Veres, The Fight Against Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property:
The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, 12 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 91, 100 (2014).
87
1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, art. 3. See PATRICK J.
O’KEEFE, supra note 46, at 41 (providing interpretation of this Article).
88 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, art. 2, 3, and 5.
89 RASCHÈR, supra note 59, at 70; see also BETTINA THORN,
INTERNATIONALER KULTURGÜTERSCHUTZ NACH DER UNIDROITKONVENTION 97 (2005).
90
Michael L. Durta, Sir, How Much is that Ming Vase in the Window?:
Protecting Cultural Relics in the People’s Republic of China, 5 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. &
POL’Y J. 62, 76-77 (2004).
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Suppose a cultural property owned by a private museum in
country A has been illegally exported to country B. If both country A
and country B are signatory states to the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention, the original owner of country A can file a lawsuit in a
court in country B to demand the restitution of cultural property
against the current possessor. In this case, the court decides on the
restitution of the cultural property based on the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention.91 If neither country A nor country B is a signatory to the
1995 UNIDROIT Convention, a court would decide on the
restitution of the cultural property according to domestic norms. In
that case, the civil law and cultural property protection law of the
country concerned are most central to domestic norms. Civil law and
cultural property protection law differ among countries. For instance,
under the Korean legal system, Korean civil law and cultural property
protection law are written in a code. Under the Anglo-American legal
system, civil law consists primarily of judicial precedent. The
definition of cultural property also varies by country, as do the
contents or scope of laws regulating cultural property.
The principles of trial are not currently specifically established
to handle disputes about the restitution of cultural property. Thus,
each country’s court is likely to handle a lawsuit filed for the
restitution of cultural property in the same way it handles a dispute
over the restitution of other objects. However, as reviewed above,
cultural property is res extra commercium,92 and thus it is not desirable to
handle lawsuits about cultural property in that way. Considering the
peculiarities of cultural properties, courts should apply special legal
doctrines to a case of restitution of a cultural property. For a given
cultural property, a new principle should apply in choosing the
governing law relevant to the dispute, and the burden of proof
should shift to the defendant.
B. New Principle for Choice of Governing Law
When a cultural property has been exported from a country
and situated in the territory of another country, and a person claiming
To apply the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention to this case, a cultural
property had to be stolen or exported after both states became parties to the
Convention. 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, at art. 10.
92
See supra notes 31-36.
91
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ownership of the cultural property has filed a lawsuit in a court, the
court must choose which state’s law governs.93 The substantial legal
issues in the ownership of an exported cultural property are
summarized as follows: First, if a cultural property was illegally
exported and distributed, and a third party has acquired the cultural
property without perceiving this inherent illegality, the court must
decide whether to recognize good faith acquisition for the third party.
Second, in cases where a third party has acquired the property outside
a transaction process and fails to meet the requirements for good
faith acquisition, the court must decide whether to recognize the
ownership based on the acquisitive prescription and whether the
right to demand restitution is extinguished according to the extinctive
prescription.
Representatively, the case of Winkworth vs. Christie, Mason &
Woods Ltd.94 was a case of whether to recognize good faith
acquisition. The case of Koerfer vs. Goldschmidt95 was a case of whether
acquisitive prescription was completed. The case of Greek Orthodox
Patriarchate of Jerusalem vs. Christie’s, Inc.96 was a case of whether or not
the extinctive prescription was completed. The requirements and
exercise processes for good faith acquisition, acquisitive prescription,
and extinctive prescription vary by country. So, in legal relationships
with foreign elements, which country’s law will be chosen as the
governing law is a decisive factor affecting lawsuit results.
The courts where the above-mentioned lawsuits were filed
chose the governing law according to the principle of lex rei sitae.
More specifically, those case were decided according to the laws of
the countries where the cultural properties were situated at the time a
juristic act to acquire it was performed or a juristic fact to create its
legal ownership was completed. When a court decides on a right
about an object, especially a movable object, it is not inherently
wrong to choose, as a governing law, the local law of the country
93
MICHAEL ANTON, INTERNATIONALES KULTURGÜTERPRIVAT- UND
ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT 426 (2010).
94
Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd., 1 All E.R. 1121 (1980).
95
Koerfer gegen Goldschmidt, BGE 94 II 297 (Swiss Federal Court, Dec. 13,
1968).
96
Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc., 1999 WL
673347 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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where the act of altering a right is performed or a fact of creating a
right is completed. In fact, that choice is a general principle of private
international law.97 Also, if a court decides the dispute according to
the principle of lex rei sitae, the local law of that time is applied to a
transaction or acquisition performed within the territory where the
object is situated. Another result isthat, insofar as the court of a third
country respects the sovereignty of the country where the object is
situated, the court observes international comity.98
Although the principle of lex rei sitae is generalized in that
way, its application to cultural properties as if they were ordinary
objects can hardly deflect criticism for mechanically applying the law
without any thought of the nature of cultural properties. Suppose
that a cultural property owned by person of country A was stolen
and exported to country B and there purchased at an antique shop by
person , who does not know how it came to the shop. If person
filed a lawsuit in a court of country B against person demanding
the restitution of the property, the court in country B should decide
which country’s law is governing. In this case, if the court in country
B chooses according to the principle of lex rei sitae, the law of country
B where the object is currently situated will become the governing
law. If country B’s law recognizes good faith acquisition, person
will be able to maintain ownership through good faith acquisition.
Furthermore, suppose that person now sells this object to
person
in country C, and person
currently has possession. If
person has filed a lawsuit in a court of country C against person
demanding the restitution of the property, the court of country C
must also decide which country’s law is governing. This time, if,
according to the principle of lex rei sitae, the court of country C
decides whether or not person has properly acquired ownership of
the object, it will judge whether or not person
meets the
requirements of good faith acquisition. In that case, the governing
law would be the law of country B where the object was situated
when person ’s good faith acquisition was completed. Also, if the
court of country C judges that person
fails to meet the

Derek Fincham, How Adopting the Lex Originis Rule Can Impede the Flow
of Illicit Cultural Property, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 111, 115 (2008).
98
Id. at 115.
97
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requirements of good faith acquisition but person is likely to meet
them, it can choose and apply, as a governing law, the law of country
C where the object was situated when person ’s good faith
acquisition was completed.
That is the mechanism for the choice of a governing law
according to the principle of lex rei sitae currently applied. However, it
can be justified only on the condition that the cultural property in
question is viewed as an object of transaction. In other words, that
procedure is only justifiable if the features of res extra commercium are
completely excluded from the cultural property, and it is considered a
normal object. However, cultural property is an object sui generis that
has inalienability as part of its basic nature; therefore, it is
inappropriate to treat cultural properties like normal objects.
Moreover, the legal regulations protecting cultural properties vary by
country. Suppose that a cultural property is illegally exported from
country A to country B. If country A’s law prohibits the distribution
or good faith acquisition of a cultural property, but country B’s law
recognizes good faith acquisition, the ownership of the cultural
property can be easily changed or laundered in country B by illegally
exporting the cultural property from country A to country B and
there involving an innocent third party for completion of good faith
acquisition. Afterwards, the illegal cultural property can be legally
distributed. In this hypothetical, country A’s law for cultural property
protection becomes meaningless. Thus, the principle of lex rei sitae is
likely to be abused as means of ownership laundering for cultural
properties, which require a principle of governing law different from
that of normal objects.
To this end, the principle of lex originis has been suggested as
an alternative.99 In cases where the principle of lex originis is adopted
as a governing law applicable to legal disputes about cultural
properties, the problem becomes deciding what should be viewed as
99
German scholar Prof. Erik Jayme has already proposed connecting
the factor “Heimatrecht” (law of home-country) and the developed lex orignis
rule in international disputes over cultural property. Erik Jayme, Internationales
Kulturgüterscchutz: Lex originis oder lex rei sitae – Tagung in Heidelberg, IPRAX 1990 at
347; see also Erik Jayme, Neue Anknüpfungsmaximen für den Kulturgüterschutz im
internationalen Privatrecht, in DOLZER ET AL., RECHTSFRAGEN DES
ITERNATIONALEN KULTURGÜTERSCHUTZES 5 (1994).

743

2016

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:2

the ‘origin’ of a cultural property to determine the ‘connecting
factors.’ Because cultural properties are historical products unlike
other objects, it is difficult to uniformly define their origin, which
requires consideration of multiple criteria,100 such as: religious value,
national identity, place where the cultural property was produced,
place where the cultural property is situated, place where the cultural
property was installed, place where the cultural property was found,
place where the cultural property was inherited, and place where the
cultural property was designated as res extra commercium.
In summation, a court having jurisdiction over cultural
property disputes should judge what connecting factors should be
established and which country’s law should be adopted as a
governing law. In this regard, two values can conflict: transaction
safety and cultural property protection. In other words, the court
must decide whether to place a high value on protecting a good faith
purchaser of a cultural property or to privilege the original owner of a
cultural property. A court that emphasizes the former will generally
determine governing law according to the conventional principle of
lex rei sitae, whereas a court that regards the latter as more important
will adopt the alternative principle of lex originis as governing law. In
short, the principle of lex rei sitae is generally appropriate as governing
law for normal objects, whereas the principle of lex originis is
appropriate for cultural property.101
C. Shifting the Burden of Proof
Who bears the burden of proof in a civil suit greatly affects
the results. In the period of Roman law, the general principal for the
burden of proof was not stably established. However the principle
“Necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit”102 was in common use.
Afterwards, with the development of the law of evidence, a
contemporary principle of the burden of proof was established by
100

WEIDNER, supra note 31, at 194-201; ANTON, supra note 93, at 851-

91.

101
Fincham, supra note 97, at 146; Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-ofLaw Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen Cultural Property, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
1177 (2005).
102
Latin maxim meaning “The burden of proof is on the one who
declares, not on one who denies.”
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German scholar Leo Rosenberg: Each party to proceedings must
assert and prove the existence of the conditions for application of the
rule on which s/he relies.103 According to this principle, if an object
has been transferred from its owner to another person without legal
ground and is currently kept by the other person, the owner should
prove ownership of the object.
But what if the object is a cultural property? Current civil
procedure laws have no specific regulations in that regard. If the
principle of the burden of proof is equally applied to a cultural
property, the person who asserts ownership of the cultural property
currently possessed by another person must prove ownership of the
object and that the other person possesses it illegally. However, that
principle is inappropriate to cultural properties because they have
basically the nature of inalienability, unlike normal objects. If a
cultural property designated as res extra commercium by a national law is
transferred to other place, it does not exist under normal conditions.
So in that case, the person who currently possesses the cultural
property should be required to prove he has duly acquired it. If he
fails to prove his legitimacy in possessing the cultural property, the
property should be returned to the original owner.
It could cause confusion to the current property system to
shift the burden of proof for all cultural properties in restitution
lawsuits. Accordingly, the burden of proof should be shifted only for
cultural properties that meet certain requirements. Such cultural
properties can be reviewed in terms of two aspects. The first is
category, such as cultural properties that represent royal authority and
religious cultural properties that belonged to churches or temples. It
should be difficult to assume that a state or churches or temples sold
or donated such cultural properties to other persons. An individual
person who possesses those kinds of cultural property should be
required prove that s/he acquired it legitimately. The second aspect
concerns the time of acquisition. If a cultural property was exported
without a legitimate source of right in a time of war or colonization,
it cannot be easily accepted that the current possessor of the cultural

“Jede Partei hat die Voraussetzungen der ihr günstigen Norm (=
derjenigen Norm, deren Rechtswirkung ihr zugute kommt) zu behaupten und zu
beweisen.” in LEO ROSENBERG, DIE BEWEISLAST 98-99 (1965).
103
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property acquired it legitimately. Therefore, in that case, the current
possessor should be required to prove that s/he acquired it
legitimately. However, it is necessary to set a time limit for that shift
in the burden of proof to recent wars or colonial periods with
reasonable current influence.
As a possible example for shifting the burden of proof,
consider a special exhibition called the Ogura104 collection in the
Tokyo National Museum, Japan. It contains a helmet and armor
worn by King Gojong, who reigned when Japan annexed Korea.
That armor and helmet are those King Gojong put on in war and are
the symbols of the supreme commander. Thus, they cannot have
been transferred or donated to another person. They were quite likely
to have been exported during the Japanese colonial period, and it is
unlikely that they were sold or donated to Ogura. Thus, if the Korean
government were to demand that the Tokyo Museum return them,
the Tokyo Museum, as current possessor of the cultural properties,
should be required prove that it acquired them legitimately.
V. CONCLUSION
These days, each state tries to protect its cultural properties
and recover illicitly exported cultural properties. There is controversy
over whether cultural properties are the exclusive property of each
country (cultural nationalism) or the common heritage of humanity
(cultural internationalism). However, it is obvious illicit trafficking of
cultural properties should be prohibited and illicitly exported cultural
properties should be returned to their country of origin. The 1970
UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are
based on that perception. These international conventions are
important because they are international standards to prevent the
illicit export of cultural properties and enable the restitution of illicitly
exported cultural properties. However, because the 1970 UNESCO
104
Ogura Dakenoske (小倉 武之助: 1870–1964) was a Japanese
businessman who collected a huge number of Korean cultural properties during
the Japanese colonial era in Korea. He donated his collected Korean cultural
properties to the Tokyo National Museum. Park Soo-mee, Legacy Lost: Korea’s
Missing Treasures, KOREA JOONGANG DAILY, Dec. 22, 2008,
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2898892
(last accessed May 4, 2016).
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Convention focused on administrative measures of the government
to “prevent” the illicit trafficking of cultural properties and lacks selfexecuting power, it is limited to being a basic norm for the restitution
of illicitly exported cultural properties. To reinforce those weak
points, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention was promulgated, but
counties worried about recession in the art market are reluctant to
sign. These two Conventions cannot be applied to restitution of
cultural properties exported illicitly to other countries before signing
the Convention because neither of them has retroactive effects.
Therefore, countries involved in disputes over the restitution of
cultural properties tend to solve them by concluding bilateral
conventions. The 1965 Agreement on Cultural Property Between
Korea and Japan has a significant meaning in that it was a
comprehensive attempt made between Korea and Japan to handle
the restitution of cultural properties exported during the Japanese
colonial period.
Disputes over restitution of cultural properties that are not
subject to multilateral or bilateral conventions can be solved through
the decision of a court. However, no specific legal regulation under
domestic laws is applicable to disputes over restitution of cultural
properties, which means that legal principles applied to normal
objects have been applied to disputes over cultural properties.
However, cultural properties are basically res extra commercium, a
concept that originated in Roman law and is acknowledged in each
country’s cultural property protection law. Disputes over cultural
properties require application of legal principles different from those
used for normal objects. In other words, it is desirable for courts to
apply the principle of lex originis instead of lex rei sitae in choosing
governing law.105 Furthermore, when proving the ownership of a
cultural property, it is also desirable to make a defendant prove
legitimate acquisition of cultural properties within certain categories.
Applying that suggestion to lawsuits presents challenges.106
105
It is remarkable that Belgium adopted in the Codification of Private
International Law of July 27, 2004, a modified lex originis rule regarding recovery
of the illegally removed cultural patrimony. See Fincham, supra note 97 at 147.
106
For example, these two problems might actually be difficult to solve:
a concrete criterion for deciding on the country of origin of a cultural property
and a concrete criterion to determine which cultural property can be accepted
for shifting the burden of proof.
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Nevertheless, if a court acknowledges the peculiarity of cultural
properties and adopts that suggestion, international disputes over the
restitution of illicitly exported cultural properties could be solved
more smoothly.
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THE PRUDENTIAL CARVE-OUT CLAUSE:
IS RISK THE NEW CORRUPT MORAL?
John Anwesen*

This Article presents the first analysis of the WTO panel report in Argentina – Measures
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, the first decision interpreting one of the most
controversial clauses in the General Agreement on Trade in Services – the prudential carve-out
clause. Prudential carve-out clause has been a matter of controversy ever since the Uruguay
Round of Negotiations, when the text was adopted, and remains a matter of debate decades
after. The panel report in Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
issued in September of 2015, clarified that national measures violating free trade commitments
need not be “prudential” and only the reasons for those measures must. However, the panel’s
interpretation of the word “prudential” as “preventative” or “precautionary” raises questions.
Panel’s interpretation left this word essentially powerless.
This Article takes on the task of interpreting the prudential carve-out clause following relatively
more of a mechanical framework utilized by the Appellate Body in United States – Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services. The Appellate Body in
that case used Vienna Convention’s rules of treaty interpretation. Following Vienna
Convention tools of treaty interpretation, this Article proposes that “prudential,” while
remaining vague, conveys some sort of a reasonableness standard. After the recent international
financial crisis, as countries increasingly engage in regulations of the financial services sector,
challenges to such regulations are becoming more likely. Therefore, a close examination of the
prudential-carve out clause may help the regulators, potential challengers, and WTO dispute
settlement bodies better understand what may or may not be a permissible regulation affecting
the international supply of financial services.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Horace (65-8 B.C.), the Roman lyric poet, in Odes says: “The
sea brought contact with strangers who could disrupt domestic life by
exposing citizens to the bad manners and corrupt morals of
barbarians.”1
The Great Financial Crisis, which officially started in
December of 2007, affected virtually all countries around the globe.2
The collapse in international trade due to the Financial Crisis was
“exceptional by historical standards.”3 There are many arguments
about what caused or contributed to the Financial Crisis. Certainly it
is difficult to point to one or several causes in a complex world of
voluminous interconnected economic transactions. If the task is to
avoid a financial crisis, one will inevitably be required to consider the
past causes. However, if one accepts that financial crises are
inevitable because of many causes, then the task becomes how to
contain a potential future crisis—instead of trying to avoid it. If one
of the aspirations and objectives for promoting liberalized
international trade is world peace—countries depending on each
other through trade are less likely to be involved in direct conflicts—
such dependency has its downside when one economic sector of one
country collapses and pulls various world economies into a
downward-spiral. It is no secret that a closed, isolated economy
would be immune to international economic crises, but that economy
will forgo all of the benefits of liberalized trade during times of
prosperity.

DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE 12 (1996).
BUSINES CYCLE DATING COMMITTEE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DETERMINATION OF DECEMBER 2007 PEAK IN
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 2 (2008).
3
Andrei A. Levchenko, Logan T. Lewis & Linda L. Tesar, Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, The Collapse of International Trade During the 2008-2009 Crisis 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16006, 2010) (“Relative to
economic activity, the drop in trade is an order of magnitude larger than what was
observed in the previous postwar recessions, with the exception of 2001. The
collapse appears to be broad-based across trading partners: trade with virtually all
parts of the world fell by double digits.”).
1
2
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Although the days of Horace are long gone and trade may no
longer expose citizens to “bad manners and corrupt morals,” trade in
financial services may expose them to financial risks. The question
then becomes how a country would reap the benefits of liberalized
international trade and protect its citizens from the risk of potential
financial crises. While countries may attempt reducing toxic risk
exposure in the area of financial services, such attempts may violate
various World Trade Organization (“WTO”) commitments.
However, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”)
provides an avenue for countries to claim an exception under the
prudential carve-out clause. This exception has been long subject to
controversy ever since the negotiations on the text began, because
negotiators attempted to strike the right balance between free trade
and the national right to regulate—an issue that remains unresolved.
Part II of this Article will introduce the historical
development of the GATS to show the complexity of the
negotiations.
Part III will introduce the GATS structure and summarize
some of its parts to give relevant general background information.
Part II will point out some of the other GATS exceptions because
the reasoning for those exceptions will be useful for limiting the
scope of the prudential carve-out clause, as discussed in Part V.
Part IV will introduce the prudential carve-out clause and
summarize a recent WTO panel report that interpreted parts of the
clause for the first time, adopting a three-prong legal standard. One
of the prongs of the legal standard is a requirement that measures
must be “prudential,” meaning “preventative” or “precautionary,” as
interpreted by the panel.
Part V will analyze the panel report and argue that panel’s
interpretation of “prudential” is overly broad in some sense and
could lead to absurd regulations. To do so, Part V will follow
previous WTO Appellate Body decisions which utilized treaty
interpretation rules of the Vienna Convention. This Part will propose
that “prudential” should have some determination of reasonableness
which the panel report did not require. Further, Part V will argue that
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the broad scope of the prudential carve-out clause is narrowed by the
existence of other exceptions in the GATS.
Part VI will conclude.
II. GATS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) was drafted in the Second World War’s aftermath by
delegates of many countries during 1946-47 and signed on 30
October 1947.4 For almost a half-century since GATT entered into
force in 1948, it did not get much attention from international
diplomats and lawyers, except for international trade enthusiasts,
because the main focus of the times was the Cold War.5 However,
GATT eventually led to the birth of the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) in 1995.6 The Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (“WTO Agreement”) contains four Annexes, the first
item in the Annexes (Annex 1A) is “GATT 1947”—now known as
“GATT 1994.”7 GATT essentially governs trade in goods,8 while the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1B to the WTO
Agreement, deals with services.9 While GATT existed for over a halfcentury, GATS is relatively a new agreement. Services were not
always conceived as being internationally tradeable. This conceptual
shift about services occurred in the early 1970s and mid-1980s—
from services as non-tradeable to services as tradeable.10 Business
pressure was one variable which caused the conceptual change
among countries towards the idea that services could be traded
internationally by private enterprises.11 For example, the American
RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 5-7 (3d ed. 2007).
Id. at 7.
6
Id. at 8.
7
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
8
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
9
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS].
10 BHALA, supra note 4, at 1541-42.
11 Id. at 1542.
4
5
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financial service sector (e.g., American Insurance Group (AIG),
American Express, Bank of America, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, J.P.
Morgan, and Merrill Lynch) saw expansion opportunities to countries
with emerging middle classes and began lobbying for removal of
trade barriers with respect to services.12
GATS was a product of complex 1986-93 Uruguay Round of
negotiations and was not finalized until 1994.13 GATS negotiations
were described as “sector-by-sector—tortuous, inch-by-inch, as it
were.”14 One factor contributing to the difficulties encountered
during negotiations was that because of the way services are traded,
GATS trade liberalization provisions had to extend further into postborder measures when compared to GATT provisions.15 Another
contributing factor to the complexity was how commitments under
GATS were made.16 GATS commitments are generally classified into
general and specific, where specific commitments apply only to
specific service sectors and sub-sectors to which a WTO member
(“Member”) has committed to; moreover, the specific sectors and
sub-sectors are further narrowed by one or more of four modes of
supplies through which that service may be supplied.17 Even after the
Uruguay Round was completed and the basic GATS text was
finalized, significant trade liberalization commitments were made
through Members’ schedules of specific commitments.18
Negotiations for market access commitments in the area of
financial services were extended to June 30, 1995 and later extended

12
Id. at 1542-43 (“No GATT contracting party wanted services trade
liberalization on the agenda of any new round of multilateral trade negotiation
more than the U.S.”).
13
Id. at 1539.
14
BHALA, supra note 4, at 1549.
15
Id. at 1541 (“In general, trade in services involves much more behindthe-border regulation than does trade in goods.”).
16
Id. at 1539.
17
See id. at 1578-91.
18
See id. at 1540 (citing WTO, Second Protocol to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, S/L/11 (July 24, 1995); WTO, Third Protocol to the General Agreement
on Trade in Services, S/L/12 (July 24, 1995); WTO, Fourth Protocol to the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, S/L/20 (Apr. 30, 1996); WTO, Fifth Protocol to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, S/L/45 (Dec. 3, 1997)).
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by another month.19 Negotiations took place in the middle of the
Asian economic crisis which could have been used by countries such
as Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand as an excuse
not to liberalize the trade in financial services.20 However, instead the
Asian leaders agreed that Newly Industrialized Countries and Least
Developed Countries would benefit from liberalization perhaps
because it would permit cheaper financial capital flow into the
markets of those countries.21 Then on December 12, 1997 an
agreement on financial services commitments was made which
covers a substantial portion of trade in banking, securities, insurance
and financial information.22
III. GATS SUMMARY
GATS is composed of the Preamble, six separate parts to the
Agreement, and followed by Annexes. One of these Annexes is the
Annex on Financial Services. Part I of the GATS deals with the
scope by, inter alia, defining trade in services through modes of
supply.23 Part II relates to general commitments.24 Part III relates to
specific commitments.25 Part IV covers negotiations, schedules of
specific commitments, and modifications of those schedules.26 Part V
contains institutional provisions such as the dispute settlement and
enforcement.27 Part VI mainly contains definitions and states that the
Annexes are an integral part of the agreement.28 Without going into
all of the GATS details, few segments of it are important for
purposes of this Article: the Preamble, four modes of supply, general
commitments, specific commitments, exceptions from commitments,
and dispute settlement.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

BHALA, supra note 4, at 1581.
Id. at 1581-82.
Id. at 1582.
Id. at 1581.
GATS, supra note 9, art. I.2.
See generally id. art. II-XV.
See generally id. art. XVI-XVIII.
See generally id. art. XIX-XXI.
See generally id. art. XXII-XVI.
See generally id. art. XXVII-XXVII.
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A. GATS Preamble
The Preamble to GATS recognizes seven important
objectives and considerations: (1) importance of trade in services for
the growth and development of world economy, (2) economic
growth through expansion of trade under the conditions of
transparency and progressive liberalization, (3) liberalization through
successive rounds of multilateral negotiations aimed at promoting the
interests of all participants while giving due respect to national policy
objectives, (4) recognizing the general right of Members to regulate,
and more specifically, introduce regulation on the supply of services
within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives, (5)
development of developing countries, (6) facilitate increasing
participation of developing countries in trade in services, (7) special
economic situation and economic development of least-developed
countries.29
B. Four Modes of Supply
Trade in services is defined in an unusual way. Instead of
saying what trade in services is, GATS defines the trade in services
through how the supply of service is performed. There are four ways
in which a service can be supplied—the four modes of supply: (1)
“from the territory of one Member, into the territory of any other
Member,” i.e. cross-border supply, for example providing customer
services from one country to the customers of a company in another
country; (2) “in the territory of one Member to the service consumer
of any other Member,” i.e. consumption abroad, for example a
tourist consuming the services of a guide abroad, (3) “by a service
supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the
territory of any other Member,” i.e. commercial presence, for
example a branch operating abroad that provides banking services to
consumers abroad, (4) “by a service supplier of one Member, through
presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other

See GATS, supra note 9, Preamble; cf. BHALA, supra note 4, at 1569
(In an attempt to avoid overlapping statements, objectives are stated and organized
in a different manner in this Article.).
29
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Member,” i.e. temporary movement of natural persons, for example a
visiting professor teaching abroad.30
C. General Commitments
Commitments under GATS are categorized into general and
specific.31 General commitments are the minimum obligations that
apply across the board to all sectors and sub-sectors of supplied
services.32 General commitments in GATS Part II are: the Most
Favored Nation treatment (“MFN”) under Article II, and
Transparency under Article III of GATS.33 MFN treatment requires
any treatment which a Member accords to like services and service
supplies of any other country to be immediately and unconditionally
accorded to the other Members’ service suppliers.34 In other words,
when two countries liberalize trade among each other and one of
them is a Member, any favorable treatment related to service supply
granted by the Member is automatically multilateralized for all
Members.35 Finally, Article III contains transparency commitments
related to “all relevant measures of general application which pertain
to or affect the operation of [GATS].”36
D. Specific Commitments
Specific commitments in GATS Part III cover mainly two
topics: National Treatment and Market Access.37 According to GATS
Part III, a Member may make market access and/or national
treatment commitments in specific sectors (sub-sectors or sub-subsectors) of supplied services; moreover, a Member can also specify

30
31
32

GATS, supra note 9, art. I; see also BHALA, supra note 4, at 1546-48.
See GATS, supra note 9, Table of Contents.
See GATS, supra note 9, art. II.1, III.1; see also BHALA, supra note 4,

at 1578.
33
34

GATS, supra note 9, art. II, III.
See GATS, supra note 9, art. II; see also BHALA, supra note 4, at 1579-

82.
35

See GATS, supra note 9, art. II; see also BHALA, supra note4, at 1562-

36

GATS, supra note 9, art. III.
See id. art. XVI, XVII.

63.
37
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the mode(s) of supply to which such commitment(s) are applicable
to.38
Once a Member makes specific market-access
commitment(s), unless the specific commitment(s) provide otherwise,
Member may not impose: (1) “limitations on the number of service
suppliers,” (2) “limitations on the total value of service transactions
or assets,” (3) “limitations on total number of service operations or
on the total quantity of service output,” (4) “limitations on the total
number of natural persons that may be employed,” (5) measures that
restrict or require a particular form of legal entity organization, (f)
limitations on foreign shareholding percentage or total value of
foreign investment.39
Once a Member makes specific national treatment
commitment(s), unless the specific commitment(s) provide otherwise,
the Member must “accord to services and service suppliers of any
other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of
services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own
like services and service suppliers.”40
E. Exceptions
GATS provides many exceptions from general and specific
commitments. The applicability of the prudential carve-out clause
may depend on the reasoning of those exceptions, as discussed in
Part V(A)(2), and at this point it is sufficient to be generally aware of
the existence of those exceptions. Some of those exceptions include:
economic integration agreements, labor market integration
agreements, balance of payment safeguards, MFN exemptions,
government procurement, providing advantages to adjacent
countries, emergency safeguard measures, essential security interest,
disclosure of information contrary to public interest, movement of

38
39
40

Id. art. XVI.1, XVII.1; see also BHALA, supra note 4, at 1585.
GATS, supra note 9, art. XVI.2.
Id. art. XVII.1.
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natural persons, administration of domestic regulations, and general
exceptions.41
For example GATS Article XIV, General Exceptions
provides five types of measures which a Member may implement that
are exempted from the Member’s general or specific commitments.42
Of the five categories of measures, three of the categories require
measures to be “necessary.”43 For example, subparagraph (c) in part
permits implementation of measures “necessary to secure compliance
with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Agreement . . . relating to . . . the prevention of
deceptive and fraudulent practices. . . .”44 In other words, if a
Member is implementing a law or a regulation related to prevention
of deceptive and fraudulent practices, and that law or regulation is
not inconsistent with Member’s commitments under the Agreement,
any measures that are necessary to the implementation of such law or
regulation are also exempted from the Agreement—even if those
necessary measures are inconsistent with the Agreement.45
Additionally, such measure(s) will not be exempted if arbitrary or
discriminatory without legitimate justification(s).46
While the scope of each of these exceptions may be a topic
for a separate article, it may be consequential on the ultimate
determination of whether the prudential carve-out clause applies.

See generally id. art. II.2, II.3, V, VI, X, XII-XIV bis, Annex on Article
II Exemptions.
42
Id. art. XIV.
43
Id. art. XIV.(a)-(c).
44
Id. art. XIV.(c).
45
See id; see generally Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶300-27,
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services].
46
See GATS, supra. note 9, art. XIV; see also U.S. – Gambling and Betting
Services, supra note 45, ¶ 339-51.
41
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IV. ANNEX ON FINANCIAL SERVICES: PRUDENTIAL CARVE-OUT
CLAUSE
Trade in the financial service sector is also governed by the
Annex on Financial Services (the “Annex”).47 The tension between
trade liberalization commitments and nations’ sovereignty presents
itself in the prudential carve-out clause contained in the Annex.
Prudential carve-out clause provides an exception from general and
specific GATS commitments:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of the
Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from
taking measures for prudential reasons, including for
the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders
or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a
financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity
and stability of the financial system. Where such
measures do not conform with the provisions of the
Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of
avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations
under the Agreement.48
This text in the GATS has attracted much attention. Many
have claimed that the prudential exception was not clear and
clarification was necessary, sometimes attempting to provide
clarification.49 Also, there has been some confusion about whether
GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services.
Id.
49
See generally Communication From Barbados: Unintended Consequences of
Remedial Measures taken to correct the Global Financial Crisis: Possible Implications for WTO
Compliance, COMMITTEE ON TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES, ¶¶ 11, 23,
JOB/SERV/38,
(Feb.
18,
2011),
https://www.coc.org/files/BarbadosSubmission.pdf (“It would seem that the
wording of paragraph 2 of the GATS Annex on Financial Services may need to be
amended.”); Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial Services in the GATS and Domestic
Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155 (1997) (“The scope of this exemption to
basic GATS principles is not well defined. It can therefore be expected that
measures taken under this provision will be the subject of controversial
interpretation in the future, possibly in the context of dispute settlement
procedures.”); Juan A. Marchetti & Petros C. Mavroidis, What Are the Main
Challenges for the GATS Framework? Don’t Talk About Revolution, 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
47
48
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the measure or the reason for that measure must be prudential in
order to qualify as an exception under the clause.50 Some have stated
that further clarification was necessary with respect to the apparent
contradiction between the first and the second sentences, sometimes
calling the clause a “self-cancelling loophole.”51 Others expressed
concerns that the exception will be used for disguised protectionist
measures.52 Some predicted that the issue will eventually appear in
REV. 511 (2004) (“Examples of provisions the scope of which is unclear
include: the scope of the so-called ‘prudential carve-out.’”); Dominique Servais &
Julie Dutry, GATS 2000: High Stakes for the Financial Services Sector?, 6 INT. BUS. L. J.
653, (1993) (“[T]he clause is interpreted differently according to the country.”);
Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, GATS’ Prudential Carve Out in Financial Services and Its Relation
with Prudential Regulation, 57 INT. COMP. L. Q. 613 (2008) (“The difficulty of the
prudential carve out is that while the uncertainty caused by its text is clear, there
has not been any indication or the urgent need to revise it.”); Michael S. Barr &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT. L.
15 (2006) (“[T]he financial services accord requires market liberalization and
national treatment, but permits countries to engage in valid ‘prudential measures’
that would otherwise be inconsistent with the agreement; the scope of such
prudential measures is likely to be circumscribed by adherence to the Basel
standards.”) (citation omitted); Gretchen Morgenson, Barriers to Change, From Wall
St.
and
Geneva,
N.Y.
Times,
Mar.
17,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/business/wto-and-barriers-to-financialchange.html?_r=0 (“Last October, Ecuador asked that the W.T.O. review financial
rules so that the country could preserve its ability to create regulations that ensure
‘the integrity and stability of the financial system.’”).
50
E.g., Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial Services in the GATS and
Domestic Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155, 158 (1997); G-20 Pittsburgh
Summit, Special Pittsburgh G-20 Report from Public Citizen’s Global Trade
Watch, No Meaningful Safeguards for Prudential Measures in World Trade Organization’s
Financial Service Deregulation Agreements, at 10-17 (Sept. 2009).
51
G-20 Pittsburgh Summit, Special Pittsburgh G-20 Report from
Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, No Meaningful Safeguards for Prudential Measures
in World Trade Organization’s Financial Service Deregulation Agreements, at 3-5 (Sept.
2009); see also Communication from Barbados, supra note 49, ¶ 11; Alan
Alexandroff et al , Global Trade Watch on the Prudential Car Out, International
Economic Law and Policy Blog (Dec. 12, 2015, 11:57 PM),
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2010/05/global-trade-watch-on-theprudential-carve-out.html.
52
E.g., Dominique Servais & Julie Dutry, GATS 2000: High Stakes for the
Financial Services Sector?, 6 INT. BUS. L. J. 653, 664-65 (1993) (“It is often
propounded that there is a real risk of the prudential clause being used by some
countries as an mechanism to justify the upholding of certain regulations that aim,
under the prudential veil, to protect the local financial industry by either refusing,
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front of a WTO panel.53 While others stated that the “confrontational
approach” within the dispute settlement system [was] unlikely.54 In
any event, the importance of this clause has not been overstated.
“After a decision is rendered, the losing nation will see how much (or
how little) sovereignty has been transferred to the WTO.”55 Such a
decision was rendered on September 30, 2015 by a WTO panel.
A. Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services:
Report of the Panel
On September 30, 2015 a WTO panel for the first time
addressed the prudential carve-out clause in Argentina – Measures
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services (the “Panel Report”).56
In the Panel Report, inter alia, Argentina claimed that the
prudential exception in paragraph 2(a) of the Annex applied to
measures 5 (requirements for market access related to reinsurance
services) and 6 (requirements for access to the Argentina’s capital
market) implemented by Argentina.57 Measure 5 essentially banned
or limiting, access to their market.”); Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial Services
in the GATS and Domestic Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155, 161 (1997)
(“Individual countries could, for example, attempt to cover discriminatory
treatment under the prudential carve-out.”).
53
Duncan Alford, International Financial System Risks: A Current
Assessment, 1 J. INT. BANKING L. & REG. 40 (2005) (“The operation of this
prudential supervision ‘carve out’ and the trade liberalisation [sic] provisions of the
Financial Services Agreement will undoubtedly come before the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism in the near future.”); Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial
Services in the GATS and Domestic Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155, 158
(1997) (“It can [] be expected that measures taken under this provision will be the
subject of controversial interpretation in the future, possibly in the context of
dispute settlement procedures.”).
54
Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, GATS’ Prudential Carve Out in Financial Services
and Its Relation with Prudential Regulation, 57 INT. COMP. L. Q. 613, 640 (2008) (“The
community of international financial regulators is close-knit, and such a
confrontational approach [bringing dispute within WTO dispute settlement system]
does not seem likely.”)
55
Duncan Alford, International Financial System Risks: A Current
Assessment, 1 J. INT. BANKING L. & REG. 40, 41 (2005).
56
Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
WT/DS453/R (Sept. 30, 2015).
57
Id. ¶¶ 7.781, 7.808, WT/DS453/R (Sept. 30, 2015).
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the supply of reinsurance services from countries not cooperating for
purposes of tax transparency and the global fight against money
laundering and terrorist financing according to the criteria defined by
the Financial Action Task Force.58 Measure 6 banned stock market
intermediaries from transacting (e.g. public offering of negotiable
securities, forward contracts, futures or options of any nature or
other financial instruments or products) with persons from noncooperative countries.59 A country was to be considered
“cooperative” if it: (i) “[had] signed with Argentina a tax information
exchange agreement or an international double taxation convention
with a broad information exchange clause, provided that the
information [was] effectively exchanged; or (ii) [had] initiated with
Argentina the negotiations necessary for concluding such an
agreement and/ or convention.”60 Under measures 5 and 6 Argentina
imposed different requirements on service suppliers depending on
whether they were established and registered in cooperative or noncooperative countries.61
Panama argued against the applicability of the prudential
carve-out clause.62 Although the panel ultimately found for Panama
on this issue, Panama appealed the report to the Appellate Body
arguing that the panel erred, inter alia, in not limiting the scope of the
prudential carve-out clause to “domestic” regulations.63 Argentina
also appealed the Panel Report arguing, contrary to the panel’s
finding, that the services provided from cooperative and noncooperative countries were not “like” services.64 While the Panel
Report is pending an appeal, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”)
will not be able to adopt the Panel Report.65 The Appellate Body
report, once issued, will be automatically adopted, receiving legal
See id ¶¶ 2.23–2.34.
See id. ¶¶ 2.35–2.36.
60
Id. ¶¶ 7.907 [footnote omitted].
61
Id. ¶ 7.907.
62
Id. ¶¶ 7.793–7.807.
63
See Notification of an Appeal by Panama, Argentina – Measures Relating
to Trade in Goods and Services, WT/DS453/7 (Oct. 30, 2015).
64
See Notification of Another Appeal by Argentina, Argentina – Measures
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WT/DS453/8 (Nov. 30, 2015).
65
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes art. 16, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
58
59
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force, unless the DSB decides by unanimous consensus not to adopt
the report.66 Customarily when DSB adopts a panel report, it is
adopted “as modified by the Appellate Body”;67 thus, ultimately DSB
may adopt the Appellate Body’s findings of law which were directly
appealed. Appellate Body may even modify rulings on issues that
were not directly appealed if the modification was necessary for
ruling on the issues appealed.
The Panel Report provided important guidance and if
adopted by the DSB will serve as persuasive authority for the
development of the international trade law as the meaning of the
clause and its practical application became especially important in the
context of post-recession regulations. The Panel Report adopted a
three-prong legal standard under which the measure qualifying for
the prudential exception must: (1) affect the supply of financial
services, (2) be taken for prudential reasons, (3) and not be used as
means of avoiding the Country-Member’s commitments or
obligations.68 Consequently the Panel Report applied the adopted
standard to the measures implemented by Argentina, as discussed in
subsection (4).
1. The Scope of the Annex: Measures Affecting the Supply of Financial
Services. - The Panel Report found that the provision represents an
exception; therefore, the burden of proof lies with the responding
party to demonstrate that its measures are covered under the
provision.69 As a preliminary matter, the panel report considered
paragraph 1(a) as context for the interpretation of paragraph 2(a) of
the Annex—the prudential carve-out clause; thus, it found that the
party claiming the exception must demonstrate that the measure in
question is a measure “affecting the supply of financial services.”70

Id. art. 17.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 257, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997)
[hereinafter EC – Bananas III].
68
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶¶ 7.851, 7.796 (Although the parties did not appeal any of the three prongs of the
adopted legal standard, Panama appealed arguing that there is a fourth prong
requirement in the Annex that the measure must be “domestic.”)
69
Id. ¶ 7.816.
70
Id. ¶ 7.822 (citation omitted).
66
67
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Having previously found that the measures in question were
“affecting trade in services” and were in violation of the GATS, the
Panel Report stated that if a measure affects trade in services under
Article I:1, it must be considered to be a measure affecting the supply of
services.71 In other words, the panel report equated the words trade
and supply, perhaps because Article I:2 of the GATS states that “[f]or
purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply
of a service. . . .”72
To sum it up, if a measure affects trade in services and
violates the GATS, then the prudential exception may apply if the
services affected by that measure are financial. According to the panel
report affecting has a broader meaning than “regulating” or
“governing.”73 As to what services are considered financial, the Panel
Report stated that “paragraph 5 of the Annex on Financial Services
defines the concept of a ‘financial service’ as ‘any service of a
financial nature offered by a financial service supplier of a
Member’ . . . [and] all the services subsequently listed in paragraph 5
of the Annex are services of ‘a financial nature.’”74
2. Measures Taken “for Prudential Reasons.” - The Panel Report
took on the task of determining which measures are “for prudential
reasons” by: (a) distinguishing that the reason for the measure must be
prudential—not the measure itself, (b) analyzing the term “prudential
reasons,” and (c) analyzing the word “for” separately.75

Id. ¶ 7.851.
GATS, supra note 9, art. I.2.
73
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶ 7.854 (quoting EC – Bananas III, supra note 67, ¶ 220) (“The ordinary meaning of
the word ‘affecting’ implies a measure that has ‘an effect on,’ which indicates a
broad scope of application. This interpretation is further reinforced by the
conclusions of previous panels that the term ‘affecting’ in the context of Article III
of the GATT 1947 is wider in scope than such terms as ‘regulating’ or
‘governing.’”)
74
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶ 7.857.
75
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶¶ 7.859-63.
71
72
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a. Reasons must be prudential. - Panel Report found that the
reasons for the measure must be prudential.76 Although Panama
observed that other paragraphs in the Annex (paragraphs 3 and 4)
refer to “prudential measures” and “prudential issues” and argued
that the key term is the word “prudential”—not the “reasons,”77 the
Panel Report emphasized that the text speaks of the reasons being
prudential and not the measures.78 Moreover, the Panel Report stated
that a contrary interpretation “would not give any meaning to the
term ‘reasons’ used in that provision.”79 Finding that there is no other
reason why to use the terms (prudential reasons and prudential
measures) interchangeably, the panel held that the textual term—
prudential reasons—should be used instead.80
b. Prudential means “preventative” or “precautionary.” - Next the
Panel Report consulted dictionary definitions of “motivos coutelares”
(prudential reasons) and held that the ordinary meaning of
“prudential” is “preventative” or “precautionary.”81 The Panel Report
looked into the Spanish Royal Academy’s dictionary and found that
“motivo” (motive) means “that which moves or has efficacy or power
to move; moving cause or reason for something” and “coutelar”
(prudential)—“preventative, precautionary; said of a measure or rule
intended to prevent a particular outcome or guard against that which
might impede it.”82 Also, the Panel Report considered English and
French dictionary definitions of equally authentic versions of the
provision.83 The Panel Report looked into the Shorter Oxford Dictionary
and found that the word “prudential” is defined as “[o]f, involving or
characterized by prudence; exercising prudence, esp. in business
affairs.”84 The Panel Report looked into the Le Petit Robert
dictionary, but did not find a definition for “prudential,” instead the
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. ¶ 7.863.
Id. ¶ 7.860 (footnote omitted).
Id. ¶ 7.861.
Id. ¶ 7.862.
See id. ¶¶ 7.859-63.
See id. ¶ 7.865.
Id. (quoting DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAÑOLA (23rd ed.

2014)).
83

See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note

56, ¶ 7.866.
84

Id. (quoting SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th ed.

2007)).
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report looked into the word “prudence” which was defined as
“[a]ttitude of a person who, reflecting on the significance and
consequences of his acts, takes steps to avoid mistakes and possible
mishaps, and refrains from anything that might be a source of
harm.”85 Panama, Argentina, and third parties such as United States
and Brazil agreed with the definition of “preventative” or
“precautionary,” except Panama applied it to the word “measures”
and further defined “precautionary” differently.86
The Panel Report found support in the context of the clause
which provides a non-exhaustive list of prudential reasons: “the
protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to
whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier” or “to
ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.”87 According
to the panel, these are examples of precautionary reasons.88 Then, the
panel basically recognized that “preventative” or “precautionary” are
also vague words and stated that the meaning and importance
attached to prudential reasons may vary over time; however, such
vagueness—according to the panel—is appropriate, because “WTO
Members should have sufficient freedom to define the prudential
reasons that underpin their measures, in accordance with their own
scales of values.”89 The panel found support in policy objectives
identified in previous panel reports and stated that CountryMembers, “in applying concepts equally important for society, such
as those covered by Article XX for the GATT 1994 [general

Id. (quoting DICTIONNAIRE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE (2000)).
See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56, ¶¶ 7.797, 7.867 (citing Third Party Written Submission of the United States,
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, at 7 n.13, WT/DS/453,
(June
4,
2014),
available
at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US%203rd%20Pty%20Sub%20Fin.pdf)
(citation omitted).
87
See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56, ¶ 7.866; see also GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, § 2(a).
88
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56¶ 7.868
89
Id. ¶ 7.871.
85
86
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exceptions], are entitled to determine the level of protection they
consider appropriate.”90
The panel also found that the broad interpretation of the
word “prudential” “corresponds to the object and purpose of the
GATS, as set out in its own preamble, which recognizes ‘the right of
Members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply
of services within their territories in order to meet national policy
objectives.’”91 The Panel Report concluded its analysis of the word
“prudential” by stating that a broad interpretation is “consistent with
the concerns of the international community regarding the nature and
impact of the financial risks and the consequent need to preserve
sufficient flexibility when determining the prudential reasons to
which the regulation should respond.”92
c. Measures taken “for” prudential reasons require a “rational
relationship” between the measure and its prudential objective. - Before
interpreting what “for” means, the Panel Report compared the
prudential exception provision to the general exceptions of Articles
XIV of the GATS and XX of the GATT 1994 and found that the
prudential exception provision does not require the measures to be
“necessary.”93 Therefore, the prudential exception provision does
not require measures to be the least trade-restrictive means for
achieving the stated objective.94
The panel began the interpretation of the word “for” by
looking at its ordinary meaning.95 It looked into dictionaries in
Spanish, English and French and found that the meaning similarly
Id. ¶ 7.870 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 176, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R, (Dec. 11, 2000); Appellate Body Report, European Communities
– Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 168,
WT/DS135/AB/R, (Mar. 12, 2011)) (citation omitted).
91
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶ 7.872 (quoting GATS, supra note 9, Preamble).
92
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶ 7.875.
93
Id. ¶ 7.884.
94
Id. (footnote omitted) (Note that in the Panel Report used the words
“objective” and “reason” interchangeably.).
95
Id. ¶ 7.886.
90
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denotes a causation.96 Therefore, “[a] measure taken ‘for’ prudential
reasons would [] be a measure with prudential cause.”97 Then
essentially the panel held that for a measure to be taken “for”
prudential reasons, there must “be a rational relationship of cause
and effect between the measure and the reason for it” in fact.98 “[A]
central aspect of the rational relationship of cause and effect is the
adequacy of the measure to the prudential reason, that is to say,
whether the measure, through its design, structure and architecture,
contributes to achieving the desired effect.”99
3. The Meaning of the Second Sentence of the Prudential Carve-out
Clause Remains Uninterpreted. - The panel refused to interpret the
meaning of the “[measures] shall not be used as a means of avoiding
the Member’s commitments or obligations under the Agreement,”
because it had already found that the prudential exception did not
cover the measures in question under the second prong of the legal
test.100
4. Panel Report’s Application of the Three-prong Legal Standard to
Argentina’s Measures. - The Panel Report applied this three-prong
standard to Argentina’s measures 5 and 6 and found that the
measures were not taken for prudential reasons.101 Argentina’s
measure 5 placed certain requirements on “non-cooperative” country
service suppliers before they could gain access to the Argentine
reinsurance service market.102 Measure 6 prohibited certain stock
market transactions with entities from “non-cooperative”
countries.103
The Panel Report agreed that the reasons identified by
Argentina with respect to measure 5 were prudential, namely “to
protect the insured, to ensure the solvency of insurers and reinsurers,
and to avoid the possible systemic risk of the insolvency and failure
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id. ¶ 7.887 (citations omitted).
Id. ¶ 7.888.
Id. ¶ 7.889.
Id. ¶ 7.911.
Id. ¶ 7.945.
See id. ¶¶ 7.906-7.920, 7.939-7.944.
See discussion supra pp. 12-13.
See id.
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of direct insurance companies.”104 The Panel Report found that
requesting relevant information from the regulatory authorities of
other jurisdictions is part of those identified reasons.105
The panel found the main issue in the conditions under
which a country was to be considered “cooperative.”106 More
specifically, one way a country could be considered cooperative was if
it had “initiated with Argentina the negotiations necessary for
concluding [an agreement with tax information exchange or an
international double taxation convention with a broad information
exchange clause] and/or convention.”107 The panel stated that this
criteria does not provide a “formal mechanism for the effective
exchange of information between Argentina and the country with
which it [was] negotiating.”108 In other words, mere negotiations did
not provide substantive information exchange.
There was another problem with the criteria under which a
country could be designated as “cooperative.” Argentina published
the list of cooperative countries only once, at the beginning of every
year, so countries that began negotiations after the list was published
would have no access to the Argentine service market until the
following year.109 In this instance, Panama was on the January 2014
list, because it had begun negotiations in November of 2013, but
other countries that began negotiations in 2014 were not on the list
yet, although they were in the same situation as Panama—merely
negotiating.110 Hence, the panel held that the entire measure did not
have a “rational relationship of cause and effect with the identified
prudential reasons,” because granting “cooperative” status without

104

Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,

¶ 7.904.
105 Id. ¶ 7.910 (“In our view, having adequate and timely information
concerning the foreign reinsurance company is fundamental for the purpose of
anticipating crises or systemic risks which, as we have seen, could be incubating in
an imperceptible manner over time and suddenly erupt.”).
106 Id. ¶ 7.913.
107 Id. ¶ 7.912 (footnote omitted).
108 Id. ¶ 7.916.
109 See id. ¶ 7.918.
110 See id.
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actual information exchange did not bear such relationship with the
stated prudential reason.111
With respect to measure 6, the Panel Report found several
reasons identified by Argentina to be prudential: “strengthen[ing] the
mechanisms for protecting and preventing abuses against small
investors, within the framework of the protective function of
consumer law”112; “ensur[ing] the full effectiveness of the principles
of investor protection, fairness, efficiency, transparency, nonfragmentation and reduction of systemic risk”;113 and “prevention of
money laundering and terrorist financing,” which in turn strengthen
the integrity and stability of the financial system.114 However, the
panel found that there was no rational relationship of cause and
effect with the identified prudential reasons, because measure 6,
similar to measure 5, exempted service suppliers from “cooperative”
countries that did not actually exchange any information.115
V. ANALYZING THE PANEL REPORT
Even if the Appellate Body renders a decision without
significant modifications and DSB adopts the Panel Report, the legal
standard to be used in future disputes is still be open to arguments.116
“In the 1996 Japan Alcoholic Beverages case, . . . . [t]he Appellate
Body concluded adopted panel reports are not binding in a strict
sense in a subsequent case, even if the subsequent case involves the
same parties and basically the same facts.”117 Article IX:2 of the
WTO Agreement provides the exclusive authority to adopt
See id. ¶¶ 7.919-7.920.
Id. ¶ 7.932.
113 Id. ¶ 7.933.
114 Id. ¶¶ 7.934-7.935 (footnotes omitted).
115 Id. ¶¶ 7.939-7.944.
116 See discussion supra pp. 13-14.
117 BHALA, supra note 4, at 19; see also Appellate Body Report, Japan –
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, pp. 12-13, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/ AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II]
(“Generally, in international law, the essence of subsequent practice in interpreting
a treaty has been recognized as a ‘concordant, common and consistent’ sequence of
acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernable pattern
implying the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”).
111
112
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interpretations of the Multilateral Trade Agreements—in this case
GATS—to the Ministerial Conference and the General Council.118
“The fact that such an ‘exclusive authority’ in interpreting the treaty
has been established so specifically in the WTO Agreement is reason
enough to conclude that such authority does not exist by implication
or by inadvertence elsewhere.”119 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body
stated that “panel reports are important part of the GATT acquis” and
create “legitimate expectation among WTO Members”; thus, “should
be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.120
The following sections will: (A) analyze the interpretation of
“for prudential reasons,” and (B) briefly discuss the second sentence
of the prudential carve-out clause.
A. Interpretation of “for Prudential Reasons”
Interpretation of the prudential carve-out clause involves a
multi-layered inquiry. The Appellate Body’s framework for
interpreting GATS provisions provides a valuable foundation for
analyzing the Panel Report.121 Under Article 3.2 of the DSU,
Country-Members recognized that the WTO dispute settlement
system may clarify provisions of covered agreements in “accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”122
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(the “Vienna Convention”) are well settled in WTO case law to be
such customary rules.123 Interpreting “measures taken for prudential

Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7, art IX.2.
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, at 13.
120 Id. at 14.
121 See generally U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45 (The
report provides a step-by-step framework for treaty interpretation according to
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.).
122 DSU, supra note 65, art. 3.2.
123 See U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 159 (“[T]he task
of interpreting any other treaty text[] involves identifying the common intention of
Members, and is to be achieved by following the customary rules of interpretation
of public international law, codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention.”); see also Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, ¶¶ 61-62,
WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2002); Appellate Body Report, United States –
118
119
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reasons,” as discussed below, requires looking into: (1) ordinary
meaning, (2) context, (3) object and purpose, (4) other things taken
into account with the context, and (5) supplementary means of
interpretation.124 However, “it should be kept in mind that treaty
interpretation is an integrated operation, where interpretive rules or
principles must be applied as connected and mutually reinforcing
components of a holistic exercise.”125
1. Ordinary Meaning. - First, analyzing under Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention, the ordinary meaning of “prudential” is vague.
“Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requires a treaty to be
interpreted ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.’”126 Identifying the ordinary meaning of a
term may begin with dictionary definitions; however, the Appellate
Body in Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 300-27,
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. – Gambling and
Betting Services], made a reservation for using dictionary definitions
alone, because such approach is too mechanical.127 According to the
Appellate Body, if in abstract the range of definitions of the word
may include the definitions of the contestant parties, then the next
proper step is to inquire into which one of the definitions is properly
attributable to the party-respondent.128
The Panel Report determined the ordinary meaning of
“prudential” mainly from Spanish and French dictionaries.129
Although the Panel Report defined the word “prudential” as
“preventative” or “precautionary,” this does not really clarify what
reasons may or may not be justified, because virtually any reason for
a measure can be stated in terms of being “preventative” or
“precautionary.” Consider a measure implemented for the reason of
Continued Existence and application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 267, WT/DS350/AB/R
(Feb. 4, 2009) [hereinafter U.S. – Continued Zeroing].
124 See U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45.
125 U.S. – Continued Zeroing, supra note 123, ¶ 268.
126 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 164.
127 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶¶ 164-66.
128 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 167.
129 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.ii.
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aiding a quick recovery of financial institutions after an economic
recession: Is not that reason preventing a slow or no recovery? Thus,
virtually any reason may be “preventative.”
Further, according to the Panel Report, if “prudential” means
preventative, and the text states “measures for prudential reasons”
are basically exempted, then what will give the panel authority to not
exempt any absurd preventative reasons a country will claim?
Consider a Country-Member claiming that the prudential reason for a
measure is to “prevent” all left-handed people from making any
financial investments. According to the current interpretation of
“prudential” as “preventative” or “precautionary,” such a measure
would qualify for the exception. It may seem at first that such a
measure would not qualify under the exception, because there would
be no rational relationship of cause and effect,130 but such a
relationship will need to exist only between the actual measure and
the stated reason for it, and the stated reason is preventing left-handed
people making certain investments. Under the present definition of
“prudential” as “preventative” or “precautionary” coupled with the
fact that any measure may be stated in terms of preventing some
event, the current interpretation of the word “prudential” means
virtually any reason, including absurd “preventative” reasons. Because
the word “prudential” practically loses its meaning, and “the
Appellate Body has stated that ‘interpretation must give meaning and
effect to all the terms of a treaty,’”131 a careful interpretation of the
word “prudential” is still required.
Dictionaries do not clarify the word. The Oxford English
Dictionary defines “prudential” as “of, belonging to, or of the nature
of prudence; involving prudence, characterized or prescribed by
forethought and careful deliberations” or as “matters that fall within
the scope or province of prudence.”132 The Oxford English
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.iii.
See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56, ¶ 7.840 (quoting Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, p. 23, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter US –
Gasoline]; see also Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 271, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16,
2006) [hereinafter US Offset Act].
132 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 729 (2nd ed. 1991).
130
131
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Dictionary defines “prudence” as “ability to discern the most
suitable, politic, or profitable course of action, esp. as regards
conduct; practical wisdom, discretion,” or “wisdom; knowledge of or
skill in a matter.”133 The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines
“prudential” as “of involving, or characterized by prudence;
exercising prudence, esp. in business affairs” and defines “prudence”
as “the quality of being prudent” or as “wisdom; knowledge of or
skill in a matter;” or “foresight; providence.”134 It also defines
“prudent” as “characterized by or proceeding from care in following
the most politic and profitable course; having or showing sound
judgment in practical affairs; circumspect, sensible” or as “wise,
discerning, sapient.”135 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
defines “prudential” as “of, relating to, or proceeding from
prudence” or as “exercising prudence.”136 Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary defines “prudence” as “the ability to govern
and discipline oneself by the use of reason,” or as “sagacity or
shrewdness in the management of affairs,” or as “skill and good
judgment in the use of resources,” or as “caution or circumspection
as to danger or risk.”137
As you can see from the English dictionary definitions, as
opposed to French and Spanish as found by the Panel Report,
“prudential” may have meanings different from “preventative” or
“precautionary.” According to the dictionaries, a “prudential” reason,
among the meaning adopted by the panel, may mean a reason
“prescribed by forethought and careful deliberations” or a reason
“involving, or characterized by quality of being wise” or a reason “of
involving the quality of having or showing sound judgment” or a
reason “relating to or proceeding from the ability to govern and
discipline oneself by the use of reason or by skill and good judgment
in the use of resources.” All these definitions encompass a
requirement that whatever must be “prudential” must in some sense
be well thought of, be wise, show sound judgment, or be reasonable.
133
134

Id. at 728-29.
2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2396 (1st ed.

1993).
135
136

Id.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1002 (11th ed.

2005).
137

Id.
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Thus, a closer look into the context in which the word “prudential”
was used is required.
2. Context. - After inquiring into the ordinary meaning of the
text, if a definitive conclusion cannot be reached, the next step is to
inquire into the context in which the relevant terms are situated
pursuant to Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention.138 Article 31
paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention also provides for documents
in addition to the text of the treaty which may be considered as
context.139 “Documents can be characterized as context only where
there is sufficient evidence of their constituting an ‘agreement relating
to the treaty’ between the parties or of their ‘accept[ance by the
parties] as an instrument related to the treaty.’”140 Thus, context
documents may comprise of the entire GATS Agreement, including
its preamble and annexes, schedules of specific commitments of the
respondent-party, provisions of covered agreements other than
GATS, and GATS schedules of other Members.141 When inquiring
into context documents, the Appellate Body first examined “the
immediate context in which the relevant entry [was] found.”142
Second, the Appellate Body examined “the context provided by the
structure of the GATS itself.”143 Third, the Appellate Body looked
“beyond the GATS to other covered agreements” where it also
considered other Member’s Schedules.144
Here the main word under scrutiny—prudential—is an
adjective, which within the most immediate textual context of the
word qualifies another word—reasons.145 To support the panel’s
finding, the most important context to be considered in treaty
interpretation is the textual context in which the word was used.146 In
U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 168; see also U.S. –
Continued Zeroing, supra note 123, ¶ 268.
139 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
140 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 175.
141 See id. ¶¶ 178-187.
142 Id. ¶ 179.
143 Id. ¶ 180.
144 Id. ¶ 181.
145 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.i.
146 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (“A treaty
138
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this case it is not the measure itself that must be prudential—but the
reasons for that measure.147 Although a prudential measure and a
measure implemented for prudential reason are not mutually
exclusive, and in most cases the two will likely overlap, this textual
distinction may be material to the ultimate determination of what
measures may be permissible under the prudential carve-out clause.148
Oversimplifying the complexity of financial regulations, consider that
it will be a relatively simpler task for a WTO panel to analyze whether
the reasons for the measure are prudential versus whether the measure
itself is prudential. It is easier to find consensus on what is a prudential
reason versus what measures may be implemented for those reasons,
because for every prudential reason there are likely to be multiple
prudential measures that could be implemented. In other words, a
prudential measure requirement would give less discretion to the
sovereign Country-Member as to what measures to implement, while
under the prudential reason requirement a Country-Member will be able
to exercise more discretion as to what measures to implement.
Looking at the context of the entire first sentence of the
prudential carve-out clause, the prudential carve-out provision
provides concrete examples of prudential reasons: “protection of
investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary
duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity
and stability of the financial system.”149 Thus, for example, a
prudential reason may be the protection of the depositors. In this
example whether a particular measure does or does not protect the
depositors at this point seems to be irrelevant. The Panel Report
inquired into the genuineness of that prudential reason—a fact
interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to
be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context,
that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be
sought.”); see also Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, p. 12 (“Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation
for the interpretive process: interpretation must be based above all upon the text of
the treaty.”) (internal quotations omitted).
147 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.i.
148 See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56, ¶ 7.831 (“The meaning of the two expressions cannot be the same and, in our
opinion, this is an important aspect to be borne in mind when interpreting this
provision.”).
149 GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, art. 2.a.

776

2016

Anwesen

4:2

intensive inquiry—when analyzing the “for” element in the phrase
“for prudential reasons.”150 Although the Panel Report found that
“prudential” means “precautionary” or “preventative” by pointing
out that the prudential reasons listed in the text are all examples of
“precautionary” or “preventative,”151 those reasons are not any more
“precautionary” as they are “wise” or “reasonable.” The list of
examples in the provision supports virtually all of the definitions of
“prudential” stated in the dictionaries.152 Nonetheless, the nonexhaustive list of “prudential” reasons indicates an intention to leave
the definition of “prudential” broader than just the examples in the
list.153
Looking into the broader context [the entire GATS
Agreement] may be more helpful from the perspective of identifying
what are not “prudential reasons”, rather than what are. If another
part of the GATS already provides an exception for some measure(s),
the reason for providing that exception effectively cannot be a
“prudential” reason for purposes of the prudential exception
provision, because otherwise the former exception provision would
be reduced to “redundancy” or “inutility.”154 The prudential
exception provision may not serve as a catch-all provision to
encompass those measures which fail under some element of one of
the other exceptions. For example, economic integration agreements
are an exception.155 The reason for exempting integration agreements
from GATS commitments is that those agreements liberalize trade
between at least some countries, and some liberalization is better than
none.156 Therefore, a reason for the prudential measure under the

See discussion supra Part III.A.2.iii.
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶¶ 7.868-7.869.
152 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
153 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶¶ 7.869-7.871.
154 See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56, ¶ 7.840 (citing US – Gasoline, supra note 130, p. 23) (footnotes omitted); see also
US Offset Act, supra note 131, ¶ 271; Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, p.
12.
155 See generally GATS, supra note 9, art. V.
156 Cf. GATS, supra note 9, art. V.4. (To qualify for the exception an
integration agreement, “[it] shall be designed to facilitate trade between the parties
150
151
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prudential carve-out clause may not be to liberalize local trade
between some countries or preventing regional market barriers,
because such a scenario is already covered. Similarly, a CountryMember should not be able to claim that the reason for the measure
is to address the “serious balance-of-payment and external financial
difficulty or threat thereof,” because such a reason is already covered
by Article XII of the GATS.157 Otherwise, for example, a CountryMember could implement a discriminatory measure aimed to prevent a
threat of a balance-of-payment difficulty, which is prohibited under
Article XII(2)(a), so long as such discriminatory measure would be
“for prudential reasons”—preventing the threat of a balance-ofpayment crisis. To be clear, a Member is free to claim exceptions
under various provisions of GATS simultaneously; however, under
the prudential carve-out clause analysis, as a matter of law, some
reasons should not be considered prudential—reasons that already
prompted negotiators to create specific exceptions in other GATS
provisions.
Finally, Members’ Schedules attached to the GATS may also
serve as context for treaty interpretation purposes.158 For example, if
a Member’s Schedule provides an interpretation of what may be a
“prudential reason” for the purposes of the prudential exception
provision, then such interpretation will be used by the panels and the
Appellate Body as context for treaty interpretation. In the present
case, Argentina’s Schedule did not contain any reference to the
prudential carve-out clause.159
3. Object and Purpose. - When no clear meaning could have
been discerned, the Appellate Body in U.S. – Gambling and Betting
Services turned to the object and purpose of the GATS for further
guidance.160 When considering the Preamble to the GATS, which is
context, to discern the object and purpose of the prudential
provision, the Panel Report emphasized “the right of the Members to
to the agreement and shall not in respect of any Member outside the agreement
raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services . . . .”).
157 See generally GATS, supra note 9, art. XII.
158 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 181.
159 Argentina – Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/4 (Apr. 15,
1994).
160 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 187.
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regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services
within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives.”161
The panel emphasized this objective to give Country-Members broad
discretion in identifying what is and what is not prudential.162
However, there must be some limits on such discretion; otherwise,
the prudential carve-out clause will render the entire GATS
meaningless with respect to financial services.
GATS has other objects and purposes which weight against
the “right of the Members to regulate.” GATS Preamble recognizes
“the growing importance of trade in services for the growth and
development of the world economy,” and aims “to establish . . . rules
for trade in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under
conditions of . . . progressive liberalization. . . .”163 Therefore, as
much as the object and purpose of the prudential exception provision
may be to recognize national policy objectives, it is also not to permit
too broad of an exception, because progressive liberalization and
expansion of trade in services are also GATS objectives.
Consequently, if the claimed prudential reason for the measure does
not go against the objective of liberalized trade, then the object and
purpose of the preamble that recognizes the national policy objective
should prevail and provide broader discretion to the implementing
Country-Member. And inversely, if the prudential reason is facially
trade restrictive, then the free-trade objective should be weighed
against the national policy objective.
4. Other Things Taken into Account Together with the Context. –
Pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
the Appellate Body in U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services continued its
analysis by taking into account any “subsequent practice
establishing the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty.”164 Although not examined by the Appellate Body in the
161

See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note

56, ¶ 7.872.
See id. at ¶¶ 7.870-7.873.
GATS supra note 9, Preamble.
164 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 190 (emphasis
added); see also id. at ¶¶ 191-192 (“[I]n order for ‘practice’ within the meaning of
Article 31(3)(b) to be established: (i) there must be a common, consistent,
discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements; and (ii) those acts or
162
163

779

2016

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:2

U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, Article 31 paragraph 3 also
requires to take into account with the context “[a]ny subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions” and “[a]ny relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.”165 Moreover, the fourth paragraph of the Article 31 requires
giving a special meaning to a term “if it is established that the
parties so intended.”166
There is no identifiable subsequent practice between the
WTO Members which could constitute an “agreement” to be used in
interpreting the prudential exception clause.167 Nor there is any
special meaning that can be discerned from the text, other than
“prudential” has an “intrinsically evolutionary nature,” because the
list of prudential reasons in the prudential exception provision was
written as non-exhaustive.168
As part of the relevant rules of international law, the Panel
Report emphasized that in the past the Appellate Body “in applying
concepts equally important for society, such as those covered by
Article XX of the GATT 1994 [general exceptions], [CountryMembers] are entitled to determine the level of protection they
consider appropriate.”169 Thus, in interpreting ambiguous or vague
terms or words such as “prudential,” the tendency should favor

pronouncements must imply agreement on the interpretation of the relevant
provision.”) (original emphasis) (citing Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117,
p. 13); Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, p. 14 (Appellate Body found that
panel reports adopted by the GATT contracting parties do not constitute
subsequent practice within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna
Convention.).
165 Vienna Convention, supra note 139, art. 31.3 (emphasis added).
166 Id. at art. 31.4.
167 Perhaps Country-Members may be able to use integration agreements
or international cooperative enforcement agreements to affect the meaning and the
interpretation of the prudential exception clause.
168 See generally Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
supra note 56, ¶ 7.873 (citations omitted).
169 Id. at ¶ 7.870 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 176, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R).
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giving the Country-Members deference to determine their reasons as
they consider appropriate.
5. Supplementary Means of Interpretation. - Finally, when the
above steps led to an ambiguous interpretation, the Appellate Body
U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services turned to the supplementary means
of interpretation.170 Supplementary means of interpretation include
“the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion.”171 This is where documents that did not meet the
requirements to be considered as context, may nonetheless be used in
treaty interpretation as preparatory work.172 Thus far in the analysis,
the meaning of “prudential” remains unsatisfying. However, from
considering other things with the context, it is evident that the word
may have been left vague intentionally to give greater deference to
the Country-Members to determine their level of protection.
Nonetheless, the context of other provisions of the GATS showed
some reasons that may not be prudential for purposes of the
prudential exception provision.173 Thus, supplementary means of
interpretation are important for either confirming that the vagueness
of the word was intentional or to clarify what “prudential reasons”
mean.
First, all negotiations after the adoption of the Annex on the
Financial Services related to clarifying the meaning of the prudential
exception clause, such as the seven times the Committee on Trade in
Financial Services debated on the prudential exception provision, are
irrelevant and do not constitute supplementary means of
interpretation, because they were not “preparatory work.”174 Work in
preparation of the Annex on the Financial Services began when the
Working Group on Financial Service including Insurance was formed
in June of 1990.175 The Working Group held four official meetings,
170

See, e.g., U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶¶ 195, 236,

248.
Vienna Convention, supra note 139, art. 32.
See, e.g., U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 197.
173 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
174 The seven meeting reports of the Committee on Trade in Services can
be found by WTO document numbers S/FIN/M/25 to 31.
175 PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS & NILS HERGER, FINANCIAL REGULATION
AT THE CROSSROADS, 280 (2011).
171
172
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and among other issues, discussed the text of the prudential
exception provision.176
During the first meeting the Chairman of the Working Group
offered five different approached for the prudential carve-out clause,
the first four ranging from narrow to broad in scope: (1) an exception
only to a qualified national treatment provision, (2) permitting all
“reasonable” prudential and fiduciary measures, (3) variation of first
and second options with enumerated examples of permissible
measures, (4) unqualified right to claim the exception, and (5)
defining precise permissible measures to reduce legal uncertainties.177
After the discussion on the topic was concluded, the Chairman stated
that it was not possible to draw a preliminary conclusion as to which
approach to use and that, in his opinion, there should be “wide room
for flexibility in order to allow for the necessary prudential
organizational measures.”178 After the first meeting of the Working
Group three formal proposals regarding the prudential-carve out
clause were circulated on behalf of: the European Communities,
United States, and Malaysia.179
The proposal from the European Communities was
circulated before the second meeting of the working group which
excepted “reasonable measures to safeguard the integrity of the
financial system, provided that these measures are not applied in a

The reports of the meetings can be found in WTO documents
MTN.GNS/FIN 1 to 4.
177 Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Note on the
Meeting of 11-13 June 1990, ¶ 78, MTN.GNS/FIN/1 (July 5, 1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100236.pdf.
178 Id. at ¶ 95.
179 See DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 280 (citing Working
Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Communication from the European
Communities, MTN.GNS/FIN/W/1 (July 10, 1990); Working Group on Financial
Service Including Insurance, Communication from the United States,
MTN.GNS/FIN/W2, (July 12, 1990); Working Group on Financial Service
Including
Insurance,
Communication
of
the
Delegation
of
Malaysia,
MTN.GNS/FIN/W/3 (Sept. 12, 1990)).
176
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manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.”180
The proposal from the United States was also circulated
before the second meeting which called for “a provision which
permits a Party to take reasonable actions necessary for prudential reasons,
for the protection of investors and depositors, or for the protection
of persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service
provider.”181 Additionally, United States had introduced an informal
paper titled “Provisions regarding financial services” according to
which “all of the proposed provisions were subject to article 9 that
stated that nothing in this agreement shall prevent a party from
taking reasonable actions necessary for prudential reasons.”182 During the
second meeting the representative of the United States stated that
“[r]easons other than prudential ones . . . most often represent the
kind of reasons that the agreement would seek to curtail.”183 With
respect to proposed article 9, which included the words “reasonable”
and “necessary,” Switzerland expressed that it “might require further
specification to increase its juridical clarity.”184
The proposal from Malaysia, submitted before the third
meeting, had a section titled “Domestic regulation (prudential
regulation).”185 Under this section the prudential carve-out clause

Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance,
Communication from the European Communities, art. 13.1, MTN.GNS/FIN/W/1 (July
10, 1990), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100245.pdf
(emphasis added).
181 Working
Group on Financial Service Including Insurance,
Communication from the United States, p. 2, MTN.GNS/FIN/W2, (July 12, 1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100258.pdf
(emphasis
added).
182 Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Note on the
Meeting of 12-13 July 1990, ¶ 46, MTN/GNS/FIN/2 (Aug. 10, 1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110082.pdf
(emphasis
added) [hereinafter Second Meeting] (The informal paper could not be located.).
183 Second Meeting, supra note 182, ¶ 37.
184 Second Meeting, supra note 182, ¶ 56.
185 Working
Group on Financial Service Including Insurance,
Communication of the Delegation of Malaysia, p.6, MTN.GNS/FIN/W/3 (Sept. 12,
1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110111.pdf
[hereinafter Communication from Malaysia] (Malaysian proposal was made on behalf
180
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would have the broadest scope of the three formal propositions at
the time:
Compliance of the MFTS [Multilateral Framework on
Trade in Services] and sectoral annotations on
financial services should not impinge on a supervisory
authority’s right to: (a) Exercise adequate and proper
supervision over the foreign financial institutions
operating in its country; (b) Implement rules and
regulations to ensure that foreign financial institutions
maintain sound and prudent practices and policies; (c)
Take necessary action for the protection of depositors and
investors; and (d) Allow flexibility to governments to
impose measures for maintenance of stability in the
financial system.186
During the third meeting of the Working Group, when
discussing this proposal, the representative of Japan stated that the
concept of prudential measures might differ from country to
country.187
After these three meetings and three proposals, the Chairman
of the Ad Hoc Working Group to the Group of Negotiations on
Services proposed the following change:
The “measures” referred to in Article XIV:1 [General
Exceptions] of the Agreement shall include reasonable
measures taken for prudential reasons to assure the
protection of investors, depositors, policyholders or
persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a

South East Asian Central Banks [SEACEN] Countries of Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Myanmar.).
186 Id. at 6-7.
187 Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Note on the
Meeting of 13-15 September 1990, ¶ 22, MTN/GNS/FIN/3 (Oct. 16, 1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110180.pdf
[hereinafter
Third Meeting].
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financial service provider, or to ensure the integrity
and stability of a party’s financial system.188
By the end of 1990 at the Ministerial Conference held in
Brussels, two versions of an annex on financial services were
proposed.189 The prudential carve-out clause of the version
submitted by Canada, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland was identical to
the Ad Hoc Working Groups Chairman’s proposal quoted above.190
The second proposal made on behalf of the SEACEN Countries
contained similar language with two key differences with respect to
the prudential carve-out clause: first, the word “reasonable” was
omitted, and second, measures for prudential reasons were not
subject to the dispute settlement.191
The negotiations work on the future Annex on Financial
Services continued through 1991 under the auspices of the Group of
Negotiations in Services.192 Canada, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland
presented an addendum to their proposal at the Ministerial
Conference in Brussels which added:
[M]easures shall not be applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
(a) restriction on the provision of financial services by
financial service providers of another Party or (b)
discrimination between domestic and foreign financial
service providers or between countries.193

Report by the Chairman of the Sectoral Ad Hoc Working Group to the GNS,
p. 10, MTN.GNS/W/110 (Nov. 6, 1990) [emphasis added], available at
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110245.pdf.
189 DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 281 [footnote omitted].
190 See Trade Negotiations Committee, Communication from Canada, Japan,
Sweden
and
Switzerland,
MTN.TNC/W/50
(Dec.
2,
1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92120056.pdf.
191 See Trade Negotiations Committee, Communication from Malaysia, p. 2,
MTN.TNC/W/52
(Dec.
4,
1990),
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/.%5CUR%5CTNC%5CW52.
192 DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 282.
193 Trade Negotiations Committee, Communication from Canada, Japan,
Sweden and Switzerland, p. 4, MTN/TNC/W/50/Add.2 (Oct. 15, 1991),
188
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Based on these submitted proposals, negotiations led to the
current text of the prudential carve-out clause.194
Comparison of the negotiated and final versions of the text
and comments made by the negotiators provides guidance for the
interpretation of the clause. First, the negotiators considered the
option for defining or listing all prudential actions which would be
permitted, but did not. Instead the clause is written in terms of
prudential reasons; thus, leaving greater deference to the CountryMembers in implementing measures. This confirms the finding in
the Panel Report that the reasons must be prudential and not the
measures.
Second, the comparison of the latest two formal proposals
shows that there was likely a compromise among countries whose
positions were to have: a “reasonable” measures requirement, exclude
from the exception particular ways in which measures could be
applied—which is most similar to the second sentence of the current
text, and to make the prudential carve-out clause subject to the WTO
dispute settlement process.
However, none of these observations speak directly as to
what “prudential” means. There was one comment that may help
understanding what “prudential” reasons are: “Reasons other than
prudential ones . . . most often represent the kind of reasons that the
agreement would seek to curtail.”195 Also, negotiators did not
consider using the word “safeguard” which is the more common
word used throughout the WTO Agreements used for identifying
“preventative” measures.
B. Second Sentence of the Prudential Carve-out Clause
If the measure falls within the scope of the Annex, the
Country-Member identifies a reason that is prudential, and the
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/.%5CUR%5CTNC%5CW50A2.PDF [emphasis
added].
194 See generally DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 282 (“Formal
records contain very little – if any – information about the negotiations that
followed these submissions.”).
195 Second Meeting, supra note 182, ¶ 37.
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measure was implemented “for” that reason, as analyzed by the panel
report, can anything else hinder the application of the prudential
exception provision? The answer “No” would render the second
sentence of the provision meaningless; thus, the answer is necessarily
“Yes, because of the second sentence of the provision.” Basically, the
second sentence would disqualify an otherwise qualified exception.
The Panel Report did not attempt to interpret the second sentence of
the clause which states: “Where such measures do not conform with
the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of
avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under the
Agreement.”196 The first part of the sentence necessarily presumes
that there may be measures for prudential reasons conforming to the
agreement, which may be permitted to be used as means of avoiding
the Member’s commitments. The second part’s “means of avoiding”
is what future WTO panels or the Appellate Body may need to
interpret.
Recall that a proposal of a provision with a sentence similar
to the final text appeared as:
[M]easures shall not be applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable (a)
restriction on the provision of financial services by
financial service providers of another Party or (b)
discrimination between domestic and foreign financial
service providers or between countries.197
If a panel finds that “means of avoiding” requires
determining the intentions of a Member in order to weed out
disguised discriminatory measures, then such intent may be discerned
from the objective structure of the regulatory measure.198

GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, § 2.a.
See Communication from Canada, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland, supra note
193; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.5.
198 See, e.g., Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117.
196
197
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VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, to answer the question of what is and what is
not a prudential reason, generally a fact intensive multi-layered
inquiry is required. Dictionary definitions are vague and do not
provide any definitions for “prudential” that are any more helpful
than if the drafters would write “measures for good reasons.” Context
of the clause is very helpful in providing two main categories of
reasons that are prudential: (1) “protection of investors, depositors,
policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a
financial service supplier”, and (2) “to ensure the integrity and
stability of the financial system.”199 Further, context of the entire
GATS Agreement shows that a “prudential” reason cannot be: “any”
reason, because that would render the word “prudential”
meaningless; merely “preventative” or “precautionary” reason,
because all and any reasons either prevent or are precautionary
against some event; and any of the reasons that have specific
exemption provisions in the GATS, because that would render those
exemption provisions meaningless. Moreover, negotiators did not
consider using the term “safeguarding reasons,” utilizing the
commonly used word “safeguard” to convey something
“preventative” or “precautionary” as used throughout various WTO
agreements; thus, another reason to conclude that “prudential” does
not mean “preventative” or “precautionary.”
Two main objects and purposes of WTO agreements related
to this provision are: recognition of national policy objectives and
progressive liberalization of international trade. If a reason for a
measure does not go against the objective of liberalized trade in
services or goods, then the remaining object and purpose to be
considered is the national policy objective, providing broader
discretion to the implementing Country-Member.
The current interpretation of the prudential carve-out clause
in the Panel Report gives more discretion to Country-Members, as
some have anticipated, by finding that reasons and not measures
must be prudential. However, such discretion is not unqualified even
under the current interpretation. If the “reasonableness” requirement
199

See GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, § 2.
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was negotiated away during the Uruguay Round, and in return the
clause was made subject to the WTO dispute settlement process,
ironically, “rationality” made its way back into the text through
panel’s interpretation of the word “for” when it was left to, as critics
would say, the “runaway jurists.”
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ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF
IMPLEMENTING THE HAGUE
ABDUCTION CONVENTION ON THE
CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND MEXICO
Breanna Atwood

I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2007, seventeen-month-old1 Andrew was abducted
to Mexico from his hometown of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.2 At the
time of his abduction, Andrew’s parents were involved in divorce
proceedings and had a temporary custody agreement granting

1
Sources differ as to whether Andrew was seventeen or nineteen
months old at the time of his abduction. Compare Trevor Richardson, My Journey
Continues
(Mar.
1,
2008),
http://mexicoabduction.blogspot.com/2008_03_01_archive.html (Trevor’s blog
stating that Andrew was seventeen months old at the time of his abduction), with
Trevor Richardson, Bring Andrew Home-Int’l Child Abduction to Mexico, YOUTUBE
(Sep.
7,
2010)
[hereinafter
Bring
Andrew
Home],
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bl_SJ1CVOdM (A news segment posted on
Trevor’s YouTube channel stating that Andrew was nineteen months old).
2
Felony Warrant For Mother Who Abducted Her Child, Andrew Richardson, In
The Summer Of 2007, MISSING & UNIDENTIFIED PEOPLE: LETS FIND THEM (Nov.
27, 2012), http://letsfindthem.wordpress.com/2012/11/27/unsolved-felonywarrant-for-mother-who-abduction-her-child-andrew-richardson-in-the-summerof-2007/.
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Andrew’s father, Trevor, visitation.3 When Trevor arrived at
Andrew’s daycare to pick him up, he was informed that his son had
not shown up for a week.4 Andrew was soon found in Querétaro,
Mexico, living with his mother, Mariana,5 a Mexican national.6
Mariana was charged in the U.S. with two felonies for abduction,7
and Trevor was granted sole legal custody of Andrew.8 Upon
arriving in Mexico, however, Mariana had told authorities that she
fled the U.S. because Trevor was abusive to her and Andrew.9
Although the U.S. determined these allegations were false,10 Trevor
remains unable to secure the return of his son to the U.S. in
accordance with his custody rights.11
Sadly, Andrew and Trevor’s story is not uncommon. Each
year, more than one thousand international parental child abductions
from the U.S. to other countries are reported.12 Since 2006, Congress
has reported that this number has “increased substantially,”13 since
advancements in international transportation and communication
have resulted in an increase in travel and immigration.14 In fact, it is
estimated that more than 11,000 American children15 currently live
3
Trevor Richardson, History, BRING ANDREW HOME,
http://www.bringandrewhome.com/andrew_feb_7_002.htm (last visited Jan. 25,
2014).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Bring Andrew Home, supra note 1.
7
Id.
8
My Journey Continues, supra note 1.
9
Bring Andrew Home, supra note 1.
10
Id.
11
My Journey Continues, supra note 1.
12
H.R. 3212, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013), available at
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/3212/text.
13
H.R. 1951, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013), available at
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1951/text; see also H.R. 3240,
111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/F?c111:1:./temp/~c111TqDdHb:e1569: (stating that the number of
international parental child abductions increased by sixty percent from 2006 to
2008, and by forty percent in 2008 alone).
14
Priscilla Steward, Access Rights: A Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights
Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, 21 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 308, 315 (1997).
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abroad as a result of international parental child abduction.16
Statistically, only half of these children will be returned to the U.S.17
International parental child abduction frequently causes
severe psychological and emotional damage to both the child and
left-behind parent.18 Often, the child is taken from a stable, healthy
environment, and relocated to an unfamiliar environment in which he
or she must meet new people, learn a new language, and understand
and assimilate into a different culture.19 Worse still, taking parents
sometimes force their children to alter their appearance or change
their name,20 and may tell their children the left-behind parent is
dead, does not want them, or is not trying to get them back.21
Abducted children often experience “anxiety, eating problems,
nightmares, mood swings, sleep disturbances, aggressive behavior,
resentment, and fearfulness,” and these problems may persist
through adulthood.22

Another source estimated that there are more than 200,000 cases of
international child abduction per year, which would significantly increase the
number of American children who are believed to be living abroad as a result of
international parental child abduction. A Parent’s Worst Nightmare: The Heartbreak of
Int’l Child Abduction: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. 110
(2004) (statement of the Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Board, National
Center
for
Missing
&
Exploited
Children),
available
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa94505.000/hfa94505_0f.htm.
16
Michael Walsh & Susan Savard, Int’l Child Abduction and the Hague
Convention, 6 BARRY L. REV. 29, 29 (2006).
17
H.R. 3212, supra note 12.
18
U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 10 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Compliance
Report],
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2010Co
mplianceReport.pdf.
19
Caitlin Bannon, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction: The Need for Mechanisms to Address Noncompliance, 31 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 129, 134 (2011).
20
U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 7 (Apr. 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Compliance Report],
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2009Ha
gueAbductionConventionComplianceReport.pdf.
21
Id.
15
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Similarly, left-behind parents frequently experience
psychological, emotional, and financial problems while attempting to
secure the return of their children.23 Left-behind parents often feel
“helplessness and the sense they do not know where to start in the
process of recovering their child.”24 A lack of financial resources
exacerbates these emotions, since the left-behind parent may be
restricted in traveling abroad, retaining an attorney, hiring translators
and interpreters, and proceeding with the case.25
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction (the “Hague Convention” or the “Convention”)
was enacted to ensure that victims of international parental child
abduction are returned to their custodial parent.26 The text of the
Convention, however, does not set forth standards or procedures to
implement the Convention.27 Consequently, many countries have
failed to comply because of internal difficulties with enforcement.28
This comment will examine the problem of noncompliance,
with a focus on children abducted between the U.S. and Mexico.
Part II provides a general overview of the Convention and examines
its objectives and operation between contracting states. Part III
assesses the problems of the Convention, particularly its lack of an
enforcement mechanism. Part IV describes the differences between
the U.S. and Mexico’s legal systems, with an emphasis on custody
rights. Part V explains the history of the Convention in the U.S. and
Mexico, focuses on each country’s compliance efforts, and provides
an overview of recent compliance efforts in Latin America. Finally,
Part VI explores potential solutions for addressing noncompliance,
including creating Hague Convention courts and providing adequate
resources to left-behind parents and Central Authorities.
Id.
2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 11.
24
2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 7.
25
Id.
26
The Convention on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, opened
for signature Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98 [hereinafter Abduction Convention],
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=24.
27
Elisa Perez-Vera, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l Law, Explanatory
Report
430
(1981)
[hereinafter
Perez-Vera
Report],
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf.
28
Bannon, supra note 19, at 153.
22
23
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II. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
On October 24, 1980, twenty-nine Member States of the
Hague Conference unanimously adopted the Convention, which was
signed the following day.29 Currently, more than eighty countries are
party to the Convention, including the U.S. and Mexico.30 The
Convention’s primary goal is for countries to work together to
“protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their
wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure
their prompt return to the State of habitual residence31.”32 The
Convention also seeks to ensure that rights of custody and access are
returned to the “status quo” that existed before the child was
abducted.33 Finally, the Convention seeks to deter abducting parents
from engaging in international forum shopping to find a country in
which they believe they can obtain a favorable custody agreement.34
A. Objectives of the Hague Convention
The Hague Convention states two primary objectives:35 (1)
“to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or
retained in any Contracting State,”36 and (2) “to ensure that rights of
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 426.
Members of the Organisation, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=24
(last
visited
Jan.
26,
2014),
now
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing.
31
Neither the Hague Convention nor ICARA define a child’s state of
habitual residence. In Abbott, however, the Supreme Court explained that a child’s
state of habitual residence is “fixed by the custody arrangement,” so the child
should be returned to the country of his or her custodial parent. Abbott v. Abbott,
560 U.S. 1, 33 (2010).
32
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at Preamble.
33
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429.
34
Id.; Walsh & Savard, supra note 16, at 30.
35
Both of the Convention’s objectives assume that the return of the
child to the state of habitual residence is in his or her best interest. Although the
Convention does not explicitly refer to the child’s best interest, contracting states
consider them to be of utmost importance when determining custody and access
rights. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 431.
29
30
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custody and access under the law of one Contracting State are
effectively represented in the other Contracting States.”37 A taking
parent’s duty to return a child is triggered only when the child’s
removal or retention is deemed wrongful under the Convention.38
Removal or retention is considered wrongful where it is (1) in breach
of custody rights in the state in which the child was habitually
resident immediately prior to his or her removal or retention, and (2)
when the left-behind parent was actually exercising those custody
rights at the time of the removal or retention.39
The Convention defines custody rights as “relating to the care
of . . . the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s
place of residence.”40 Custody rights differ from access rights, which
are the “rights to take a child for a limited period of time to a place
other than the child’s habitual residence.”41 Custody rights may arise
by law, or by a judicial or administrative decision or agreement that
has legal effect under the law of the child’s state of habitual
residence.42
B. The Role of the Central Authority
To execute the mandates of the Hague Convention,
contracting states are required to assign a Central Authority.43 The
primary role of the Central Authority is to return abducted children
by encouraging cooperation between officials in each state and
among other contracting states.44 In addition, Central Authorities
must assist in locating the child, attempt to facilitate a voluntary
return of the child, and, if necessary, initiate legal proceedings for the

A contracting state is “any country which is a party to the
Convention.” 22 C.F.R. § 94.1 (2013).
37
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 1.
38
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 444.
39
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 3.
40
Id. at art. 5(a).
41
Id. at art. 5(b).
42
Id. at art. 3.
43
Id. at art. 6.
44
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 7.
36
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child’s return.45 In the U.S., the designated Central Authority is the
Office of Children’s Issues within the U.S. Department of State.46 In
Mexico, the Central Authority is the Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores.47
C. Filing a Hague Convention Application
For assistance in returning an abducted child, left-behind
parents who believe their child has been wrongfully removed or
retained must apply to a Central Authority.48 The Central Authority
then must act “without delay” to transmit the application to its
pertinent counterpart Central Authority,49 which must “take[] all
appropriate measures” to locate the child and secure his or her
prompt return.50
A left-behind parent must satisfy three threshold
requirements before filing a valid Hague Convention application.
First, the child’s country of habitual residence and country of
abduction must both be signatories to the Convention.51 Second, the
child must have been removed from the state of habitual residence in
breach of custody or access rights authorized in that state.52 Third,
the child must be younger than sixteen years of age.53 Even if the
child is abducted or an application for the child’s return is initiated

45
Id.; Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention, HAGUE CONF. ON
PRIVATE INT’L LAW (July 2012), http://www.hcch.net/upload/outline28e.pdf.
46
Authorities, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=133 (last visited
Jan. 26, 2014).
47
Int’l Parental Child Abduction, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/country/mexico.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2014).
48
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 8; Perez-Vera Report,
supra note 27, at 455 (stating that the applicant may apply to whichever Central
Authority it deems most appropriate).
49
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 9.
50
Id. at art. 10.
51
Id. at art. 35.
52
Id. at art. 3.
53
Id. at art. 4.
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before the child turns sixteen years old, the Convention ceases to
apply as soon as the child reaches this age.54
If all three requirements are satisfied and the child is
successfully located, the appropriate Central Authority must assist the
left-behind parent to initiate court proceedings in the country in
which the child is located.55 In these proceedings, the court should
not consider the merits of the underlying custody dispute.56 Instead,
the court’s sole focus is to determine whether the child was
wrongfully removed according to custody rights in the child’s state of
habitual residence and to return those children it determines to have
been wrongfully removed.57 If the parents desire to modify their
custody agreement, they must contact the appropriate authorities in
the child’s state of habitual residence once the child has been
returned.58
D. Defenses to the Hague Convention
To protect the child’s best interests, the Hague Convention
does not require the prompt return of abducted children under five
circumstances.59 First, there is no obligation to return a child if more
than one year has elapsed from when the child was wrongfully
removed or retained to when the left-behind parent made a request
for the child’s return, as long as the child has settled in to his or her
new environment.60 Second, there is no duty to return a child if the
parent with custodial rights was not exercising those rights at the time
of the child’s removal or retention.61 Third, if the left-behind parent
consented or acquiesced in the child’s removal or retention, the
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 4.
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 455.
56
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 16-19.
57
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429.
58
Id. at 430.
59
The first three defenses listed must be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence, and the last two must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Nat’l
Report
Int’l
Child
Custody,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/International_Child_Abducti
on_Remedies_Act.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
60
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 12.
61
Id. at art. 13(a).
54
55
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taking parent is not required to return the child.62 Fourth, there is no
obligation to return a child if the abducting country determines that
doing so would pose a “grave risk” or place the child in an otherwise
“intolerable situation.”63 Finally, a taking parent is not required to
return a child if doing so would go against the requesting state’s
fundamental principles relating to the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.64
III. PROBLEMS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Prior to the Hague Convention, a left-behind parent would
have little to no legal remedy to ensure his or her child’s rightful
return.65 The Department of State could not enforce an American
custody agreement outside of the U.S.,66 since custody rights
authorized in the U.S. could not be enforced in other countries.67 In
addition, courts in the U.S. were reluctant to enforce a left-behind
parent’s custody rights, since the abducted child was no longer
located within the U.S.68
The Convention has not achieved its laudable goals. The
Convention was designed to ensure that wrongfully removed children
would be returned in accordance with custody rights ordered in the
child’s state of habitual residence (and effectively return the situation

Id.
Id. at art. 13(b).
64
Id. at art. 20.
65
Tai Vivatvaraphol, Back to Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence
in Int’l Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3325,
3332-33 (2009); see also Susan Mackie, Procedural Problems in the Adjudication of Int’l
Parental child Abduction Cases, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 445, 448 (1996) (stating
that before the Convention, taking parents would obtain a favorable custody
agreement in the abducting country, precluding the left-behind parent from
establishing his or her custody rights).
66
Int’l Child Abduction, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 1995), available at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/population/children/9501.html.
67
Vivatvaraphol, supra note 65, at 3332.
68
Id.
62
63
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to the “status quo”69); however, the Convention is not performing as
it was originally intended.70
The Convention’s primary issue is that its text does not
contain an enforcement mechanism for “ensuring that Contracting
States fulfill their obligations or for dealing with those Contracting
States that fail to do so.”71 As a result, enforcement of the
Convention hinges solely on the cooperation and willingness of
contracting states.72 If contracting states do not comply, there are no
consequences or repercussions.73 Left-behind parents report that
even when their children are abducted to countries that are
signatories to the Convention, most of these countries “routinely
reject the responsibility that comes with participation in [the
Convention]” and the U.S. “fail[s] to respond to their pleas for
help.”74
As a result of the lack of an enforcement mechanism,
numerous parties to the Convention are considered noncompliant.75
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA),76 enacted
in the U.S. to enforce the Convention, requires the Department of
State to release an annual compliance report.77 Reports include
detailed country-by-country international child abduction statistics,
summaries of unresolved cases, address issues contracting states are
having with compliance, and describe efforts to encourage parties to
the Convention to use nongovernmental organizations to assist leftbehind parents seeking the return of their children.78 Compliance

69
70

Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429.
Bannon, supra note 19, at 153.

Id.
Id. (quoting Paul R. Beaumont & Peter E. McEleavy, The Hague
Convention on Int’l Child Abduction 242 (P.B. Carter ed., 1999).
73
Id.
74
H.R. Con. Res. 293, 106th Cong. (2000).
75
Bannon, supra note 19, at 153.
76
See discussion infra, at Part V.B.
77
42 U.S.C. § 11611(a) (1988).
78
Id.
71
72
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reports also list all countries the Department of State determines are
having difficulties enforcing the Convention.79
When evaluating a contracting state’s compliance, the
Department of State evaluates three areas: Central Authority
performance, judicial performance, and law enforcement
performance.80 First, the Department of State evaluates how quickly
a country’s Central Authority processes Convention applications, its
willingness to help left-behind parents find competent legal
assistance, and its responsiveness to inquiries made by the U.S.
Central Authority (USCA) and left-behind parents.81 Next, the
Department evaluates judicial performance, including how quickly
the country’s courts process Convention applications and appeals,
whether the courts correctly apply the Convention’s legal procedures,
and how effective courts are in enforcing decisions.82 Finally, the
Department reviews law enforcement performance by examining
whether law enforcement officials are successful in expeditiously
locating abducted children and taking parents, and enforcing court
orders issued under the Convention.83
Based on contracting states’ performance, they may be
labeled by the Department of State as either “Countries Not
Compliant with the Convention” or “Countries Demonstrating
Patterns of Noncompliance with the Convention.”84 A “Countr[y]
Not Compliant with the Convention” designation signals the country
is not competent in all performance areas.85
A “Countr[y]
Demonstrating Patterns of Noncompliance” designation indicates
the country is not competent in one or two of the three performance

79
80

Id.
2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 6.

Id. at 12.
Id.
83
Id.
84
U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliant with the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 6 (Apr. 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Compliance Report],
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2008Ha
gueAbductionConventionComplianceReport.pdf.
85
Id.
81
82
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areas.86 Mexico has earned both of these designations in recent
years.87 In addition, a country is considered compliant if it is
competent in all three areas, although the Department of State
considers even one unresolved case to possibly “reflect broader
problems of concern with the country’s compliance.”88
IV. DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE
U.S.
Mexico and the U.S. possess different legal systems, and
different philosophies regarding custody and parental rights.89 In
deciding Hague Convention return cases, the law of the child’s state
of habitual residence governs the validity of the claim.90 This law
must be construed broadly to “embrac[e] both written and customary
rules of law91 . . . and the interpretations placed upon them by caselaw.”92 This has led to misunderstandings in enforcing custody
agreements, and makes it difficult for the U.S. and Mexico to
uniformly enforce the Hague Convention. Ultimately, this conflict
contributes to the Department of State’s determination that Mexico
is noncompliant.93

Id.
See U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 15 (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Compliance
Report],
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2007chil
d_abduction_Compliance_Report.pdf; 2008 Compliance Report, supra note 83, at 16;
2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 21; 2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at
22.
88
2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 15.
89
Mexico’s legal system derives from civil law, so judges look primarily
at the Code when deciding legal issues. The U.S.’ legal system derives from
common law, so judges decide legal issues based on statutes and precedent.
Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, U.S./Mexico Cross-Border Child Abduction – the Need for
Cooperation, 29 N.M. L. REV. 289, 294 (1999).
90
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 445.
91
An example of a customary rule of law is the concept of patria
potestas in Mexico. See discussion infra, at Part IV.A.
92
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 445.
93
2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 22.
86
87
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A. Custody Rights in Mexico
In Mexico, the concept of patria potestad,94 translated to
parental authority, is applied to the legal relationship between
children and their parents.95 Exercising parental authority involves a
duty of care and custody to the minor child.96 As Mexican courts
apply this concept, custody of a child involves special care, attention,
and love.97 Further, “[c]ustody cannot be understood separately from
the physical supervision of the children, because that connection is a
means to protect them, raise them . . . and provide for them.”98
Parental authority is distinct from the physical custody of a child or
an arrangement of visitation rights, however, because parental
authority is inherent in the relationship between children and their
parents.99
Historically, parental authority referred to paternal power, so
“a father had a near absolute right to his children, whom he viewed
as chattel.”100 This natural right was viewed as so strong that courts
were virtually “powerless” to interfere.101 Over time, however,
Mexican courts began to subordinate the concept of parental
authority to the best interests of the child.102
Today, parental authority in Mexico is largely governed by the
Civil Code,103 and “has evolved from an absolute power into a legal
power.”104 Parental authority has slowly transformed into a joint
94
“Patria potestad” is Spanish for “parental authority.” Patricia Begné,
Symposium on Comparative Custody Law: North American Parental Authority and Child
Custody in Mexico, 39 FAM. L.Q. 527, 527 (2005).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 533.
97
Id. at 534.

Id.
Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 453 (1st Cir. 2000).
100
Kathryn Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making – How
Judges use the Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 14 (1998).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 16.
103
JOSÉ ANTONIO MÁRQUEZ GONZÁLEZ, FAMILY LAW IN MEXICO 80
(Kluwer Law Int’l 2011).
104
Begné, supra note 94, at 528.
98
99
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responsibility between the father and mother.105 In divorce cases,
both parents continue to exercise parental authority over the child,106
unless this authority is legally terminated.107 Since Mexican family law
courts are instructed to consider the best interests of the child in
deciding custody arrangements,108 children are commonly placed with
their mothers following a divorce.109 Only one to five of every one
hundred fathers are awarded custody of their children.110 In fact,
mothers are automatically awarded custody of children under age
seven (and sometimes up to age twelve, depending on the state),
unless the father proves that the mother poses a significant danger to
the child’s development.111
B. Custody Rights in the U.S.
Similar to Mexico, the U.S. historically awarded custody rights
to fathers, since children were considered the father’s property.112 In
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, states increasingly awarded
custody based on the best interests of the child.113 As a result,
mothers were often awarded custody of their children, especially in
the case of young children.114
Recently, the “maternal presumption” has lessened, and the
legislature considers joint custody and uses a primary caretaker
standard to determine the child’s best interests.115 Joint custody
assumes that allowing a child to maintain relationships with both
Sedillo Lopez, supra note 89, at 297.
Id.
107
Allison Maxim, Int’l Parental Child Abduction: Essential Principles of the
Hague Convention, 69 APR BENCH & B. MINN. 18, 20 (Apr. 2012).
108
Begné, supra note 94, at 539.
109
Sedillo Lopez, supra note 89, at 298.
110
Aline Juárez Nieto, Patria Potestad, Donde la Biología Juega en Contra de
los
Varones,
CNN
MEXICO
(July
11,
2012,
3:32
PM),
http://mexico.cnn.com/salud/2012/07/11/patria-potestad-donde-la-biologiajuega-en-contra-de-los-varones.
111
C.C.D.F. art. 282, § VI.
112
Mercer, supra note 100, at 16.
113
Id. at 17-18.
114
Id. at 26.
115
MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE U.S. 129 (1994).
105
106
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parents is in the child’s best interests.116 The primary caretaker
standard presumes that it is in the child’s best interest to live with
whichever parent has provided continuous care.117
Despite
movements toward these new standards, mothers are still awarded
custody of their children more frequently than fathers.118 For
example, in 2012, only 18.3 percent of custodial parents were
fathers.119
V. HISTORY OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND
MEXICO
Mexico is the most popular destination for children abducted
from the U.S., and vice versa.120 For example, in 2009, the USCA
was involved with 558 cases in which American children were
abducted to Mexico.121 Japan had the second largest number of
active cases with thirty-eight.122 This phenomenon likely results from
Mexico’s proximity to, and historical and cultural connections with,
the U.S.123 Today, there are roughly 11.7 million individuals living in
the U.S. who were born in Mexico, and Mexico-U.S. migration is the
largest bi-national migration flow in the world.124

116

J. SHOSHANNA EHRLICH, FAMILY LAW FOR PARALEGALS 211 (4th

ed. 1008).
Mercer, supra note 100, at 47.
Timothy Grall, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support:
2011,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Oct.
2013),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-246.pdf.
119
Id.
120
Sedillo Lopez, supra note 89, at 290.
121
Ernie Allen, President & CEO, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited
Children, Speech to the Amber Alert S. Border Initiative: Child Abductions:
Globally, Nationally and Along the U.S./Mexico Border (Aug. 31, 2009) (transcript
available
at
http://www.icmec.org/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry
=en_X1&PageId=4108).
122
Id.
123
Sedillo Lopez, supra note 89, at 289.
124
Marc R. Rosenblum, William A. Kandel, Clare Ribando Seelke &
Ruth Ellen Wasem, Mexican Migration to the U.S.: Policy and Trends, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. (June 7, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42560.pdf.
117
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A. Mexico’s Compliance with the Hague Convention
In recent years, the Department of State has found that
Mexico has struggled to fulfill its obligations under the Hague
Convention.125 For three consecutive years, Mexico was designated
as a country exhibiting “patterns of noncompliance” because the
Mexican Central Authority (MCA) was ineffective at locating
abducted children and taking parents within Mexico.126 For example,
in 2009, there were forty-seven cases of children abducted from the
U.S. to Mexico, and the children were only located in thirteen of
these cases.127
In 2010, Mexico was labeled as “not compliant.”128 The
USCA reported it “experienced serious difficulties” working with the
MCA, causing left-behind parents to endure “costly inconvenience”
and “significant delays” in processing return applications.129 For
example, the USCA requested the MCA’s assistance in locating
children involved in thirty-eight unresolved cases that had been
pending for more than eighteen months, but the MCA failed to
locate them “[i]n many of the cases.”130
Three factors contribute to Mexico’s difficulties enforcing the
Hague Convention. First, Mexico has not enacted legislation, like
ICARA in the U.S., to effectively implement the Convention.131
Instead, this responsibility is reserved to the states.132 As a result,
Congress unanimously adopted a resolution urging Mexico and other
noncompliant countries “to ensure their compliance with the Hague
125
See 2007 Compliance Report, supra note 87, at 15; 2008 Compliance Report,
supra note 84, at 16; 2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 21; 2010 Compliance
Report, supra note 18, at 22.
126
See 2007 Compliance Report, supra note 87, at 15; 2008 Compliance Report,
supra note 84, at 16; 2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 21.
127
2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 21.

2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 22.
Id.
130
Id.
131
Reyna Aurora Martínez López, The Experience of Mexico on Int’l Child
Abduction (last visited Feb. 1, 2014), available at http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/482364/publicationFile/4325/RedeLopez.pdf.
132
Id.
128
129

805

2016

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:2

Convention by enacting effective implementing legislation and
educating their judicial and law enforcement authorities.”133 Mexico,
however, continues to enforce the Convention according to
independent state law.134
Second, Mexico does not have sufficient resources to locate
abducted children and taking parents, or to educate officials and
judges about the Convention’s procedures.135 For example, some
Mexican judges continue to adjudicate cases arising under the
Convention based on procedures found in state civil codes136 and the
merits of the underlying custody dispute, which is inconsistent with
the Convention.137 Instead, judges are supposed to assume the
existing custody agreement from the child’s state of habitual
residence is valid, and must return the child based on this
agreement.138 Recently, Congress encouraged Mexico and other
noncompliant countries to “further educate its central authority and
local law enforcement authorities regarding the Hague
Convention . . . and the need for immediate action when a parent of
an abducted child seeks their assistance.”139
Third, taking parents may file an “amparo,” a special appeal in
which the taking parent claims that the government has violated a
constitutional right.140 When an amparo is filed, the case is put on
hold until a ruling on the amparo has been made.141 A ruling on an
amparo may be appealed multiple times, resulting in costly delays to
the left-behind parent.142

S. Con. Res. 98, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted).
Martínez López, supra note 131.
135
2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 22-23.
136
Id. at 23.
137
U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 5 (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Compliance Report],
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2011Ha
gueComplianceReport.pdf.
138
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 430.
139
S. Con. Res. 98, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted).
140
2011 Compliance Report, supra note 137, at 5.
141
Id.
142
2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 21.
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In an attempt to solve these problems, in 2008, the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico City began working with the MCA “to persuade
the Mexican branch of Interpol to apply more resources and effort to
locate abducted children, and to educate the judiciary in an effort to
increase understanding of the Convention.”143 Further, the MCA
began working with the Agencia Federal de Investigación (AFI) in an
effort to more efficiently locate abducted children.144 Finally, the
MCA has also claimed that it has undertaken legislative initiatives to
restrict the use of amparos in Hague return cases.145
For the past three years, the Department of State has noted
the MCA has made significant improvements in its enforcement of
the Convention.146 Unfortunately, the MCA and Mexican law
enforcement continue to experience difficulties locating abducted
children because of inadequate staffing and other resources.147
Mexican courts are also exceptionally slow in processing Hague
return applications,148 and judges continue to adjudicate Hague return
cases inconsistently.149 As a result, the number of unresolved return
applications is increasing.150
B. The U.S.’ Compliance with the Hague Convention
Congress enacted ICARA to give effect to the Hague
Convention in the U.S.151 The Act gives the Convention the force of
law in the U.S., and imposes consequences, such as contempt, if the
Convention is not complied with.152 ICARA and the Convention

143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id.
2011 Compliance Report, supra note 137, at 5.
Id.
Id.
2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 23.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
See generally 2011 Compliance Report, supra note 137.
Formerly 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(1) (1988), now 22 U.S.C.A. § 9001

(b)(1) (2015).
Laura McCue, Left Behind: The Failure of the U.S. to Fight for the Return of
Victims of Int’l Child Abduction, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 85, 95 (2004).
152
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serve “to deter international child abduction and to provide a
mechanism for the prompt return of abducted children.”153
Parts of ICARA, however, hinder operation of the
Convention. For example, ICARA grants state and federal courts
concurrent jurisdiction over all claims arising under the
Convention.154 It is recommended that Hague Convention return
cases be filed in federal court because “[f]ederal judges are
considered . . . better equipped to [rule according to the Convention]
as opposed to state court judges, who are accustomed to making best
interests of the child determinations and who may be more inclined
to do so in Hague Convention cases.”155 Consequently, a left-behind
parent may engage in forum-shopping to obtain the most favorable
venue to pursue his or her Hague return case, resulting in additional
costs and delays.156
The Department of States’ three most recent compliance
reports do not include statistics analyzing the U.S.’ handling of
incoming Hague Convention cases.157 Nonetheless, in 2009, there
were 324 newly filed Convention applications involving 454 children
that were abducted into the U.S.158 Of these 454 children, the U.S.
only returned 154 of them to their country of habitual residence.159
120 of these children were abducted from Mexico, and only fiftythree were returned.160 Although the U.S. does not evaluate its own

153
Judge Veronica Torrez, Cheryl Coleman & Tina Burleson, The
International Abduction of International Children: Conflicts of Laws, Federal Statutes, and
Judicial Interpretation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 7, 30 (2005).
154
22 U.S.C.A. § 9001 (b)(4) (2015).
155
Kilpatrick Townsend, Litigating Int’l Child Abduction Cases Under the
Hague Convention, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN 69 (2012),
available at http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/HagueLitigationGuide/haguelitigation-guide.pdf.
156
Linda Silberman, Patching Up the Abduction Convention: A Call for a New
Int’l Protocol and a Suggestion for Amendments to ICARA, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 41, 57-58
(2003).
157
See generally 2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20; 2010 Compliance
Report, supra note 18; 2011 Compliance Report, supra note 137.
158
2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 6.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 15.
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performance, these numbers suggest that, despite ICARA, the U.S.
also experiences difficulties enforcing the Convention.
C. Latin American Efforts to Promote Compliance with the
Hague Convention
In 2004, judges and Central Authorities from seventeen Latin
American countries, Spain, and the U.S. met to discuss ways to
improve regional operation of the Hague Convention.161 Officials
concluded that cooperation with the Convention would require
“[r]egular international meetings and contacts among Judges and
Central Authorities for the purpose of exchanging information, ideas
and good practice.”162 At follow-up meetings, officials recommended
and developed “regional model law of procedure” to “facilitate
national implementation of the [Convention].”163
In 2011, officials from Latin American countries and
organizations, Spain, and the U.S. met “to discuss how to improve,
among the countries represented, the operation of the
[Convention] . . . and to provide information on the implementation
of the [Convention].”164 The meeting proposed to develop a
“practical handbook” to assist judges in Hague proceedings,
recommended limiting grounds for appeals to streamline
proceedings, and emphasized the importance of communication
between Central Authorities and judges.165 In theory, educating all
161
The Latin American Judges’ Seminar on the 1980 Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, available
at http://www.hcch.net/upload/monterrey2.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
162
Officials also made other conclusions and recommendations,
including establishing national training programs from judges, central authority,
personnel, and attorneys. Id.
163
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Inter-American Expert Meeting on
Int’l Child Abduction, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW (Nov. 10, 2006),
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/concl_iin_e.pdf.
164
Mexico Inter-American Meeting, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW
(Feb.
25,
2011),
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2011&varevent=217
.
165
Int’l Child Protection Conferences and Seminars, HAGUE CONF. ON
PRIVATE
INT’L
LAW,
available
at
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judges in every contracting state and encouraging communication
between Central Authorities is a viable solution. Streamlining these
efforts and providing resources to facilitate the return of children will
best serve the Convention’s goals.
VI. SOLUTIONS FOR ADDRESSING NONCOMPLIANCE BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND MEXICO
Compliance with the Hague Convention is critical for
protecting abducted children.166 The Convention is often considered
a “one-way street” for Americans.167 Left-behind parents from
noncompliant countries benefit from the “almost certain” guarantee
that children abducted into the U.S. will be returned, while American
parents lack these same guarantees.168 In truth, the U.S. also has a
meager track record for returning children. Consequently, the
Convention remains an empty promise for many left-behind parents.
The U.S. and Mexico (and other contracting states) must ensure that
abducted children are promptly returned to their custodial parent.
A. Educating Judges About Hague Return Cases
Despite efforts to educate judges about Hague return cases,
these cases are often decided inconsistently within a country and
between countries.169 Judges are told to rule based on a broad
interpretation of law, which includes the customary laws of the
child’s state of habitual residence.170 Many judges also determine

http://www.hcch.net/upload/newsletter/nl2012tome18e_p25.pdf (last visited
Feb. 2, 2014).
166
2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 10.
167
Thomas A. Johnson, The Hague Child Abduction Convention: Diminishing
Returns and Little to Celebrate for Americans, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 125, 135
(2000).
168
Id. at 129.
169
Linda Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Abduction Convention: In Search of
a Global Jurisprudence, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2005).
170
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 26, at 445.
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family law issues according to the best interests of the child, but this
may be inconsistent with the existing custody agreement.171
Educating each judge in the U.S. and Mexico about the
Hague Convention is a daunting task, particularly because many of
these judges will never be assigned a Hague return case. Ideally,
providing a dedicated group of judges or courts would alleviate the
problems associated with an inconsistent judiciary. In the U.S.,
Congress may use its Article I powers “[t]o constitute tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court.”172 In Mexico, each state’s Congress
has the power to create federal administrative courts.173 A court
dedicated to Hague return cases would allow judges to become
intimately familiar with the Convention and case law from other
countries.174 As a result, Hague Convention return cases would be
adjudicated consistently with the objectives of the Convention.
B. Providing Adequate Financial Resources to Left-Behind Parents
The U.S. does not provide adequate resources to left-behind
parents. The U.S. made a reservation175 to Article 26 of the Hague
Convention. Although making a reservation to Article 26 has not
posed significant problems to other countries, it is a major source of
delays in the U.S.176 The U.S. places the burden of paying for legal
proceedings and attorneys solely on the left-behind parent, unless
Silberman, supra note 168, at 1057.
Two examples of Article I courts are the Court of Appeals for
Veterans’ Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 9.
173
Ana Elena Fierro & Adriana García, Design Matters: The Case of
Mexican
Admin.
Courts,
CIDE
(Dec.
2010),
available
at
http://www.libreriacide.com/librospdf/DTEJ-48.pdf.
174
The International Child Abduction Database (INCADAT) was
established in 1999 “to promote mutual understanding, consistent interpretation
and thereby the effective operation of the [] Convention.” INCADAT allows
judges (and others) to search for judicial decisions handed down in other countries
to
examine
legal
analysis
and
holdings.
INCADAT,
http://www.incadat.com/index.cfm?act=text.text&lng=1 (last visited Feb. 1,
2014).
175
Article 42 allows countries to make a reservation to Article 26 of the
Convention. Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at Art. 42.
176
Mackie, supra note 65, at 454-55.
171
172
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these costs are covered by legal aid or assumed by pro bono
attorneys.177 The legal aid system in the U.S., however, is underfunded,178 and the availability of pro bono attorneys is decreasing,
especially for family law-related claims.179
The expenses of a Hague Convention return case extend
beyond the legal proceedings.180 Despite the U.S. legal aid system’s
lack of funds, the U.S. should be required to assist indigent leftbehind parents in these proceedings, since this benefits the abducted
child and minimizes the time the child spends in an unfamiliar
environment. The United Kingdom, for example, has been
successful in requiring its legal aid system to cover all legal costs to
the extent it can bear.181 The U.S. could also require taking parents to
cover the left-behind parents’ legal expenses, but this may not be
feasible depending on the taking parent’s financial situation.
C. Providing Adequate Resources to Central Authorities
Mexico does not provide adequate resources to the MCA to
locate abducted children and taking parents.182 Although the MCA
works with Interpol and AFI, the Authority still lacks the manpower
and funds necessary to be effective, especially when the left-behind
parent does not know the child’s exact location.183 Mexico’s lack of
resources makes cooperation with the U.S. paramount.
The USCA should limit using its resources to educate
Mexican judges, the MCA, and law enforcement on Hague return
cases. Although the Department of State has noted recent
improvements,184 the bulk of the MCA’s problems no longer result
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at Art. 26.
Mackie, supra note 65, at 455.
179
Id. at 458.
180
For example, left-behind parents often must pay to locate the child,
travel to the country the child is located in, and travel home. The left-behind
parent may also miss work, and the taking parent may stop making child support or
alimony payments. Mackie, supra note 65, at 457.
181
Id. at 456.
182
2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 23.
183
Id.
184
2011 Compliance Report, supra note 137, at 5.
177
178
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from a lack of information. Instead, the USCA should expend its
resources in the form of manpower to assist the MCA and Mexican
law enforcement in locating abducted children in Mexico.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Hague Convention lacks an enforcement mechanism to
ensure that abducted children are promptly returned. In many
countries, the Convention is an empty promise for left-behind
parents. Although the U.S. enacted ICARA to implement the
Convention, the U.S. has an unacceptable track record in returning
abducted children. The U.S. and Mexico must work together to
ensure that children are promptly located and returned.
Consequently, the U.S. and Mexico should create courts with judges
dedicated to Hague Convention return cases to ensure consistency
and accuracy in decisions. The U.S. must provide financial assistance
to left-behind parents, and Mexico and the U.S. must provide
resources to the MCA to locate abducted children and taking parents.
Under the current framework, the Convention fails to protect
thousands of children and families every year. We can do better.
Our children deserve better.
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NATIONAL TREASURE: A SURVEY OF
THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW
REGIME FOR UNDERWATER CULTURAL
HERITAGE
Christian Hoefly

I. INTRODUCTION
The SS Gairsoppa was doomed when the vessel left Calcutta,
India in December of 1940 and sailed in the treacherous Atlantic Seas
during World War II.1 Unknown to the sailors navigating the vessel
on that day, the salvage of the sunken ship in 2011 would set
precedent to navigate the equally unforgiving waters of maritime
salvage law. Amongst a virtual sea of conflicting international
common law principles, international conventions, and national laws,
the salvage of the SS Gairsoppa provides a model for contracted
historical salvage for other states to follow.
Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. (“Odyssey”), a Floridabased salvage firm well-experienced in salvage operations and salvage
litigations, conducted the salvage of the SS Gairsoppa. Working cooperatively with the United Kingdom government, Odyssey entered
into a contracted salvage of the SS Gairsoppa that ensured salvage of
the vessel, and established clear ownership rights of the salvaged
property. Contracting historical salvage not only promotes the
exploration and recovery of sunken vessels and artifacts by providing
clear economic incentives for governments and salvors alike, but
1
SS Gairsoppa Historical Overview, ODYSSEY MARINE EXPLORATION,
http://www.shipwreck.net/ssgairsoppahistoricaloverview.php (last visited Oct. 21,
2013) [hereinafter SS Gairsoppa Historical Overview].
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equally serves to minimize the litigation risk associated with historical
salvages.
This article surveys the current international salvage law
regimes, and analyzes the economic incentives provided by the
current laws. Part II traces the history of the SS Gairsoppa and
chronicles the service of the vessel, its eventual sinking, and the
contracted salvage agreement that led to the vessel’s recovery. Part
III details the applicable laws governing international historic salvages
including traditional international law, and international treaties. Part
III also analyzes the economic incentives of the current legal regime.
Part IV discusses the alternative of contracted historical salvage
operations and the advantages, both legal and economic, for states to
enter into contracted salvage.
II. FROM BATTLE TO RESURRECTION
The SS Gairsoppa was one of many vessels sunk in the
Atlantic during World War II, but it could reshape more than just the
ocean floor. The vessel transported an extraordinary amount of silver
on its final journey, and the vessel’s salvage now provides a path for
many states to follow in recovering their lost treasures. This section
details the life of the SS Gairsoppa to provide insight into the ship’s
interaction with international law. The section also provides an
overview of the contracted salvage that should serve as a model for
other states with historic shipwrecks.
A. Life of the SS Gairsoppa
The SS Gairsoppa began its career for the British India Steam
Navigation Company Ltd. in 1919 as a commercial vessel.2 British
India Steam Navigation Company finished construction of the

2

Id.
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vessel.3 The vessel sailed the commercial waters of China, Australia,
India, and East Africa for the next twenty years.4
In the years leading up to the Second World War, the U.K.
Director of Sea Transport of the Admiralty approached the British
India Steam Navigation Company attempting to enlist passenger
ships to join the British Fleet.5 The SS Gairsoppa was in war service by
1940, along with all 103 British India Company ships.6 By the end of
the war, fifty-one of these 103 ships were destroyed.7
The SS Gairsoppa’s final voyage started in Calcutta, India in
December 1940, where the vessel was loaded with what was thought
to be £500,0008(about $1,980,200)9 of silver ingots along with tons of
other general cargo.10 The Gairsoppa joined the merchant convoy SL
64 off the coast of West Africa, and headed to Liverpool.11 The
convoy slowed to 8 knots (9.2 mph)12 due to the poor condition of
the ships, and was unable to connect with escort warships as the
convoy entered dangerous Atlantic waters off of the western coast of
Africa.13 Matters became bleaker as the Gairsoppa reached northern
Id.
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7 Id.
8 Lloyd’s of London Press, LLOYD’S WAR LOSSES: THE SECOND WORLD
WAR, 190, (Sep. 3, 1939 - Aug. 14, 1945, vol. 1).
9
See Tables of Historical Exchange Rates to the United States Dollar,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tables_of_historical_exchange_rates_to_the_United
_States_dollar (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (which provides the historical exchange
rate of the pound to dollar in 1940. $1,980,200 1940 dollars would be worth
approximately $33,080,231.10 today based on an inflation estimate provided by the
Bureau
of
Labor
Statistics
available
at
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).
10 SS
Gairsoppa,
CONVOY
WEB,
http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/sl/mem/64_1.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
11 SS Gairsoppa Historical Overview, supra note 1.
12 See
Calculator
and
Unit
Converter,
GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/search?q=8+knots+to+mph&rlz=1C1CHFX_enUS519
US519&oq=8+knots+to+mph&aqs=chrome..69i57j0.6016j0j7&sourceid=chrome
&espv=210&es_sm=93&ie=UTF-8 (last viewed Oct. 21, 2013).
13 SS Gairsoppa Historical Overview, supra note 1.
3
4
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latitudes. The vessel lost touch with the convoy due to high wind
speeds, ocean swells, and insufficient fuel.14
On February 17, 1941, German Captain Ernst Mengersen’s
U-boat, which was responsible for sinking over 70,000 tons of cargo
during the war, torpedoed the Gairsoppa.15 The torpedo triggered an
explosion which destroyed communications, and with no distress call
sent, the Gairsoppa sank into the North Atlantic and became a grave
for all the men on board except for one.16
B. Contract for Salvage
The British House of Commons originally tendered the
salvage of the Gairsoppa in 1989 after adopting a policy of publically
offering salvage contracts for government-owned wrecks and
cargoes.17 The policy attempted to obtain the best return on
investment for the taxpayers financing the salvages, but failed to
receive adequate interest.18 The initial tendering only received one bid
from Deepwater Recovery and Exploration, which was not
pursued.19
The salvage was revisited in January of 2010, when the
United Kingdom Government Department for Transport awarded
the salvage contract to Odyssey.20 The competitive process used blind
bids received by the Government to establish how much of the
known, insured silver would be retained by the salvage companies as

Id.
Id.
16
Id.
17
Parliamentary Business – Publications & Records: Written Answers November
15,
1989
Column
257,
PARLIAMENT.UK,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm198889/cmhansrd/1989-1115/Writtens-2.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
UK Government Awards Exclusive Salvage Contract to Odyssey Marine
Exploration for Recovery of SS Gairsoppa Silver Cargo, ODYSSEY MARINE
EXPLORATION, http://shipwreck.net/pr195.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2013)
[hereinafter Exclusive Salvage Contract].
14
15
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compensation.21 The Government received three bids, and accepted
Odyssey’s bid.22
The contract for the salvage was based on “standard
commercial practices,” and called for:
Odyssey [to] assume the risk, expense, and
responsibility for the search, cargo recovery,
documentation, and marketing of the cargo. If the
salvage is successful, Odyssey will be compensated
with a salvage award which consists of a majority of
the net value of the recovered cargo after deduction
of expenses of search and salvage.23
The contract allowed Odyssey to retain 80% of the salvaged
silver’s value after recouping exploration costs.24 Simply put, the
United Kingdom would subtract the exploration cost from the total
value of the salvaged silver, and then retain only 20% of that figure.
This contract was extremely lucrative for Odyssey; based on the
estimated value of the insured silver, Odyssey stood to earn forty-five
million dollars.
Odyssey expected the exploration to take ninety days,25 but it
proved more difficult when the Gairsoppa was not found within the
original search location.26 Odyssey located the Gairsoppa in 201127
approximately 4700 meters (approximately three miles) below sea
level in international waters nearly 300 miles off the coast of
Id.
Parliamentary Business – Publications & Records: Written Answers October
31,
2011
Column
419W,
PARLIAMENT.UK,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111031/text
/111031w0002.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
23
Exclusive Salvage Contract, supra note 20.
24
SS Gairsoppa Operational Overview, ODYSSEY MARINE EXPLORATION,
http://www.shipwreck.net/ssgairsoppaoperationaloverview.php (last visited Oct.
17, 2013) [hereinafter SS Gairsoppa Operational Overview].
25
Exclusive Salvage Contract, supra note 20.
26
SS Gairsoppa Operational Overview, supra note 24.
27
Kerry Sanders & Lauren Sullivan, $77M Sunken Treasure Found at
Bottom of Atlantic, TODAY NEWS, (July 23, 2013, 11:48 AM),
http://www.today.com/news/77m-sunken-treasure-found-bottom-atlantic6C10714149.
21

22
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Ireland.28 While finding the vessel was a major hurdle, it did not
ensure that the precious silver cargo would be located.29 In fact,
Odyssey did not recover the first bar of silver until the following year,
on July 18, 2012.30 The summer 2012 operations yielded 1,218 bars of
silver (approximately 48 tons); the summer 2013 operations yielded
an additional 1,574 bars (approximately 61 tons).31 In total, the
salvage operation recovered 99% of the insured silver aboard the
Gairsoppa, which amounted to 110 tons of silver (approximately 3.2
million troy ounces).32
Odyssey turned over the salvaged silver to JBR Recovery
Limited, a leading European broker, for sale.33 The estimated value
was seventy-seven million dollars, and the cost of exploration was
twenty million dollars.34 Out of the fifty-seven million dollar net total,
Odyssey will receive about 45.6 million dollars and the United
Kingdom will receive the remaining 11.4 million dollars worth of
silver.
III. COMPARISON OF CONTROLLING LAW
A. Traditional Maritime Law of Salvage and Finds
International common law tradition maintains two controlling
doctrines that concern historic shipwreck salvage: salvage law and the
law of finds. Salvaging a historic shipwreck, or any vessel in distress,
requires technical expertise to conquer the high level of risk and
danger involved.35 Generally, the primary motivation of salvage
operations is the compensation received for the task, which normally

SS Gairsoppa Operational Overview, supra note 24.
Sanders, supra note 27.
30
SS Gairsoppa Operational Overview, supra note 24.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Sanders, supra note 27.
35
CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF
CULTURAL HERITAGE, 307-08 (2010) [hereinafter International Law].
28
29
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is a percentage of the salvaged property’s value.36 The common law
of salvage incentivizes individuals to assume the risk associated with
the operations in order to rescue ships, their cargo, and their sailors.37
Salvage law applies to ships that have been abandoned,
derelict, or shipwrecked.38 Salvage operations must demonstrate four
conditions: (1) the property must be in marine peril;39 (2) the salvor
must attempt the operation voluntarily; (3) the operation must be in
the interest of the owner; and (4) the salvor must be at least partially
successful in recovering the property.40 While the salvor may be
completely or partially motivated by the salvage reward, the salvor
may not be under any duty to rescue the salvage vessel.41
Under salvage law, it is presumed that the owner has not
abandoned his interest in the vessel or its cargo.42 Without
abandonment, the salvor cannot gain title over the recovered
property and is only entitled to the salvage reward.43 To receive the
salvage reward, the salvor must file a motion with the controlling
admiralty/maritime court.44 Most often the reward is a percentage
basis of the property recovered. The percentage awarded varies
depending on the salvage operation’s level of risk, cost, and skill.45 If
the owner refuses or is unable to pay the reward, the salvor can
receive a maritime lien on the property.46
On the other hand, if the vessel or property is abandoned, the
law of finds controls.47 A majority of historic shipwrecks are

Id.
Id. at 288.
38
Id. at 300.
39
The term “marine peril” is ordinarily understood to mean that a
vessel is at risk of sinking, losing its cargo, or otherwise in danger from rough seas
or other forces which might compromise its seaworthiness. International Law, supra
note 35, at 300.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 304.
42
Id. at 309.
43
Id.
44
International Law, supra note 35, at 307.
45
Id. at 309.
46
Id. at 311-12.
47
Id. at 310.
36
37
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presumed abandoned.48 A key exception of sovereign immunity
applies to vessels like warships.49 The law of finds allows for the
salvor to retain full title over the salvaged property.50 The salvor is
entitled to the property based on the assumption that “the property
involved either was never owned or was abandoned.”51
Courts decide whether salvage law or the law of finds
applies.52 The determination is fact specific, but courts tend to apply
the law of finds to historic shipwrecks.53 This tendency results from
the fact that the majority of wrecks go unsalvaged for decades if not
centuries, regardless of the owners actual intent to abandon the
wreck.54
B. International Salvage Law Conventions
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. - The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)55 aimed at
addressing navigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic
jurisdiction, legal status of resources on the seabed, passage of ships,
conservation and management of living marine resources, protection
of the marine environment, a marine research regime, and setting a
binding procedure for dispute settlement between States.56 UNCLOS
addresses historical shipwrecks in articles 149 and 303.57 It is not
Id.
See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS] art. 42(5), 236
(recognizing that sovereign vessels like warships are entitled to immunity from the
conventions laws, this is a traditional principle of international law).
50
Id. at 310.
51
Valentina Sara Wadi, Investing in Culture: Underwater Cultural Heritage and
International Investment Law, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 853, 870 (2009) (citing
Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
52
Wadi, supra note 51, at 870 - 71.
53
Id. at 871.
54
Id.
55
UNCLOS, supra note 49.
56
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective),
OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_per
spective.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) [hereinafter UNCLOS Historical Perspective].
57
UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 149, 303.
48
49
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surprising given the major concerns of UNCLOS that the
Convention only tangentially addresses historical shipwrecks.
However, these articles do represent substantive international law
that has been applied to historical salvage sites.58
Article 149 is included within Part XI of UNCLOS titled
“The Area,”59 and primarily addresses the deep-sea mining rights in
customary international waters.60 The article reads:
All objects of an archaeological and historical nature
found in the Area shall be preserved or disposed of
for the benefit of mankind as a whole, particular
regard being paid to the preferential rights of the State
or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or
the State of historical and archaeological origin.61
The article encompasses historical shipwrecks without
mentioning the term in its broad phrase “all objects of an
archaeological and historical nature.” Many commenters have
criticized the language as over-inclusive, and a “political tactic” by
states that wished to advance the recognition of general cultural
heritage rights.62 Regardless of the reason for the article’s inclusion,
subsequent interpretations have yielded disparate meanings.
One of the main issues left unresolved by Article 149 is how
to “preserve[] or dispose[] of” historical objects.63 The ambiguity of
the phrase and lack of clarification leaves salvors no clear guidance.
Preserving an object has been interpreted as meaning both leaving

58
Craig Forest, Historic Wreck Salvage: An International Perspective, 33 TUL.
MAR. L. J. 347, 368 (2009).
59
UNCLOS, supra note 49, at Part XI.
60
See generally id. at Part XI (which details, through the multiple articles
in the section, the duties owned to States concerning resources in the area. The
convention defines “area” to mean “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” in article 1).
61
Id. at art. 149.
62
Anastasia Strati, THE PROTECTION OF THE UNDERWATER CULTURAL
HERITAGE: AN EMERGING OBJECTIVE OF THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA
310 (1995).
63
Forest, supra note 58, at 369.
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the item “in situ,”64 and, conversely, placing the object in a museum
for display.65
Another issue with interpreting the article is what
“preferential rights” should be given to which State.66 UNCLOS
refers to rights of “State or country of origin,” as well as, “State of
cultural origin” and “State of historical and archaeological origin.”67
While analogous in many situations, UNCLOS never explicitly
defines the terms. Further, UNCLOS’s negotiations used the terms as
synonyms, but all were left in the article, implying differing meanings
to the terms.68
Article 303 furthers the protections for underwater cultural
heritage and is included in Part XVI of UNCLOS titled “General
Provisions,”69 and Part XVI addresses general rights applicable to all
zones discussed in UNCLOS. Article 303 provides:
1. States have the duty to protect objects of an
archaeological and historical nature found at sea and
shall cooperate for this purpose.
2. In order to control traffic in such objects, the
coastal State may, in applying article 33, presume that
their removal from the seabed in the zone referred to
in that article without its approval would result in an
infringement within its territory or territorial sea of
the laws and regulations referred to in that article.
3. Nothing in this article affects the rights of
identifiable owners, the law of salvage or other rules

64
In situ is a Latin phrase meaning in the natural or original position or
place. In situ Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/insitu (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). In the context of the
Convention, it refers to leaving a shipwreck in its present resting place on the ocean
floor.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 149.
68
Forest, supra note 58, at 369.
69
UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 303, Part XVI.
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of admiralty, or laws and practices with respect to
cultural exchanges.
4. This article is without prejudice to other
international agreements and rules of international
law regarding the protection of objects of an
archaeological and historical nature.70
At first glance, Article 303 seems to restate the general duty
of the State “to protect objects of an archaeological and historical
nature found at sea.”71 Article 303, Sections 2 and 3 set the
controlling law for historical salvage. Under Article 303(2), States
with any historical wrecks found within the contiguous zone have full
jurisdictional control over the salvage.72 In Article 303(3), UNCLOS
seems to concede that traditional laws of salvage apply.73 UNCLOS
did not intend this to be the case, as demonstrated by the language of
303(4). The Article carves out a provision to “harmonize the rules of
the law of the sea” with the “emerging law of archaeology and
cultural heritage.”74 This exception to Article 303’s applicability paved
the way for both the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”),
1989 International Convention on Salvage Law, and the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(“UNESCO”), Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention (“UCH”),
which are comprehensive conventions on historical salvage law.75
UNCLOS was never intended to be controlling law for
historical salvages, and Articles 149 and 303 are unsurprisingly
vague.76 However, the treaty is substantive international law and
created a clear carve out for controlling salvage law treaties.
2. IMO 1989 International Convention on Salvage Law. - The main
purpose of general salvage law is to “encourag[e] the rescue of
UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 303.
Id.
72
Id.; see also UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 33 (contiguous zone can
extend twenty-four miles from the state’s coastal baselines that determine its
territorial sea).
73
UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 303.
74
Forest, supra note 58, at 370.
75
Id.
76
Id.
70
71
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endangered property at sea, and, importantly, protect[] the marine
environment from pollution [of] ships.”77 In 1989, the IMO passed a
comprehensive convention to update international salvage law.78 The
IMO convention replaced the law of salvage adopted in Brussels
1910, which centered around the “no cure, no pay”79 principle.80 The
IMO convention incentivizes environmental protection during
salvage where the “no cure, no pay” regime did not, by providing a
“special compensation” award for minimizing damage to the
environment.81
The IMO convention does not define “vessel” to include or
exclude historical shipwrecks, but historic shipwrecks and their cargo
are included within its definition of “property.”82 The definition is
broad and applies to “any property in danger” that is “not
permanently and intentionally attached to the shoreline and includes
freight at risk.”83
While not apparent from the text’s plain meaning, the
expansive definition of property was understood by the drafters to
include historical salvage. During the negotiations surrounding the
convention, the German diplomat attempted to introduce an
amendment that would have directly addressed sunken ships.84
Conversely, the Argentinean diplomat proposed an amendment that

Id.
International Convention on Salvage, Apr. 4, 1989, 1953 U.N.T.S.
165 (1989) [hereinafter IMO].
79
“No cure, no pay” is a principle that requires a “useful result” for a
salvage award; in the absence of a useful result, there is no payment. A “useful
result” is when property of value is saved. Property includes the vessel, cargo, or
life. See Nicholas J. Gaskell, The 1989 Salvage Convention and the Lloyd’s Open Form
(LOF) Salvage Agreement 1990, 16 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 49-50 (1991).
80
International Convention on Salvage, INT’L MAR. ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Internation
al-Convention-on-Salvage.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
81
Id.
82
IMO, supra note 78, at art. 1 (The convention defines vessel to mean:
any ship or craft, or any structure capable of navigation; and defines property to
mean: any property not permanently and intentionally attached to the shoreline and
includes freight at risk).
83
IMO, supra note 78, at art. 1.
84
Gaskell, supra note 79, at 35 (1991).
77
78
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would have excluded sunken vessels from the convention.85 Without
the adoption of either amendment, historical shipwrecks or any
sunken vessel became property under Article 1(c).86 Further, Article
30(1)(d) permits States to exempt “maritime cultural property of
prehistoric, archaeological or historic interest” from the convention’s
provisions.87 The reservation’s implication is clear: if member States
do not explicitly state the convention does not apply to its historical
sunken shipwrecks, then the convention will apply to any salvage
operations on these wrecks.88
Before the IMO convention came into force, U.S. courts
often held general maritime salvage law applied to historic
shipwrecks.89 The distinction between general maritime law and the
IMO convention is important because general maritime law does not
apply to abandoned shipwrecks.90 Prior to the IMO convention,
abandoned shipwrecks were controlled by the “harsh, primitive, and
inflexible” common law of finds, which expressed “the ancient and
honorable principle of ‘finders, keepers.’”91 The IMO convention
makes no distinctions for “abandoned” property. Thus, the law of
finds never applies in jurisdictions employing the IMO convention.92
Without the exclusion, the application of the IMO to historic
shipwrecks falls well within the requirements of “any property in
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 36-37.
87
IMO, supra note 78, at art. 30; Martin Davies, Whatever Happened to the
Salvage Convention 1989?, 39 J. MAR. L. & COM. 463, 483 (2008).
88
Davies, supra note 87, at 483.
89
See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978); and Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v.
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing vessel, 549 F.Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla.
1982)(holding that historical vessels being salvaged are governed by the “general
maritime law of salvage applied to the retrieval of property from shipwrecks”).
90
Davies, supra note 87, at 483.
91
An abandoned shipwreck is any wreck that has not been salvaged
within a certain common law period of time. The time period ranges depending on
the jurisdiction of the wreck and any controlling national or international laws. See
Hener v. U.S., 525 F.Supp. 350, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding general maritime
salvage law was “harsh, primitive and inflexible”); Martha’s Vineyard Scuba
Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833
F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding the basic operating values of common
salvage law to be “finders, keepers”).
92
Davies, supra note 87, at 483.
85
86
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danger” that is “not permanently and intentionally attached to the
shoreline and includes freight at risk.”93
Due to its language, the IMO convention includes historic
salvage operations; the application of the IMO convention to historic
vessels poses problems. Even if courts would favor the application of
the IMO convention over the common law of finds, the purpose of
the IMO convention is to provide the salvor with payment from the
owner of the salvaged property.94 Without knowledge of the owner
of the historic shipwreck, the IMO convention does not provide
clear authority on ownership of the property.95 The IMO convention
in Article 12(1) provides that a successful salvage operation “give[s]
the right to reward,”96 but the IMO convention does not detail the
procedure to follow if the owner is unknown. The IMO convention
does not state the reward must be monetary, and one could argue
that payment could be the salvaged property, but there is no clear
authority to establish that argument.97
While the IMO convention does not provide clear
international law for historic shipwrecks, it does provide differing
incentives from UNCLOS. The IMO convention introduced major
reform to international salvage law, especially considering the
incentives for protection of the marine environment.98 Due to the
problematic language of the IMO convention regarding historic
vessels, it has not seen widespread adoption by States as governing
law for historic wrecks.99
3. UNESCO UCH Convention. - The thirty-first United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(“UNESCO”) adopted the Convention on the Protection of the
Underwater Cultural Heritage100 (“UCH Convention”) in November
IMO, supra note 78, at art. 1.
Davies, supra note 87, at 484.
95
Id.
96
IMO, supra note 78, at art. 12(1).
97
Davies, supra note 87, at 484.
98
Forest, supra note 58, at 371.
99
Id.
100
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage,
Nov. 2, 2001, UNESCO Doc.31C/Resolution 24 (2002) [hereinafter “UCH
Convention”].
93
94
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2001.101 The UCH Convention attempts to provide protection to
States with underwater cultural heritage (“UCH”)102 by clarifying the
ambiguity surrounding the legal status of historic shipwrecks.103 The
protection, preservation, and proper display of UCH advance
UNESCO’s core value of educating the world public.104
The UCH Convention built upon UNCLOS to develop a
comprehensive convention to govern historic shipwreck salvage and
protection.105 The UCH Convention began as an International Law
Association’s (“ILA”)106 draft convention in 1994.107 The draft
convention included an annex, which set out the benchmark
standards for underwater archaeology, and prohibited the
commercialization of historic shipwreck salvage operations.108 The
draft convention went as far as to prohibit the application of salvage
law to historic shipwrecks.109 The draft convention was submitted to
UNESCO for adoption, where the inclusion of salvage law and noncommercialization clauses were heavily debated.110
The preamble of the UCH Convention explicitly
acknowledges “the importance of underwater cultural heritage as an
101
Protecting Underwater Heritage From Treasure Hunters, UNESCO
GENERAL CONFERENCE,
http://www.unesco.org/confgen/press_rel/291001_subaqua.shtml (last visited
Oct. 17, 2013) [hereinafter “Protecting UCH”].
102
UCH is a term created by the drafters of the Convention. Generally,
under the Convention, UCH “encompasses all traces of human existence that lie or
were lying under water and have a cultural or historical character.” Safeguarding the
Underwater Cultural Heritage, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/themes/underwater-culturalheritage/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
103
Protecting UCH, supra note 101.
104
About the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage,
UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/underwater-culturalheritage/2001-convention/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter “About UCH”].
105
Forest, supra note 58, at 372.
106
Founded in 1873, the International Law Association is a private nongovernmental organization of persons interested in international law. About Us,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, http://www.ilahq.org/en/about_us/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
107
Forest, supra note 58, at 372.
108
Id. at 373.
109
Id.
110
Id.
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integral part of the cultural heritage of humanity” and admits the
UCH is “deeply concerned by the increasing commercial exploitation
of underwater cultural heritage, and in particular by certain activities
aimed at the sale, acquisition or barter of underwater cultural
heritage.”111 Further, “the public’s right to enjoy the educational and
recreational benefits of responsible nonintrusive access to in situ
underwater cultural heritage” was a major factor.112 Lastly, the UCH
Convention expresses concern with the current legal framework of
historic salvage by acknowledging “the need to codify and
progressively develop rules relating to the protection and
preservation of underwater cultural heritage in conformity with
international law and practice.”113
Opposition to UCH convention’s application of salvage law
to historic shipwrecks is best summarized by the commentary to the
ILA draft convention114:
[T]he law of salvage relates solely to the recovery of
items endangered by the sea; it has no application to
saving relics on land. For underwater cultural heritage,
the danger has passed; either a vessel has sunk or an
object has been lost overboard. Indeed, the heritage
may be in greater danger from salvage operations than
from being allowed to remain where it is. . .The major
problem is that salvage is motivated by economic
considerations; the salvor is often seeking items of
value as fast as possible rather than undertaking the
painstaking excavation and treatment of all aspects of
the site that is necessary to preserve its historic
value.115

UCH Convention, supra note 100, at 1.
UCH Convention, supra note 100, at 1.
113
Id.
114
Forest, supra note 58, at 373.
115
Id., citing Patrick J. O’Keefe & James A.R. Nafziger, The Draft
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L
L. 391, 404 (1994).
111
112
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This argument is reiterated by many commenters116 and was
stated multiple times in the negotiations of the convention.117 The
UCH convention codifies this argument in “Article 4 – Relationship
to law of salvage and law of finds”118 stating that “activity relating to
[UCH] shall not be subject to the law of finds.”119
The broad prohibition against salvage law application is
subject to an exception. The exception stems from developed States
expressing concerns over the limiting of sovereign power of States to
engage in commercial and cultural transactions.120 Salvage law can be
applied when “authorized by the competent authorities” to the extent
salvage law conforms to the UCH Convention and “ensures [the]
recovery of the [UCH] achieves its maximum protection.”121

See Forest, supra note 58, at 373; O’Keefe, supra note 116, at 404;
Strati, supra note 63 at 300; Luigi Migliorino, In Situ Protection of the Underwater
Cultural Heritage Under International Treaties and National Legislation, 10 INT’L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 486 (1995); Janet Blake, The Protection of the Underwater
Cultural Heritage, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 819-43 (1996); Bruce E. Alexander,
Treasure Salvage Beyond the Territorial Sea: An Assessment and Recommendations, 20 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 7-8 (1989).
117
Forest, supra note 58, at 373, citing Roberta Garabello, The
Negotiating History of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater
Cultural Heritage, in The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Before
and After the 2001 UNESCO Convention, 89, 123-3, (Roberta Garabello & Tullio
Scovazzi eds., 2003).
118
Article 4 reads:
“Relationship to law of salvage and law of finds
116

Any activity relating to underwater cultural heritage to which this
Convention applies
shall not be subject to the law of salvage or law of finds, unless
it:
(a) is authorized by the competent authorities, and
(b) is in full conformity with this Convention, and
(c) ensures that any recovery of the underwater cultural heritage
achieves its maximum protection.”
UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 4.
119
UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 4.
120
Garabello, supra note 117, at 123-25.
121
UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 4.
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The prohibition against applying salvage law to UCH
supports the UCH Convention’s main purpose of banning
commercial exploitation of UCH.122 The Annex of the UCH
Convention describes commercial exploitation as “fundamentally
incompatible with the protection and proper management of
underwater cultural heritage.”123 The Annex allows for the recovery
and deposition of UCH by “professional archaeological services” for
the purpose of a “research project.”124 Further, the UCH convention
states that in situ preservation is the preferred option when a
historical shipwreck is discovered.125 In situ not only preserves
archaeological investigation that can occur before the site is
disturbed,126 but also serves to freeze commercial incentives for
salvage. Commercial salvors often seek items of value as fast as
possible rather than undertaking the painstaking excavation and
treatment of all aspects of the site that is necessary to preserve its
historic value.127
The scope and jurisdiction of the UCH Convention are quite
broad. The definition of UCH, according to the convention, includes
“all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or
archaeological character which have been partially or totally
underwater, periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years.”128
Hundred-year-old, historic shipwrecks are included in this
definition.129 The jurisdiction of the UCH convention is slightly more
limited than UNCLOS or the IMO convention. The jurisdiction
extends to all international waters, which are also controlled by
UNCLOS or the IMO convention, but allows coastal States complete

Id. at art. 2(7).
Id. at Annex, I. General Principles, R. 2.
124
Id.
125
Id. at art. 2 para. 5.
126
Forest, supra note 58, at 368.
127
Jeremy Neil, Note & Case Comment, Sifting Through the Wreckage: An
Analysis and Proposed Resolution Concerning the Disposition of Historic Shipwrecks Located in
International Waters, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 895, 911 (2010/2011).
128
UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 1 para. 1(a).
129
The definition continues to outline specific items intended to fall
under the UCH Convention’s protection: “vessels, aircraft, other vehicles or any
part thereof, their cargo or other contents, together with their archaeological and
natural context.” UCH Convention, supra note 100, at 1 para. 1(a)(ii).
122
123
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sovereignty within territorial waters as outlined by UNCLOS or the
IMO convention.130
C. Economic Incentives
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. - The main
problem plaguing the development of salvage law is the struggle
between providing economic incentives to motivate would-be
salvors, and preserving the archeological value of historic
shipwrecks.131 UNCLOS, in broad terms, imposes duties on would-be
salvors to “protect objects of an archaeological and historical
nature,”132 and gain the approval of the “coastal State” for removal of
objects.133 Even within the comprehensive framework of UNCLOS,
salvors must remain cognizant of the interaction of traditional salvage
law and the law of finds.134 Due to the lack of treaty language
regarding historic shipwrecks, UNCLOS’s economic incentives flow
from traditional salvage law and, more importantly, the law of
finds.135 The law of finds allows for full possession of the wreck once
the salvager makes an affirmative effort to take possession of the
wreck.136
While providing salvors with title to salvaged objects, the law
of finds provides limited economic incentives.137 The incentive to
salvage historic shipwrecks under UNCLOS and the law of finds is
limited to the estimated value of items aboard the vessels, but this
fails to recognize any intrinsic value of the wrecks.138 The majority of
national governments and archaeologists expressly disfavor the
application of the law of finds, and salvage law, generally, to historic
shipwrecks.139 The disfavor stems from the law’s nature to overlook
UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 7, para. 1.
Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, Murky Waters: The Law and
Economics of Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 295 (2006).
132
UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 303(1) (emphasis added).
133
Id. at art. 303(2).
134
Id. at art. 303(3).
135
Hallwood, supra note 131, at 295, 293.
136
Id. at 293.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Neil, supra note 127, at 904.
130
131
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the archaeological value contained in the shipwreck and surrounding
area.140 It is not unusual for salvors of historic shipwrecks to be
referred to as pirates, looters, and thieves for their role in removing
artifacts from sites merely for profit without regard for their historic
significance.141
The primary economic driver for the salvage of historic
shipwrecks under UNCLOS is the value of items aboard the vessels
due to the law of finds providing title.142 Salvors under UNCLOS
must “protect” the items they salvage from historic shipwrecks.143
However, many archaeologists would argue that removing items
from their current location on the seafloor is not protecting them.144
The fact that the items are submerged, and removed from the
presence of oxygen slows the deterioration process.145 Even the most
careful salvages disturb the delicate ecosystems of historic shipwreck
sites and threaten the site’s archaeological value.146
On the other hand salvors argue that without the salvage of
historic shipwrecks, sites offer little value and are in danger of
complete destruction from other human activity and natural
disasters.147 Salvors defend their position by stating that human
actions, like fishing trawlers and plastic waste,148 combined with
natural disasters, like hurricanes and earthquakes, effectively destroy
the archaeological content of these sites and cause the loss of

Id.
See, e.g., David J. Bederman, The UNESCO Draft Convention on
Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Critique and Counter-Proposal, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM.
331, 343 (observing that the International Law Association views salvors as
“looters” and “destroyers of our past”).
142
Hallwood, supra note 131, at 295, 293.
143
UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 303(1).
144
Ole Varmer, The Case Against the “Salvage” of Cultural Heritage, 30 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 279, 280 (1999).
145
Varmer, supra note 144, at 280.
146
Id. at 280-81.
147
Neil, supra note 127, at 905.
148
Cahal Milmo, Why is There a Storm Brewing Over the Right to Plunder
Shipwrecks?, THE INDEPENDENT (UK), June 9, 2009,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/why-is-there-a-stormbrewing-over-the-right-to-plunder-shipwrecks-1700207.html.
140
141
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countless artifacts.149 Further, many commercial salvage companies
employ a team of archaeologists to maintain high compliance
standards during the salvage.150 For example, Odyssey employs a
team of archaeologists whose goals are to maintain compliance with
community standards, preserve the history associated with recovered
cultural relics, and fully document all artifacts that are recovered
before they are passed on to museums and collectors.151
2. IMO 1989 International Convention on Salvage Law. - As
discussed above, the IMO convention was not explicitly written to
control the salvage of historic shipwrecks. However, the UCH
convention excludes any sunken vessels less than one hundred years
old.152 This carves out an area of historic vessels that have been on
the seafloor for less than one hundred years. This means that the
recovery of vessels from WWII is not controlled by the UCH
convention, but instead by the IMO convention. The incentives to
salvage these vessels, like the SS Gairsoppa, operate similar to
restitution.153
Restitution operates under the assumption that a person
enriched by the actions of another should be liable to pay for the
enrichment.154 This restitutionary payment is the driver for the
salvage reward recognized under the IMO convention, in that the
salvage must have a “useful result”155 to be entitled to the reward.156
Additionally, the restitutionary value of the reward is enhanced by
several other motivators. Courts routinely increase the salvage
149
Chris Southerly et al., N.C. OFFICE OF STATE ARCHEOLOGY, FALL
2006 RECOVERY PLAN FOR NORTH CAROLINA ARCHAEOLOGY SHIPWRECK SITE
31CR314, 1 (2006).
150
See, e.g., A Commitment to Archaeology, ODYSSEY MARINE
EXPLORATION, http://www.shipwreck.net/archaeology.php (last visited Dec. 24,
2013) (provides the specific steps Odyssey undertakes to protect the artifacts it
recovers).
151
Id.
152
UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 1 para. 1(a).
153
See Catherine Swan, The Restitutionary and Economic Analyses of Salvage
Law, 23 A & NZ MAR. L. J. 99, 104-06 (2008) (details the history of salvage law and
its shared restitutionary goals).
154
Swan, supra note 153, at 105-06.
155
See supra note 79 (defines a “useful result” to be when property of
value is saved. Property includes the vessel, cargo, or life.)
156
Swan, supra note 153, at 106.
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rewards for maintaining salvage vessels on standby,157 and
successfully protecting the environment.158
The IMO convention’s salvage rewards differ from a purely
restitutionary reward for services rendered.159 The reward serves three
main purposes: compensation for the work done, reimbursement for
the expenses incurred, and a reward to promote the public policy of
salvage.160 The reward’s purpose does not align with a restitutionary
model, and is quite often a purely discretionary amount determined
by the court.161
The salvage reward can also be compared to a model of
contingent payment.162 The contingent model, elaborated on by
William Landes and Judge Richard Posner, predates the adoption of
the IMO convention. The model states that as the probability for
successful recovery increases, the ensuing reward should decrease.163
This is reflected in the criteria used to determine the salvage rewards
listed in Article 13 of the IMO convention.164 As the degree of
success rises in the salvage, the weight of the factors decreases, and
so does the salvage reward. Thus, while the IMO convention’s
salvage reward is primarily a restitutionary payment on its face, the
factors used to determine the reward align with a contingent payment
model.

Id.
IMO, supra note 78.
159
Swan, supra note 153, at 106.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, ‘Salvors, Finders, Good
Samaritans, and Other Rescuers’, 7 J. L. STUD. 83, 100-103 (1978).
163
Landes, supra note 162, at 101.
164
IMO, supra note 78, at art. 13 (the criteria include the salved value of
the vessel and other property, the skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or
minimizing damage to the environment, the measure of success obtained by the
salvor, the nature and degree of the danger, the skill and efforts of the salvors in
salving the vessel, other property and life, the time used and expenses and losses
incurred by the salvors, the risk of liability and other risks run by the salvors or
their equipment, the promptness of the services rendered, the availability and use
of vessels or other equipment intended for salvage operations, and finally, the state
of readiness and efficiency of the salvor’s equipment and the value thereof).
157
158
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The contingent payment model is reinforced by the “special
compensation”165 given to salvors that protect the environment in
their salvage operations. The reward serves to promote
environmental protection in salvage operations, measures that were
routinely overlooked by previous regimes.166 This type of payment
does not fit into a restitutionary model, and instead serves to
promote public policy, in accordance with a contingent fee model.167
The payment reflects the balancing of proper economic incentives
against the increased cost of preventing environment damage during
salvage operations.168
3. UNESCO UCH Convention. - The UCH convention
features an almost complete lack of economic incentives. Unlike the
salvage title gained under traditional maritime law and UNCLOS, or
the salvage reward given under the IMO convention, the UCH
convention’s main provisions serve to ban the “commercial
exploitation”169 of historic shipwrecks. According to the convention,
the “commercial exploitation” of UCH is “deeply concerning”
especially considering the sale, acquisition or barter of UCH.170 By
declining to provide economic incentives for historic salvage, the
UCH seemingly abridges any reason to independently conduct these
types of operations.
The adoption of the UCH convention did not stop the search
for and salvage of historic vessels, but simply shifted the cost burden
from commercial salvors to the States’ with UCH sites.171 The UCH
convention requires that state parties “cooperate in the protection of
underwater cultural heritage,”172 “preserve underwater cultural
IMO, supra note 78, at art. 14 (“special compensation” is provided
when a salvage is carried out in such a way to protect the environment. The
compensation is equal 30% of the expenses incurred by the salvor).
166
Forest, supra note 58, at 371.
167
Swan, supra note 153, at 109.
168
Id.
169
UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 2(7).
170
Id. at 1. (“Deeply concerned by the increasing commercial
exploitation of underwater cultural
heritage, and in particular by certain activities aimed at the sale, acquisition or barter
of underwater cultural heritage.”)
171
Neil, supra note 127, at 911.
172
UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 2(2)
165
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heritage for the benefit of humanity,”173 and “take all appropriate
measures in conformity with this Convention and with international
law that are necessary to protect underwater cultural heritage.”174
These requirements assume States will regulate and control the
historic salvage market. Further, with the elimination of independent
economic incentives, the States now face the burden of motivating
commercial salvage companies to find and recover historic
shipwrecks.
The State controlled salvage market has seen a number of
such arrangements.175 Interstate agreements have been reached over
the CSS Alabama (France and United States), HMS Birkenhead (United
Kingdom and South Africa), HMS Erebus (United Kingdom and
Canada), HMS Terror (United Kingdom and Canada), Estonia
(Estonia, Finland, and Sweden), and the most notable historic
salvage, Titanic (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and
France).176 Odyssey has entered into several salvage agreements with
the United Kingdom which include the SS Gairsoppa, SS Mantola,
HMS Victory, and HMS Sussex.177 These agreements will undoubtedly
continue to increase as the market for commercial salvage adjusts.
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR COUNTRIES WITH HISTORICAL SALVAGE
SITES
The contracted salvage of the SS Gairsoppa should serve as a
model for states with historic shipwrecks. States with known sites or
states aware of vessels lost at sea should seek to enter into contracted
agreements for the exploration and salvage of these vessels. By
contracting the salvage of these vessels, states maintain significant
control over their cultural heritage while promoting the necessary
economic incentives for salvage operations. As outlined in the UCH
convention, these historic shipwrecks contain valuable insight into
historically significant events, as well as extraordinarily valuable
Id.
Id.; Neil, supra note 127, at 911.
175
Hallwood, supra note 131, at 296.
176
Id.
177
Shipwrecks, ODYSSEY MARINE EXPLORATION,
http://www.shipwreck.net/shipwrecks.php (last visited Dec. 24, 2013).
173
174
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metals and precious stones. The international legal regime shifted the
burden of incentivizing historic salvage to the state. Demonstrated by
the agreements between Odyssey and the United Kingdom,
contracted salvage motivates commercial salvage companies to
undertake these operations while protecting the archaeological value
of the sites.
The terms of the agreement need to be carefully considered
in order to properly protect the interests of both the country and the
commercial salvage company.178 The agreements should call for a
project plan that details the complete operation. The plan should
provide the government with detailed information of equipment,
people, techniques, and conservation methods to be used. The
agreement should detail the period for acceptance of the plan, and
any needed termination terms. Following approval, the commercial
salvage company should post a deposit sufficient to cover
governmental expenses to serve as collateral in case of insufficient
performance of the agreement. Additionally, the government may
want to include a term detailing how monitoring of the operation will
be accomplished, whether by government officials or company
certified reports.
The most important terms of the agreement are the
compensation parameters. As in the SS Gairsoppa’s salvage, a profit
sharing model should be employed. By sharing a percentage of
overall profits, the government incentives the commercial salvage
company to maximize gain during the operation. The agreement
should detail the exact percentages, as well as the calculations to
determine the profit.
Additionally, contracted salvage avoids the uncertainty that
litigation involves. By having the state and salvage company negotiate
for their interest, contracted salvage can find the optimal solution;
whereas, litigation often falls short. Litigation involves uncertainty in
178
My recommendation is modeled after the successful agreements
utilized by the United Kingdom and Odyssey; See Partnering Agreement
Memorandum Concerning the Shipwreck of the HMS Sussex, Between the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland &
Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. (Sept. 27, 2002), available at
http://shipwreck.net/pam (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
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the controlling law, substantial legal fees, delayed timing to reach a
decision, and unforeseeable results. Contracted salvage streamlines
the process by establishing a binding agreement for the interested
parties, and mitigates the litigation uncertainty. Salvage contracts
normally include dispute resolution terms. The terms often include
arbitration clauses that completely remove litigation risk.
States employing contracted salvage recognize the need to
provide adequate economic incentives for salvage operations while
protecting their UCH. These agreements foster commercial salvage
companies’ participation, while safeguarding the archaeological
interests in historic shipwrecks. Contracted historic salvage therefore
provides states with preferable results when the current international
regime obfuscates desired outcomes.
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